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For almost three decades, Eastern DRC has been going through a global crisis that today 
no one can describe in the right terms. Since the so-called war of liberation, the people, flora, and 
fauna of this part of the country have instead fallen into domination and predation that have 
swallowed up everything in its path. Tons of reports have been written, thousands of pages of 
reports have been transmitted, voices have been raised to cry out, documentaries, and all sorts of 
media have been used by human rights activists, religious leaders, enlightened politicians, 
national and international organizations to denounce what has today become a genocide, but all 
of that has been done in vain. When we surveyed national and international opinion, we were 
shocked to find that nearly 12 million souls – the numbers are frightening –have been snatched 
from life in unprecedented violence and brutality without frustrating the stewards of national and 
international politics. 
Men, women, children, and even fetuses were savagely massacred in a way that even the 
worst of the barbarians could not imagine. Mutilations, decapitations, skinning, suffocation, 
strangulation, burning and burying people alive, rape of men, women, children, and even babies, 
disemboweling of pregnant women, crushing of the skulls of newborns, the introduction of sharp 
or burning objects into the female genitalia, burial in mass graves, etc. We could go on and on 
citing the most horrific ways, one after the other, that so-called "human" beings have 
shamelessly used to not only kill bodies but also to kill souls over entire generations. Almost 
thirty years later, rivers of blood flow, the smell of rotting flesh can be smelled for miles around, 
corpses forced to remain anonymous and whose memories are being forgotten are scattered, 
without a dignified burial, over an area of 69,130 square kilometers, that is, twice the size of 
Belgium, two and a half times the size of Rwanda, almost the equivalent of Georgia, or the state 
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of West Virginia and Delaware combined (in the USA). Moreover, the number of deaths that 
these massacres represent, in almost thirty years, has exceeded the populations of countries like 
Burundi, Haiti, Tunisia, Bolivia, Benin, Belgium, Cuba, Portugal, Greece, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Libya, etc. Imagine if one of these countries was wiped off the world map. What horror, what 
wickedness one would say. And yet, there is a stony silence when such horror continues to be 
perpetuated in a country whose existence and value are known to all. 
The Congo is, after post-World War II Europe, the place in the modern world where the 
barbarity of human beings has reached proportions that are unheard of. And yet we do not talk 
about it. That is why we decided to start this work, driven by the awareness of the value of the 
dignity and sacredness of the human being, as well as nature and the need to fight for the poorest. 
Our goal is to initiate a restoration of the dignity of all those whose blood still cries out, to plead 
for justice to all those souls that still do not find rest due to suffering from the prejudices suffered 
and not repaired. We want to open the eyes of our readers and orient their conscience first to 
recognize the injustice of a war suffered by an innocent population in Eastern Congo, and then to 
consider the option of working for social justice and peace in Congo. To do this, the first chapter 
will present a panoramic view of the conflict in Eastern Congo by primarily situating the reader 
on the background of the conflict which is rooted in neighboring Rwanda, and on the main 
protagonists who fueled this conflict between 1996 and 2002.  
Then we will present in the second chapter the causes of this conflict. We have chosen 
three of them: the military errors of the intervention of the United Nations Forces in the Congo, 
the cracks in the formation of the Congolese government and the negligence of those in power, 
and finally the disintegration of the Congolese Army.  These first two chapters reveal a principle 
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in violence in the Congo: social justice. The restoration of forgotten memories will therefore 
require the restoration of social justice.  
This is the concern of our third chapter and the heart of our work. It will explore the 
notion of social justice in two stages: first in its theoretical aspect with the new paradigm that 
Nancy Fraser proposes to us, that of parity participation, and that of Pope Francis, integral 
ecology, universal communion, and social friendship. We will also briefly add the notion of the 
culture of encounter. Then will follow with offering moral recommendations to embody social 
justice in the action of the United Nations through MONUSCO, and in the action of the 
government and the Congolese army.  
This work aims to restore forgotten memories through a plea for a new approach to social 
justice, which is expressed in respect and remembrance of the dead, fraternal communion, 
integral ecology, and social friendship. This form of justice is only possible through the 
promotion of a culture of encounter that brings the international community, the Congolese 
government, and army, as well as the Congolese people and the armed gangs around the same 









CHAPTER I: JUST OR UNJUST WAR? ANATOMY OF A FORGOTTEN CONFLICT 
Introduction 
 The Congolese Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Dr. Denis Mukwege, said in his speech in 
Oslo: "It is not only the perpetrators of violence who are responsible for their crimes, but also 
those who choose to look the other way.”1 This statement reminds us of the responsibility of 
every human being for the events that affect the dignity and life of his fellow human beings. It 
reminds us that, unlike Cain (Gen 4:9); each one of us is the guardian of his neighbor, directly or 
indirectly, physically or morally, because we share the same and unique humanity. Nothing 
human should be alien to any human2, let alone anything that undermines and destroys this 
precious gift of God. And yet, we are almost saddened to see that in one corner of the world, the 
Eastern regions of Congo, humanity is being destroyed and scorned, raped and bruised, without 
this leading to a collective movement of indignation, denunciation, and action. We share this 
feeling of oblivion, this incomprehensible silence in the face of millions of people killed, raped, 
mutilated, separated from their families, or reduced to the state of slavery, with authors and 
human rights activists such as Charles Onana3, Patrick Mbeko4, Ambroise Bulambo Katambu5, 
and national and international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human 
                                                          
1 “The Nobel Peace Prize 2018,” NobelPrize.org, accessed February 9, 2021, 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2018/mukwege/55721-denis-mukwege-nobel-lecture-2/. 
2 I paraphrase here the Latin comic poet Terence (Publius Terentius Afer), born in Carthage around 190 BC and died 
in Rome around 159 BC. JC in his work Heautontimoroumenos, c. 77. He says: "Homo sum: humani nihil a me 
alienum puto". This formula will be taken up again in Catholic theology, and reformulated in the Pastoral 
Constitution Gaudium et Spes, 1: "the joys and hopes, the sorrows and anxieties of the men of this time, especially 
the poor and all those who suffer, are also the joys and hopes, the sorrows and anxieties of the followers of Christ, 
and there is nothing truly human that does not find an echo in their hearts" (Gaudium et Spes, 1). 
3 Charles ONANA, Ces tueurs Tutsis au cœur de la Tragédie Congolaise, Duboiris, 2009, 322p. (These Tutsi killers 
at the heart of the Congolese tragedy. (The translation is mine). 
4 Patrick Mbeko et Honore Nganbda, Stratégie du Chaos et du Mensonge, Erabliere, 2014. 
5 Ambroise Bulambo Katambu, Mourir au Kivu. Du Génocide des Tutsis aux massacres dans l’Est du Congo-RDC, 
Les Editions du Trottoir, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001. 
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Right Watch6, International Rescue Committee7, International Crisis Group8 , even the Congolese 
government through its Ministry of Human Rights,9 and  Congolese churches especially the 
catholic church. 
 Our repertoire would be incomplete if we do not mention the cries of the Catholic Church 
of the Congo, which has been calling for years for the awakening of the universal conscience on 
the drama of the Congo. Some would question our affirmation of silence given this non-
exhaustive list of works and reports on the situation in the Congo. We are aware that there are 
reports (one of the most detailed and which we will describe and use in this work is the Mapping 
Report), documentaries, workshops, and even resolutions of the United Nations Council on 
human rights violations in the Congo. However, we stand against the lethargy and inaction of 
those who have the power to resolve conflicts between peoples and are not doing anything 
substantial. Our indignation is that there are tons of writings but very little action on the ground.  
 In 1999, a year after the beginning of the "Second Congo War,” the Secretary General of 
the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stated that "the United Nations has no higher purpose, deeper 
commitment and greater ambition than the prevention of armed conflict.”10 Twenty-two years 
later, despite the colossal means deployed by the United Nations (one of the largest missions in 
the world)11 in the Congo, the number of deaths, displaced persons, people raped, mutilated, 
                                                          
6 Shout For Congo, The Greatest Silence: Rape in the Congo, 2020, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=MNq0WmW2nV0.  
7 International Rescue Committee (IRC), Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo, an Ongoing Crisis. See, 
https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/661/2006-7congomortalitysurvey.pdf  
8 International Crisis group, Katanga, The Congo’s Forgotten Crisis. See, 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/katanga-the-congo-s-forgotten-crisis.pdf  
9 Ministère des droits humains, Livre Blanc : La guerre d’agression en République Démocratique du Congo, trois 
ans de massacres et de Génocide « A huis Clos », Kinshasa, 2001. 
10 Kofi A. ANNAN, Eviter la guerre, prévenir les catastrophes : le monde mis au défi. Rapport annuel sur l’activité 
de l’organisation, New York : Nations Unies, 1999, 13. 




tortured, children enrolled in armed groups whose numbers have increased dramatically12 and 
armed conflicts have reached proportions that give the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) the 
second place on the chessboard of bloody conflicts in the 20th century after the Second World 
War.13  Indeed, these elements impel us to join our voice to those who are already speaking out 
against the horrors of the Eastern Congo conflict which seems to elude all the actors involved 
and whose population pays for the consequences with their lives every day.  
 It is important to underline here that the work herein focuses primarily on the armed 
conflicts in Eastern Congo, mainly in the Kivu region,14 which is the longest and most 
destabilizing conflict for the country. These two descriptions make it both complex and dynamic. 
We will give a global view of this subject by drawing upon the available literature that relates to 
it. Then we will turn our attention to Rwandan history and its relationship with Congo since 
1990. That will help us to understand the Congolese crisis.  Then we will explore some mass 
killings, those of Kasika and Makobola, which constitute the case studies of our work. The 
agents of these massacres will also be described.  Since the goal of our work is the restoration of 
forgotten memories with a focus on reconciliation and justice, we choose the cases that are very 
little known and seem to have been kept in the cupboards of nightmares, if not thrown into the 
                                                          
12 Researchers from the Congo Research Group counted 70 armed groups in December 2015. (Jason K. Stearns et 
Christoph Vogel, Cartographie des groupes armes dans l’Est du Congo, http://congoresearchgroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/GEC-Groupes-arme%CC%81s-en-RDC2.pdf. The International Crisis Group, in an article 
published in December 2019, spoke of more than 100 armed groups that are devastating the eastern part of Congo. ( 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/b148-new-approach-un-stabilise-dr-
congo  
13 Caritas, Six million dead in Congo’s war. https://www.caritas.org/2010/02/six-million-dead-in-congos-war/. This 
report released in 2010 needs to be updated. Unfortunately, no one keeps track of these deaths anymore and, 
everyone is content with the estimates. In an article published in 2018, Human Right Watch stated that this number 
of six million has already been exceeded. See, Human Right Watch, The Congolese Government at War with its 
People, April 18, 2018. (https://www.hrw.org/fr/blog-feed/la-rd-congo-en-crise) 
14 This precision is important because during the last 20 years, the country has experienced other armed conflicts, in 
the center and west. The Kamuena Nsapu group in Kasaï reported by Amnesty International 
(https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2018/07/the-stolen-childhoods-of-kasai-drc/) and The Red Cross 
International Comittee ( https://www.icrc.org/en/document/drc-conflict-food-children-farming-nutrition-survival-
kasai), the Bundu Dia Kongo conflict in the South West. 
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ocean of ignorance. These memoirs represent a sample of the millions of others forgotten, whose 
history will one day hold us accountable.  
1. Overview of the War in Eastern Congo15  
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims the right to life of every human 
being.16  However, this natural and immutable right seems to have lost its meaning in the Eastern 
DRC. This side of the country has become what Theodore Trefon identifies as a “forsaken black 
hole characterized by calamity, chaos, confusion and a bizarre form of cannibalism where 
society is its own prey.”17  
 This part of the work seeks to highlight the violation of this sacred principle of protecting 
and promoting life by exposing the history of a violent, unjust, and unfortunately unknown war 
at the international level because it did not benefit from the spotlight of the major media. In her 
article "Kivu: The Forgotten War," Marthe Bosuandole begins with this meaningful remark: 
"When asked to name a long-running war somewhere in the World, many people are likely to 
point to notorious hotspots such as Afghanistan or Syria. How many would name Kivu? Yet this 
                                                          
15 Here are some references for a better understanding of the historical and political situation of this region: David 
van Reybrouck, Congo: une histoire, 1. éd, Lettres néerlandaises (Arles: Actes Sud, 2012), Charles Onana, Ces 
tueurs Tutsis au cœur de la tragédie congolaise, Paris, Duboiris, 2009; Isidore Ndaywel, Histoire du Congo, des 
origines à nos jours, Bruxelles, Le Cri, 2013; Frank Piasecki Poulsen, Blood in the Mobile, Documentary, 
Denmark/Germany, Octobre 2011 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tv-hE4Yx0LU ); Jean francois Hugo, La 
République Démocratique du Congo, Une guerre Inconnue, Paris, Michalon, 2006; Yaa-Lengi M. Ngemi, Genocide 
in the Congo (Zaire). In Name of Bill Clinton, and of the Paris Club, and of the Mining Conglomerates, So It Is! , 
San Jose, Writers club Press, 2000; Theodore Trefon, Reinventing Order in the Congo. How People Respond to 
State Failure in Kinshasa, London, Zed Books, 2004; Pierre Englebert, Why Congo persists: Sovereignty, 
globalization and the violent reproduction of a weak state, Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper Series, Oxford, 
2003. 
16 "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person" says the declaration. 
17 Theodore Trefon, ed., Reinventing Order in Congo: How People Respond to State Failure in Kinshasa (London ; 
New York : Kampala, Uganda: Zed Books, ; Fountain Publishers, 2004), 1. 
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conflict in the heart of Africa ranks among the longest, bloodiest and potentially most dangerous 
wars in recent history."18   
This remark sounds like a challenge to us. Refusing to side with those who are complicit 
in keeping silent in the face of evil, we want to present, on a critical historical basis, the general 
situation of the Kivu conflict. To do so, we will limit our remarks to the period from 1996 to 
1998.19  We will exhume here the serious violations of human rights (mass rape, psychological 
trauma, systematic dehumanization, organized depopulation, epidemics, and diseases of all 
kinds).20 All this violence is accompanied by the destruction of the entire ecosystem, the 
plundering of soil and subsoil resources, water and air pollution, the extermination of certain rare 
species such as the Okapi, the Mountain Gorilla, the rhinoceros, etc.). However, to better 
understand all these events, it is necessary to revisit the political and diplomatic relations 
between Congo and Rwanda in the 80s and 90s. This background will be useful in understanding 
the Rwandan presence in the Congo and the massive human rights violations by elements of the 
Rwandan army. 
2. A background: The Intervention of the Zairian government in Rwandan politics  
 The background of the history of the murderous conflicts in Eastern Congo takes all its 
colors with the humanitarian apocalypse in Rwanda. Indeed, the repercussions of the sad history 
of the Rwandan genocide were one of the elements, if not the driving force, of the destabilization 
                                                          
18 Marthe Bosuandole, “Kivu: The Forgotten War”, in The M&G Online, Agence France-Presse, 26 Sept. 2018, 
mg.co.za/article/2018-09-26-kivu-the-forgotten-war   
19 Our terminus ad quo is the one corresponding to the first Congo war which started essentially in the East of the 
country and which is still going on today in disguised forms and by metamorphosed actors. As for the terminus ad 
quem, it refers to the war of aggression in the Congo, fueled by neighboring countries, supported by foreign powers 
and multinationals. 
20 Watch Mzee Laurent Désiré Kabila's speech on the aggressions in Congo. This speech was held at the Congolese 




and the triggering of the conflict that wiped out from earth more than 10 million people.            
We cannot, therefore, expand on the Congolese chaos without briefly outlining its Rwandan 
background. Trying to understand the conflict in Eastern Congo without questioning Rwanda's 
past and its relations with the Congo would be comparable to trying to shed light on the 
Rwandan genocide while remaining silent about the attack on the plane of Rwandan president 
Juvénal Habyarimana, his Burundian counterpart Cyprien Ntaryamira and their collaborators.21  
We will therefore present the correlation between the Zaire of Mobutu, the government of 
President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda, and the  Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels of Paul 
Kagame. The interactions between these three entities will open our eyes to the real reasons that 
pushed Paul Kagame not only to invade the Congo, first in 1996 with the AFDL (Alliance de 
Force Democratiques pour la Liberation) under the cover of Laurent Desire Kabila and then in 
1998 with the RCD by putting the Congolese Ernest Wamba Dia Wamba in the lead. 
On July 4, 1973, the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces, General Juvénal 
Habyarimana, came to power in a coup d'état against President Grégoire Kayibanda (the first 
elected president of independent Rwanda), who was presented as the promoter of an ethnic 
schism between Tutsis and Hutus. The new strong man of Rwanda presented himself to his 
people as a unifier. A report of the UNHCR describes the context of Habyarimana's rise to power 
as follows: 
 He established new relations within the "ethnic" field. Relying on the Tutsi businessmen 
(who could not threaten him in any way because they were politically castrated), he 
brought the Hutu groups in the South, nostalgic for KAYIBANDA's PARMEHUTU 
(Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu)22, and the Tutsi exiles from abroad, 
perceived by those at home as a threat to their fragile tranquility. He muted the militant 
racial character of the national ideology and reinforced the "cooperative" and 
                                                          
21 Unfortunately, the reality is such that many of those who call themselves experts or specialists in the Congolese 
question refuse to look at this Rwandan background as an essential key to reading the chaotic situation in Congo. 
22 The Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement. 
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"developmental" aspect that appealed so much to foreigners, and in particular to Christian 
NGOs, which enabled him to obtain both overall political satisfaction from his regime 
and a large amount of economic aid.23 
On the diplomatic front, he decided to break away from Belgium, its former metropolis, 
and to turn to France, with which he signed a military cooperation agreement under the 
presidency of Valery Giscard d'Estaing in 1975. "The government of the French Republic places 
at the disposal of the government of the Rwandan Republic the military personnel whose 
assistance is necessary for the organization and training of the Rwandan gendarmerie.”24  From 
this point forward, France was very present in Rwanda through investors and military instructors. 
 This moment represents a key turning point in Rwandan history. As with most 
African regimes that have taken power by force, President Habyarimana built a truly totalitarian 
regime, which in essence was based on a model that has already been present in the country for 
decades.25 Besides, he established strict administrative control, imposing on every citizen, in 
addition to obtaining an identity card, a residence permit that listed the ethnicity (Tutsi, Hutu, 
Twa) of each Rwandan citizen. Moreover, as in Mobutu's Zaire, every Rwandan citizen, even the 
unborn, were already members of the presidential party, which had meanwhile become the 
country’s only party (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement: MRND26). 
Finally, the president made sure to attract the clergy to him, which he subtly but effectively 
muzzled. 27He also favored his Hutu collaborators in the northwest region, where he was 
                                                          
23 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refworld | La Crise Rwandaise: Structures et Deroulement,” 
Refworld, accessed March 15, 2021, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c28.html. 
24 “Rapport : Mission d’information Sur Le Rwanda,” 2, accessed March 15, 2021, https://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/11/dossiers/rwanda/r1271.asp#P843_41406. 
25 Refugees, “Refworld | La Crise Rwandaise.” 
26 National Revolutionary Movement for Development 
27 President Habyarimana had succeeded in making the Archbishop-Primate of Kigali, and President of the Rwandan 
Bishops' Conference, Monsignor Vincent Nsengiyumva, an active member of his single party, thus blocking any 
action by the Church against his power. The bishop resigned in 1990 following a papal ultimatum and was 
assassinated on June 5, 1994 in Gakurazo, along with two other bishops, Bishop Joseph Ruzindana and Thaddee 
Nsengiyumva, and other religious, by RPF soldiers, as testified by Esperance Mukashema, a Tutsi survivor, who 
14 
 
originally from. The hardening of power was characterized by assassinations in the ranks of the 
military (Colonel Mayuya, for example), of clergymen (the human rights activist Abbé Silvio 
Sindambiwe was killed in November 1989), of magistrates judged to be too indiscreet, such as 
the Prosecutor General of the Republic François Muganza, etc.28  
Assassinations and increased authoritarian ruled to conspiracies against the president, 
especially that led by Colonels Theoneste Lizinde and Alexis Kanyarengwe. Social discontent 
was becoming more and more audible, and the president, who until then had been holding firm, 
was now feeling his seat wobble. It was the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. The 
Cold War was over, the cards of world geopolitics had to be redistributed. The Western powers 
wanted to get rid of certain "African old friends" who had become cumbersome. Thus, after the 
La Baule summit,29 French president Francois Mitterand put pressure on Habyarimana who, on 
July 5, 1990, gave a speech opening his country to democracy and promising a multiparty 
system.30 This speech was followed by "the manifesto of the 33 intellectuals in favor of 
Democracy".31 This document insisted that democracy would not be a simple readjustment 
within the existing structures but a true opening to all the living forces of the nation. Some 
opponents, notably those of the RPF, were not open to such changes. The RPF (Rwandan 
Patriotic Fund), which we will describe in the next point, was essentially composed of Tutsi 
                                                          
was present at the time of the massacre See https://www.jambonews.net/actualites/20130409-assassinats-des-trois-
eveques-en-1994-au-rwanda-lordre-venait-de-paul-kagame/ 
28 Refugees, “Refworld | La Crise Rwandaise,” 1. 
29 On June 20, 1990, the conference of heads of state of France and Africa was held in La Baule, France. During this 
summit, the French president, François Mitterrand, gave a speech that commentators have summarized in two 
sentences: "the wind of freedom that has blown in the East must inevitably blow one day in the direction of the 
South" and then, "there is no development without democracy and there is no democracy without development. 
30 His neighbor in Zaire, Mobutu, had already, under the pressure of his former sponsors (the USA, Great Britain, 
Belgium) made a similar speech on April 24 of the same year, promising a multi-party system and a transition that 
would bring the country to elections. But these promises will remain only promises. 
31 This document was issued by local opponents. It recalls in its form and content the open letter that 10 years earlier 
13 Zairian parliamentarians had sent to President Mobutu to ask him to open the country to a multiparty system and 
to a more participatory and representative democracy of all segments of the population. 
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exiles, who wanted to regain the power they had lost when the monarchy fell in 1959. They felt 
the danger of multipartyism, (they represented only 14% of the population compared to 85% of 
the Hutu population and 1% of the Twa population)32 and did not want to compete with other 
opposition parties in the country.33  
It is also important not to forget the feeling of hatred against Habyarimana government 
which had refused them access to the country (Rwanda) when President Milton Obote of Uganda 
wanted to expel them from his country. Many of these young people then joined Uganda’s 
Yoweri Museveni's rebel movement (National Resistance Army) and helped bring down Obote 
in 1986. In return, Museveni should help them to return to their country, but this time with 
weapons.  
Each of these factors ultimately led to the launching of the first RPF attack on Rwanda. 
This attack launched on October 1, 1990, failed the RPF, thanks in particular to an approximate 
knowledge of the new realities of a country that they had left years before (Paul Kagame was 
only 2 years old in 1959), the non-cooperation of the local populations (even the Tutsis) that they 
thought were on their side, the intervention of France34 , Belgium and especially that of the 
Zairian army. Mobutu sent his counterpart and friend Habyarimana a corps of about 2,000 men, 
made up of elements of the Division Spéciale présidentielle (elite soldiers of the Zairian army - 
the equivalent of the American special forces). The Zairian military, after having repelled the 
                                                          
32 “Outreach Program on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations” (United Nations), accessed March 22, 
2021, https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/historical-background.shtml. 
33 Cf. Marie Béatrice Umutesi, Fuir Ou Mourir Au Zaïre: Le Vécu d’une Réfugiée Rwandaise, Mémoires Lieux de 
Savoir (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000), 53–54.  
34 Refugees, “Refworld | La Crise Rwandaise,” 2. On October 4, 1990, France sent a contingent of 150 soldiers to 
secure strategic infrastructures such as the French embassy, the airport and French citizens. This was Operation 
Noroit. As for the conflict, France let the Rwandan government manage the conflict itself, while providing it with 
weapons and equipment under the orders of Colonel Jean-Claude Thoman, and organizing training to teach the FAR 
to deal with the dangers of mines and traps. 
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RPF rebels, engaged in exactions, looting, and killings of Tutsis. The RPF rebels would not 
forget this. 
Additionally, the June 29, 1981 revision of the law of 1972 in Zaire, played a significant 
role in escalating the conflict. This law, which granted nationality to Rwandan refugees in Zaire, 
was revised in a more restrictive sense. Indeed, anyone who had "one of his or her ancestors who 
was a member of one of the tribes established on the territory of the Republic of Zaire within its 
limits on 1 August 1885" was now a Zairian.35 This law triggered an uprising by the indigenous 
Congolese populations (Babembe, Bavira, Bafuliro) who attacked the Tutsi populations known 
as Banyamulenge (inhabitants of Mulenge, named after the region they occupied in Kivu). This 
situation created a real climate of insecurity in the Kivus and civilian confrontations fanned by 
greedy and money-hungry soldiers who sold their weapons to civilians. 
Between 1990 and 1993, Zaire was involved in the peace negotiations between the 
Rwandan government and the RPF. Mobutu, then the oldest head of state in the region, and head 
of the second-largest French-speaking country in the world, and a closer friend of President 
Habyarimana, felt the weight of the duty of an old brother who had to reconcile his younger 
brothers. Regarding this friendship, some important elements should be emphasized. Mobutu had 
organized the funeral of President Habyarimana in the presence of the wife of the deceased, 
Agathe Kanziga. She had been extradited from Rwanda on 9 April 1994 by the French army as 
part of Amaryllis Operation.36 She landed in Gbadolite where she received a diplomatic passport 
from Zaire allowing her to travel to Kenya before returning to Zaire, which she left in 1997 with 
the entry of the AFDL, allied with the RPF, which threatened her security. To return to Mobutu, 
                                                          
35 “Rapport : Mission d’information Sur Le Rwanda,” 3. 
36 “Rapport : Mission d’information Sur Le Rwanda,” 263–80. After a stopover in Bangui, Habyarimana's wife 
landed in Paris for a brief stay before heading to Gabon, then Zaire, then Kenya, and back to Zaire. She will finish 
her journey in Gabon and then in France. 
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let us say that what he wanted above all was to restore his image as the undisputed leader of the 
region on the international scene. He also wanted to prevent the unrest and civil wars that were 
already tearing Rwanda apart from being exported to Zaire and in particular to the Kivu region.37  
As Charles Onana points out, the RPF was never in favor of a peaceful solution to the 
Rwandan conflict, because it did not think it could win democratic elections.38 Mobutu was thus 
perceived more as an obstacle than as a way out of the crisis for the RPF, which was growing in 
power and benefited from the support of the great powers, notably the USA and England, which 
also wanted to get rid of Mobutu.39  As part of the ceasefire negotiations and before the signing 
of the Arusha Accords in August 1993 (a peace agreement that was to initiate a transition to 
democratic elections in Rwanda), Zaire hosted the two parties for negotiations and ceasefire 
more than once. First in Gbadolite (President Mobutu's hometown) on October 26, 1990, then in 
Goma (North Kivu city in eastern Zaire) on November 20, 1990, and then again at the N'sele 
(President Mobutu's official residence and workplace in Kinshasa) on March 29 and March 
199140 and again in Gbadolite on September 16, 1991. During the signing of the Arusha Accords, 
President Mobutu was represented as mediator.  
The struggles between the Rwandan government of Habyarimana and the rebel 
movement of the RPF between 1990 and 1994 led to the genocide, which was triggered by the 
attack of the plane of President Juvénal Habyarimana.41 This genocide, which went on from 
                                                          
37 “Rapport : Mission d’information Sur Le Rwanda,” 191. 
38 Charles Onana, Ces Tueurs Tutsi : Au Coeur de La Tragédie Congolaise (Paris : Duboiris, 2009), 57–58. 
39 Onana, 80–84. The author uses the letter that President Clinton addressed to Mobutu on April 29, 1997. 
40 The two parties signed a ceasefire agreement which was never respected by the RPF. 
41 Onana, Ces Tueurs Tutsi, 51–62. It is important to know that documents abound and contradict each other on this 
issue. For some, such as the expert judges Nathalie Poux and Marc Trevidic, who issued their expert report on the 
April 6 attack on President Habyarimana's plane on January 10, 2012, the responsibility of the RPF and by ricochet 
of President Paul Kagame, who at the time was the leader of the RPF, is to be ruled out. The judges confirm the 
hypothesis that the shooting started from the Kanombe camp controlled by Hutu extremists and their European 
advisors. This thesis is supported by the Rwandan government. The other camp, that of Judge Jean Louis Bruguière, 
who worked on the case for ten years, Ms. Carla Del Ponte, prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
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April 6 to July 15, 1994, saw a little over 800,000 Rwandans, many of them Tutsis, massacred, 
and about 2 million Rwandan citizens flee from Rwanda. The Congo (Zaire at the time) alone 
received 1.2 million refugees, the majority of whom were Hutus. Alongside the civilians, there 
were also elements of the Armed Forces of Rwanda who had crossed over with weapons, the 
Hutu extremists (Interahamwe). These refugees had just landed in a region already plagued by 
ethnic tensions and a glaring economic crisis. For the government in Kigali, the presence of ex- 
Armed Forces of Rwanda (AFR) and Interahamwe militias constituted a danger to the new 
regime. The situation was favorable for Kagame. He was applauded by the Western powers and 
the international community, he had built up a strong and well-equipped army, he was 
capitalizing on the feeling of guilt of these international police who had allowed such a horror to 
happen and on the status of an eternal victim that was granted to the Tutsis. Thus, when Kagame 
decided to pursue the genocidaires on Congolese soil, neither the United States, UK, France, 
Belgium nor the international community offered any resistance.  
As researchers like Charles Onana42, Judi Rever43, Beatrice Umutesi44 make clear, 
Kagame was presented to the world, mainly by western medias (RFI, BBC, TV5, RTBF, etc.) as 
the stopper of the genocide, the savior of a whole people, and the new strong man of the sub-
region of the great lakes. He took advantage of these labels to send his army to the Congo and 
take revenge against all those people who were either suspected of helping the Hutus or of 
having killed Tutsis. With the discovery of large deposits of raw materials (coltan, gold, 
manganese, lithium), methane gas, precious woods) in the Kivus, the demand of large 
                                                          
Rwanda (ICTR), Abdul Ruzibiza (a former member of the RPF), Charles Onana (political scientist and investigative 
journalist), Judi Rever (investigative Canadian journalist), are leaning towards the thesis that the attack was ordered 
by senior RPF officials and that it directly involved Paul Kagame.  
42 Onana, 27–31. 
43 Judi Rever, In Praise of Blood the Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, 2020. 
44 Umutesi, Fuir Ou Mourir Au Zaïre, 52–57. 
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technological industries (for the telephone and aeronautical industry), and taking advantage of 
the misery of a people in the grip of poverty, Paul Kagame, helped by the United States and 
Great Britain, installs a system of plundering of raw materials, built on the terror of the 
populations. The latter fled their villages and their regions, leaving the ground fertile for those 
who exploit the soil and subsoil of the Congo.45 
Taken together, these elements together tell us about the RPF's motives in the DRC.  Not 
only was there motive to pay Mobutu back for the crushing defeat inflicted in 1990 and the 
killings of the Tutsis, but also to humiliate him by sabotaging his role as a leader and great 
strategist in the sub-region. 
3. Kivu’s war and its protagonists 
 “War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of 
political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.”46 
The literature on the Congolese region of Kivu has been presenting for more than a quarter of a 
century now indigestible writings not by style, syntax, or grammar but by the number of horrors 
described on thousands of pages. After the opprobrium of the Second World War that we thought 
would be conjured up by the creation of the UN and the regional and international peace 
agreements, here we are in the midst of the nightmare of the savage and unjustified killings of 
the civilian and innocent populations under the astonishingly passive and ultimately desolate 
                                                          
45 Onana, Ces Tueurs Tutsi, 125–30. We can also read the report of the United Nations experts on the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo, New York, S/2001/357,39. The same experts 
produced another report in 2002. Both reports expose Rwanda for supporting certain dangerous groups that kill, 
pillage and rape for the exploitation of raw materials. 
46 Carl Von Clausewitz, Michael Eliot Howard, and Peter Paret, On War. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008), 24, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=390520. 
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gaze47 of all those who a few years ago had declared: “Never again war”48 and who hypocritically 
continue to hum the same refrain (all the reports of the UN Security Council still condemn with 
the last energy the atrocities and massacres in Eastern Congo). The civilian populations of 
Eastern DRC die every day in a war for which they are unaware of the ins and outs; biodiversity 
is plundered and ransacked by rebel groups often supported by politicians or multinationals to 
whom they give access to the riches of the Congolese soil and subsoil.  The soil and subsoil are 
devastated for the enrichment of a circle of unscrupulous politicians and big financial 
platforms.49 In short, we are witnessing, and this for nearly 30 years (since 1996), general chaos, 
a slow, violent, and efficient destructive frenzy, a bestiality unworthy of the image and likeness 
of God of which we believe that every human being is granted. The worst is the vagueness and 
the imbroglio around this conflict, the regular and, in our opinion, ineffective interventions of 
major actors supposed to work for the search and the consolidation of peace (the UN, the EU, the 
                                                          
47 With a budget of more than one billion dollars per year and a cohort of more than 15,000 agents, with the most 
modern logistics means (https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/factsheet_monusco-feb_2018_3.pdf)  it 
seems to us incomprehensible, even reprehensible, that the United Nations and all its partners are unable to put out 
of action armed groups about which they have full information 
48 At the end of the First World War, the slogan "never again war" appeared, which quickly became the pacifist and 
anti-militarist slogan in the German region and later throughout Europe (Amsterdam, Paris, Brussels), the work of 
the German artist Kathe Kollwitz. Unfortunately, the reality of the Second World War proved that beautiful words 
alone were not enough to convert people's minds and bring them back to think about peace and the well-being of all. 
But the slogan will come back in May 1946 in the streets of Berlin and will this time be echoed by Pope Paul VI at 
the UN tribune on October 4th, 1965 in the 18th paragraph of his speech before the great powers ("Never again 
against each other, never again!"). http://www.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/fr/speeches/1965/documents/hf_p-
vi_spe_19651004_united-nations.html   After him, Pope John Paul II will repeat in his angelus of January 27, 2002, 
the words that he had pronounced in Assisi on the day of prayer for peace ("Never again war!"). Never again 
terrorism! May every religion, in the name of God, bring justice and peace, forgiveness and life, love, on earth! ») 
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/angelus/2002/documents/hf_jp-ii_ang_20020127.html. Pope Francis, 
in the Angelus of September 1, 2013, will repeat this appeal in the first paragraph of his address ("... never again 
war! never again war! peace is an eminently precious gift, which must be promoted and preserved"). 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/angelus/2013/documents/papa-francesco_angelus_20130901.html. All 
over the world, this slogan is being brandished. UNICEF has even made an exhibition of it at the Caen memorial on 
Thursday, May 17, 2019. 
49 Roland Pourtier briefly but effectively describes the major forces at play in these conflicts and specifies the stakes 
and interests of each party. With him, we can understand the twists and turns of this conflict, the extinction of some 
groups and the birth of others, the mutations of several groups and the creation of new small groups that bring 




AU, and the Congolese government) and this cruel complacency which reminds us in many 
aspects of the dark period of the African slave trade.50  For a long period (especially during the 
reign of President Joseph Kabila), NGOs, human rights associations, and human rights activists 
who rose to denounce this gratuitous barbarity were muzzled, even assassinated, and their reports 
sent to the darkest drawers of those who, by force of circumstance, have the power to put an end 
to this human and environmental infamy.51  At this point a serious question emerges: who is 
behind this terror? What are these groups that kill everyone and that nothing and no one seems to 
be able to stop? We will take a descriptive look at the different groups that sow fear and 
desolation in the eastern region of the Congo between 1996 and 2002. Depending on the interests 
                                                          
50 We refer to this period because it was the time when the massacres of the masses of people were considered a 
news item, did not prevent anyone from sleeping and, on the contrary, gave legitimacy and honors to the 
executioners. We are here in the Congo of King Leopold II of Belgium. He had obtained this geological scandal at 
the Berlin conference during which the African continent was dismembered between the powers of the time. Read, 
International Geography Bee, Scramble for Africa: Berlin conference 1884 
(http://www.internationalgeographybee.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Berlin-guide.pdf ); Steven Press, Rogue 
empires: contracts and conmen in Europe’s scramble for Africa, Cambridge, Harvard University press, 2017.  
Exterminating "negroes" was not a shocking, let alone revolting, event. This human trafficking was of no economic 
interest to the mainstream media. Consequently, they were simply abandoned to their fate. (see Adam Hochschild, 
King Leopold’s Ghost, A story of greed, terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa, District Of Columbia, Mariner 
Books, 2020We have the feeling that the populations of Eastern Congo are experiencing this abandonment today, 
especially with the continuation of the conflicts and the impasse over the atrocious murders of the populations of 
Eastern DRC. 
51 This is the case of the UN experts, authors of the Mapping Exercise report, which since 2008 had been filed in the 
UN offices and was dismissed. Finally, in 2020, following pressure from the Congolese Nobel Prize winner Denis 
Mukwege, the new Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi and certain non-governmental organizations fighting for 
human rights (LUCHA, FILIMBI, COJESKI, CLC, etc.), we began to witness a reconsideration of the report. We 
also experienced the death of Floribert Chebeya assassinated on June 1, 2010 while returning from police 
headquarters in Kinshasa. ( HRW, DR Congo, Prominent Human Right Defender Killed.  
https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/03/dr-congo-prominent-human-rights-defender-killed  ; BBC, DR Congo 
Human Rights activist found dead in Kinshasa, June 2010 https://www.bbc.com/news/10223564 ). Five years 
earlier, on July 31, 2005, Pascal Kabungulu Kibembi, another human rights defender, was shot dead in his home. 
The same year, investigative journalist Franck Ngyke died, brutally shot dead with his wife in Kinshasa. Two years 
later, it was the turn of Serge Maheshe, and the following year of Didace Namujimbo. More recently, in March 
2017, two UN experts, Zaida Catalan (Swedish) and Michael Sharp (American) as well as their interpreters and 
three motorcyclists of their team were summarily executed while investigating abuses committed against civilians in 
Kasai in the "Kamwena Nsapu" tragedy. (https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/12/still-no-justice-murders-un-experts-
congo). On June 9, 2018, one of the young founders of the Citizen LUCHA movement, Luc Nkulula (33 years old), 
who criticized and organized non-violent demonstrations against the power of Joseph Kabila, was assassinated at his 
home in Goma. ( https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/11/congolese-democracy-activists-death-mourned). These few 
examples give a glimpse of the certainly tacit but obvious will to silence all the voices that choose to denounce evil 
and to point out its perpetrators so that justice can be done. 
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at stake, armed groups are created and dissolved, merge or disappear. Nevertheless, some of 
them remain very well-known and continue to operate “peacefully” in the Eastern Congo region. 
For this study, we will focus on the armed groups that occupied Congolese soil between 1994 
and 2002. 
3.1. The FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda)52.  
This group is one of the most destructive and well-known in the region. It was created as 
political and military group in September 2000, in Nasho (Kenya). It included Hutu civilians 
seeking revenge and/or a way out, former soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces who had 
crossed the Congolese border with their weapons, and other exiled Hutu personalities such as 
Ignace Murwanahsyaka or Alexis Nshimyimana. Taking advantage of the quarrels between 
Laurent Desire Kabila53 and his former allies, Rwanda, the FDLR formed a military force and 
decided to support Kabila against the Rwandan army,54  hoping for a strong military comeback in 
Rwanda. Their area of activity lies between the territories of Masisi, Walikale, Lubero, and 
Rutshuru. They are involved in massive human rights violations and still refuse to lay down their 
arms.  
But it turns out, according to the New Humanitarian magazine, that this group, while 
remaining an elusive nebula, is experiencing internal dissension55  between those who remain 
                                                          
52 Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. 
53 Laurent Desire Kabila was the third president of the Congo since its independence. A former rebel (since the 
1960s), he fought against the power of Kasavubu by supporting Lumumba and fiercely opposed Mobutu, whom he 
considered a puppet of the Western imperialists. He did not hesitate to accept the support of Rwanda and Uganda to 
overthrow Mobutu's power. He took power on May 17, 1997. But he found himself at odds with his former 
Rwandan and Ugandan allies and was assassinated on January 16, 2001 in his office. His son, Joseph Kabila, 
succeeded him at the head of the country on January 20, 2001. 
54 “Qui sont les FDLR ? – Jeune Afrique,” JeuneAfrique.com (blog), December 3, 2007, 
https://www.jeuneafrique.com/131136/archives-thematique/qui-sont-les-fdlr/. 
55 “Les groupes armés dans l’est de la RDC,” The New Humanitarian, October 31, 2013, 
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/actualites/2013/10/31/les-groupes-armes-dans-l-est-de-la-rdc. We currently 
have factions such as the FDLR-Rud (Forces armées pour la libération du Rwanda/Rassemblement Uni pour la 
Démocratie led by General Jean Damascène Ntibabagije; FDLR-Soki named after their leader, "Colonel" SOKI, 
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extremist and swear only by arms and violence and those, on the other hand, who are more 
moderate and prefer the path of dialogue and political negotiation. With the misery, fear, 
insecurity, and tribalism, many young Congolese have joined the movement.  
3.2. AFDL (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo)56 :  
This movement was created on October 18, 1996, in Lemera in South Kivu, under the 
impulse of Rwanda,57  by the merger of four rebels Laurent Desire KABILA from Manono in the 
Katanga province, Deogratias BUGERA, a Congolese Tutsi from the Masisi region in the North 
Kivu province, Anselme Masasu NINDAGA (a Mushi, Congolese tribe, from South Kivu 
province) and General André KISASE NGANDU, the military leader (a Tetela from Kasai 
province). Kabila was the oldest member of the group, which gave him "precedence" and the title 
of Mzee (a Swahili term meaning "elder") and made him the spokesman for the new movement. 
The first victories that the movement recorded on the front, consolidated its intention to 
overthrow Mobutu and Kabila began to present himself to be the president of the mouvement 
before the international press. This was the beginning of dissent that will result in the elimination 
of KISASE on January 8, 1997, and MASASU on Nov 24, 2000. Deogratias BUGERA had no 
other option than to flee. Kabila thus remained the sole master and transformed the AFDL into a 
single political party. It should be noted that throughout the conquest of the Congo, the AFDL's 
troops consisted essentially of young adolescents, recruited in the Kivus by Anselme MASASU.  
                                                          
who was killed by another rebellion (the M23) in July 2013; FDLR-Foca under the leadership of Major General 
Mudacumura and FDLR MANDEVU led by "Colonel" Mandevu. 
56 Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo. 
57 Isidore NDAYWEL, Histoire Du Congo, Des Origines à Nos Jours (Bruxelles: Le Cri, 2013), 234. 
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3.3. FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais) and APR (Armée Patriotique Rwandaise)58 
When we talk about the conflict in Eastern Congo, the massacres of Hutu refugees in 
Congo, and the occupation and illicit exploitation of raw materials in Congo, one of the military 
groups that comes up is the RPA. It is the armed wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). 
This movement was officially founded in 1987. In addition to its political and propagandist 
branch, the RPF formed a military branch, the RPA, which recruited mainly from the Tutsi 
ethnic group in Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. The movement set up sleeper cells among the 
Banyamulenge population in Congo. The RPA launched an offensive on Rwanda on October 1st, 
1990, which ended in abject failure.  
This defeat of the RPA in the face of the Rwandan Armed Forces was largely due to the 
intervention of Mobutu, who, to support his counterpart Habyarimana, sent a commando to drive 
out the RPA rebels. We understand a little more the desire of Paul Kagame to take revenge on 
Marshal Mobutu. For four years, between October 1, 1990 (date of the first RPA attack on 
Rwanda) and before July 15, 1994 (capture of Kigali by RPA rebel forces), the RPA tried in vain 
to conquer power in Rwanda. The assassination of President Habyarimana on April 4, 1994, 
triggered mass killings and launched the RPA's war. Finally, they succeeded in taking power in 
two months. The same RPA army entered the Congo-Zaire in 1996, and they massacred Hutu 
refugees in many camps.59  This is the same army that in 1998 invaded the Congo after President 
KABILA had decreed the end of military cooperation between Congo and Rwanda.  
                                                          
58 Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). 
59 The armor of savior of the Tutsis, of stopper of the genocide that the international press will make Paul Kagame 
put on, but also the hypnosis of an international community which by shame and guilt will close the eyes on the 
actions of the RPA, will give to Kagame unlimited powers and the right of life and death on the populations of 
Rwanda and Congo. 
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3.4. RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie)60   
After the official fall of Marshal Mobutu on 17 May 1997, President Laurent Desire 
Kabila took office, supported mainly by the Rwandan and Ugandan armies. He appointed James 
Kabarebe as Chief of Staff of the Congolese army, even though he was the commander of the 
Rwandan army. But this alliance was short-lived. Kabila decided the dismissal of General James 
Kab arebe and declared on television on July 26, 1998, his express request to all allied forces to 
leave the country the next day.  
On their side, Rwanda and Uganda accused Kabila of failing in his duty of gratitude to 
those who had brought him to the head of the Congo. Thus, on August 2, 1998, a new war broke 
out in the East of the country. Rwanda and Uganda had just invaded the Congo, under the 
leadership of James Kabarebe.  
Thus, on September 1, 1998, they created RCD, as a Congolese cover to their invasion on 
a sovereign country, with a political and a military branches (reminiscent of the RPF and the 
RPA). At its head they placed, Professor Ernest Wamba Dia Wamba, a Congolese from the Bas 
Congo as well as several other Congolese who, unfortunately, as Kakule Vyasongya points out, 
have never been involved in the creation of this movement.61  This movement wants to be a 
"revised" and "corrected" replica of the AFDL.  
                                                          
60 Congolese Rally for Democracy. 
61 webmaster, “Historique de la Guerre du RCD au Nord-Kivu (par Kakule Vyasongya) – Beni Lubero Online.” Les 
autres membres de ce premier bureau sont Arthur Z’AHIDI NGOMA, Moise NYARUGABO, Jacques 
DEPELCHIN, LUNDA BULULU, Alexis THAMBWE MWAMBA, BIZIMA KARAHA, MBUSA NYAMWISI, 
Deogratias  BUGERA, Gertrude MPALA, etc.). See resolution 3314 of the United Nations General Assembly. 
Others even spoke of the great African world war. 
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The RCD succeeded in occupying the entire eastern part of the DRC, leaving Rwanda 
and other multinationals62  free rein for resource exploitation in the Congo.63  However, like 
many rebel movements, the RCD soon experienced divisions and broke up into different rival 
factions (RCD-Goma, RCD-Kisangani, RCD/MN, Etc.). All these branches became more than 
harmful, as all these branches concentrated on exploiting the wealth of the conquered territories. 
The political war had turned into an economic war whose sole focus was profit. The promised 
well-being of the population turned into a chimera. 
3.5. Mayi- Mayi or Mai-Mai groups : 
The first traces of the Mai-Mai can be traced back to the 1960s when groups of the 
Babembe tribe (located in the South Kivu) joined the mulelist rebels against President Joseph 
Kasavubu, the first president of Congo. They accused him of embezzlement of the republic's 
funds, collusion with the former colony, and encroachment on their tribal areas by Banyarwanda 
nationals.  
When the second Congo war broke out in August 1998, Kabila found himself in difficulty. 
Indeed, he did not have an army capable of facing the Rwandan and Ugandan troops. In the 
meantime, in the eastern regions, local groups (Mai-Mai/Bangilima, Mai-Mai Yakutumba, Mai-
Mai Nyatura, etc.) were organizing themselves to defend themselves against the Rwandan 
invaders and Kabila turned to these groups to help him. With the interventions of Mai-Mai, the 
villages in the interior of the country escaped the total control of the RCD army and its Rwandan 
ally (the RPA).  With time, the Mai-Mai became corrupted, separated from KABILA and enter 
the circuits of pillaging of mineral resources.  
                                                          
62 Onana, Ces Tueurs Tutsi, 125–29. 




4. Kasika and Makobola: Two Tales, one reality.  
The two stories that we are going to present in the following pages are concrete 
illustrations of these forgotten memories whose recognition we want to proclaim through this 
work. The cases of Kasika, Kilungutwe and Makobola I&II, are just a representative sample of 
all these forgotten souls that we want to exhume. We also want to present an important element: 
the injustice and lies of those who under the disguise of liberators have become oppressors.  
4.1. The Kasika and Kilungutwe massacres64:  
Under the aegis of the United Nations Human Rights Section, a Mapping Report of more 
than 500 pages was written to report on the most serious human rights violations in Congo. This 
report, along with many others65, gives details of the Kasika tragedy. But, first of all, what is the 
Mapping report? 
The Mapping Report66 is the result of a project of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights whose mission was to inventory the most serious violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law committed between March 1993 and June 2003 
                                                          
64 A map detailing all these regions will be attached as an appendix. Kasika is an administrative entity of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, located in the province of South Kivu, territory of Mwenga, community of Lwindi, 
67 miles southwest of the city of Bukavu. We will take our references for most of this description from the report of 
the white paper of the Congolese Ministry of Human Rights. 
65 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict to the Security Council; Report of the Joint 
Mission to Investigate Alleged Massacres and Other Human Rights Violations in Eastern Zaire since September 
1996 (A/51/942) dated July 2, 1997; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict; World Food Program (WFP); United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); International Court of Justice (ICJ); International Criminal Court 
(ICC); Congolese Ministry of Human Rights; Immigration Commission of Canada (DRC, The August 1998 
Rebellion and Key Groups, December 1998); US Institute of Peace (Crises on War and Governance 1997); The 
Apocalypse in North Kivu, in collaboration with the group of volunteers for peace, Report on the Mudja massacre in 
April 1997; “Association africaine de Défense des Droits de l'Homme” (Situation of human rights in the territory of 
Beni under RCD administration, August 1998-July 1999 published in September 1999); CADDHOM (Massacre of 
Kasika in South Kivu in 1998, Investigations into the 1998 refugee massacres, Atrocities committed in Kivu 
Province from 1996 to 1998); Réseau d'Organisation des Droits Humains et d'Education Civique d'Inspiration 
Chrétienne (RODHECIC), Massive Violation of Human Rights in South Kivu; DRC, Application to the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague against the Republic of Rwanda, 2002) 





in the DRC. Along with this inventory, this report was also to evaluate the means available to the 
Congolese legal arsenal and its capacity to respond effectively to human rights violations and 
finally to suggest, in consultation with the Congolese government, elements that would make it 
possible to address the issue of impunity through transitional justice.67  In addition to a preface, 
an executive summary, an introduction, and three appendices, the report is divided into four main 
sections (Inventory of the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law, Inventory of Specific Acts of Violence Committed during Conflicts in the 
DRC, Assessment of the Justice System in the DRC, and Options for Transitional Justice for the 
DRC) corresponding to the main objectives of the project and comprising five chapters, three 
chapters, and six chapters respectively. It was following the discovery, in October 2005, of three 
mass graves in a village in the Rutshuru region of North Kivu, about 46.6 miles from the city of 
Goma, by Congolese soldiers and MONUC (United Nations Mission in the Congo) observers. 
These mass graves, according to UN experts, date back to the bombings of October 30 
and November 18, 1996, of Hutu refugees by RPA who came to help Laurent Desire Kabila 
overthrow Mobutu. Rwanda justified these bombings by indicating that this camp constituted a 
security threat for Rwanda. The discovery of these pits, which contained the bones of about 300 
people, and others later found in Mugogo and Bunagana (about 20 km from Rutshuru), 
reinforced by the testimony of survivors such as Georges Bisimwa, who told the investigators of 
the International Press Service (IPS) the massacre and burial of 280 men and 32 women in 
Rutshuru, forced the UN human rights structures to ask that light be shed on all the crimes 
                                                          
67 “Drc_mapping_report_final_fr.Pdf,” 3–32, accessed May 7, 2020, 
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/countries/cd/drc_mapping_report_final_fr.pdf. Transitional justice, also known as 
"transitional justice" refers to the full range of processes and mechanisms used by a society to address massive past 
abuses, with a view to establishing accountability, providing justice and enabling reconciliation. This definition is 
found on page 461 of the document. 
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committed during the long period of the two Congo wars to evaluate the human damage and to 
apportion responsibility. Thus, on June 13, 2006, the UN General Secretary, Ban Ki-moon, in his 
report to the Security Council, announced his intention to send human rights specialists to the 
field to make an inventory,68 and on May 8, 2007, Ban Ki-moon  approved the terms of reference 
for the Mapping Exercise in consultation with the Congolese government and UN agencies (the 
Secretariat's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, MONUC, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Department of Political Affairs, the Office of 
Legal Affairs, and the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide). With a 
budget of $3 million, under the guidance of the OHCHR, the project focused on data collection, 
analysis, and evaluation of information received from local NGOs, civilian witnesses, 
consultants, and experts. On this basis, the project generated a 550-pages report describing 617 
incidents of violence that occurred in the DRC between 1993 (when Hunde and Nyanga 
militiamen massacred Hutus at the Ntoto market and in the churches of the same locality), based 
on more than 1,500 documents collected and analyzed and more than 1,280 witnesses 
interviewed69 and 2003 (establishment of the so-called national unity government with the 
famous formula of 1 president and 4 vice presidents. On December 21, 2007, by way of 
resolution 1794,70the Security Council asked for the full support of the Congolese government 
led by Joseph Kabila Kabange who had been in favor of the mapping project. The project finally 
began officially on July 17, 2008. About twenty experts were deployed throughout the 
Congolese territory and between July 2008 and May 2009.  
                                                          
68 UN Secretary-General, “Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” June 13, 2006, 54, http://digitallibrary.un.org/record/577394. 
69 Étienne Rusamira, “La dynamique des conflits ethniques au Nord-Kivu : une réflexion prospective,” Afrique 




Despite numerous difficulties related to the size of the Congolese territory, the near 
inaccessibility of certain regions, insecurity, the extent of violence, and the scale of the crimes, 
the team submitted its final report, which was published by the UN on October 1, 2010. The 
report shows that in ten years, war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed in 
the Congo against Congolese civilians and Hutu refugees and proposes that a tribunal be 
established to try the perpetrators of these massacres that the report identifies.  
The Kasika horror took place between August 23 and 24, 1998,71 only three weeks after 
the outbreak of the Second Congo War.72  More than 1200 people (men, women, children, old 
people) were massacred, burned alive, and thrown into latrines in Kasika and neighboring 
villages.73  These massacres were first brought to the attention of international opinion in 
December 1999 by some  independent source like  MINSA, an international Catholic news 
agency.74  
 On Sunday the 23rd, the population was surrounded by soldiers, identified by the 
survivors as APR soldiers, who without warning entered the houses, systematically killing and 
burning people. The soldiers attacked the customary chief, Mubeza III, born Naluindi Francis. 
He was tied up, killed with a machete, his heart extracted out of his chest and his head cut off. 
His wife, who was pregnant, was disemboweled and the fetuses (twins) cut into pieces. 26 other 
                                                          
71 It is important to clarify these two dates to understand the large number of people killed on those days. The 23rd 
of August was a Sunday, a day of worship. Many people, especially Christians, gather in their churches for worship 
on this day. The next day, Monday, is market day, and many people leave the neighboring villages to come to the 
city to buy necessities (salt, soap, sugar, clothing, etc.) and sell some food (chickens, vegetables, tubers, bush meat, 
etc.). It is therefore also a great day. Gathering together and it shows that this violence is not a coincidence, and even 
less the collateral damage of a war of liberation. 
72 Ministère des droits Humains, Livre Blanc, Tome I, 10. 
73 Mapping Report, 176 and Democratic Republic of Congo, Application to the International Court of Justice of 
LaHaye against the republic of Rwanda, May 28, 2002. 
74 Ministère des droits Humains, 10. 
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people were killed in his house.75 Then the bursar of the parish, Stanislas Wabula Kombe, along 
with three nuns of the Congregation of the Daughters of the Resurrection,76 and 37 parishioners 
were killed within the church.77 385 other people who had not been killed in the church were 
massacred while trying to flee.78 On their way to Kilungutwe, they brutally killed 43 people and 
burned 50 others in a village called Zokwe.79 Not far from Zokwe, still on the way to Kilungutwe, 
in the locality of Kalama, 95 people were burned in houses, again by RCD and RPA soldiers. 
 The next day, 24th, market day, the carnage will continue in Kilungutwe, 15 miles away 
from Kasika, where all the other villagers, come to get supplies. The soldiers, identified as those 
of the RPA, allied to the RCD80 by the survivors, opened fire on the population after gathering in 
the central market square, killing at least 173 unarmed civilians.81 After that, they asked the 
villagers to gather in the huts by groups of 50 people (all ages) and they massacred them, 
reporting some survivors to the investigators of Amnesty International.82 In another house, 54 
people were grouped together, testifies a survivor. They were forced to undress, and the soldiers 
                                                          
75 “Document,” 12, accessed March 19, 2021, 
https://www.amnesty.org/fr/documents/document/?indexNumber=AFR62%2f036%2f1998&language=fr. 
76 Bulletin of the Swiss Catholic Portal. 
77 “Document,” 12. 
78 “Document,” 13. 
79 “Document,” 12. 
80 A fringe of the rebellious Congolese army, supported by the regular Rwandan army, has been identified as the 
sponsors and executors of this human butchery. For more information, we can read with interest these few 
documents : Ministère des droits humains de la RDC, Livre Blanc: La guerre d’agression en RDC. Trois ans de 
massacres et de génocide à huis clos, octobre 2001, 11-13; Requête introductive d’instance à la Cour internationale 
de Justice de la RDC contre le Rwanda du 28 mai 2002, 4; CADDHOM, Massacres de Kasika au sud- Kivu , 1998; 
COJESKI, Rapport du 20 novembre 1998, 1998, p. 2 et 3; COJESKI, Rapport de janvier 1999, 26; Christian 
Hemedi Bayolo, L’Église profanée, chronique et violation des droits du clergé pendant la guerre d’agression 1998-
2000, février 2002, 21-23; Jean Migabo Kalere, Génocide au Congo ? Analyse des massacres des populations 
civiles, Broederlijk Delen, 2002, 47-48.61-67 ; Ambroise Bulambo, Mourir au Kivu, du génocide tutsi aux 
massacres dans l’est du Congo RCD, L’Harmattan 2001, 87.98-99 (photographies); Groupe Jérémie, « Parole à la 
base », 1999, 21-30; AI, « RDC: La guerre contre les civils non armés », 1998, 8 et 11; HRW, Casualties of war, 
1999, 30 ; Mapping Report, 183. 
81 “Document,” 12. 
82 “Document,” 12.  
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tied them up with their clothes before killing them. They then killed over 200 people following 
the same method.83 
Between August 23rd and 24th, on a journey of 37 miles (60 km), between Kasika and 
Kilungutwe, passing through Kalama, more than 1,200 people84 (men, women, children, and the 
elderly) were savagely murdered and their deaths silenced at the national and international levels. 
It seems important to us then to ask ourselves about the motives of these atrocities. Perhaps this 
will help us to lift the veil on such violence. 
 Indeed, Amnesty International reports that a few days before the dates of 23 and 24 
August, the RCD and RPA army was ambushed by the Mai-Mai resistance. During this attack, 
RCD and RPA troops lost approximately 30 militia soldiers. The local population was 
immediately singled out and accused of espionage and complicity with the Mai-Mai.85 This 
population had to be punished for their "treachery" and a commando was sent to carry out the 
punishment. They did not realize the gulf that exists between the desire for justice and the pursuit 
of revenge. We can highlight two elements that remove from this expedition any suspicion of 
justice and turn it into a horrible and repressible carnage.  
First, the failure to respect international conventions on the treatment of non-combatant 
targets. By leaving the Mai-Mai adversaries and attacking the civilians, we are clearly dealing 
with a campaign of terror rather than a reaction of self-defense. Secondly, the disproportion 
between the damage suffered by the military and the punishment inflicted on the civilian 
population is beyond comprehension. For every 30 soldiers killed in an ambush, more than 1,200 
                                                          
83 “Document,” 12. 
84 These statistics come from an ICRC report that will later be confirmed by CADDHOM, the Mapping Exercise, 
HRW, and other human rights NGOs as Groupe Jérémie, COJESKI and the CEPAS. 
85 Amnesty International, République Démocratique du Congo, La guerre contre les civils non armés, AFR 
62/36/98, Londres, 23 Novembre 1998, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/148000/afr620361998fr.pdf  
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civilians were simply massacred in an ambush. Having no means of defense, these populations 
could not even react to save themselves.86 The violence with which these murders were 
committed is also an element of the real intentions of these soldiers: to silence the population and 
send a message to the Congolese government and all the militias that supported it. Thus, 
although the RCD87 political-military authorities lately acknowledged these atrocities and 
promised to open investigations, nothing was ever done.88 Even though, they knew the names of 
those who ordered and carried out this human butchery.89  Unfortunately, the victims have been 
voluntarily thrown into the dustbin of history. They belonged to the collateral damage of a 
conflict of which they understood almost nothing.  
4.2. The Makobola Massacres90 
"It's hell. The smell of the corpses pollutes the air". It is with these words that Father 
Albanese described the spectacle which was offered to his eyes in this region of Makobola. 
                                                          
86 “Document,” 12. Amnesty's report points out that a young teenager who had the courage to ask the question of at 
least knowing the motive for this violence was strangled without any other form of trial. 
87 The president of this movement was then Mr. Ernest Wamba Dia Wamba, a Congolese man. 
88 The RCD, through the voice of its military leader Jean Pierre Ondekane, "recognized" through a press release the 
responsibility of its soldiers in these massacres. It promised that an investigation would be opened and that the 
culprits would be severely punished. Since August 31, when the communiqué was issued, we have found no trace of 
any investigation or legal proceedings. There were even plans to create a special commission to shed light on the 
massacres committed in the Kasika region. But here again, a thick veil was cast to cover up and make these innocent 
souls forget. On the contrary, the soldiers, as justified by this inaction of the hierarchy, continued to commit 
atrocities in the other villages, always with the same accusation: punishing the traitors. 
89 The Congolese Ministry for Human Rights, corroborated by the delegates of the civil society of South Kivu 
invited to the National Conference on Human Rights, organized in Kinshasa from 24 to 30 June 2001, quote without 
emblem the names of the authors, co-authors and sponsors of these murders. They are the commanders MUHIRE, 
MUKARAYI and MACHUMU, who are the executors of the orders that would have been given by the vice-
governor of yesteryear, Benjamin SERUKIZA, who may days before had presided over a security meeting of the 
province. 
90 The city of Makobola is located about 9.3 miles south of the territory of Uvira, on the border with the territory of 
Fizi. We propose a map of the region in the index of this work. 
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Questioned by Reuters, he said: "We are gradually receiving the names of the victims. We can't 
stop counting them."91   
When we decide to forget history, it takes on the task of reminding us that it is not a relic, 
but a dynamic, for which, the present constitutes a bridge toward a horizon for which it has 
already set a scenery. Kasika's story, which we described above, had been ignored. The dead had 
been forgotten. The Blood of the Innocent had been covered by a veil of lies, contempt, neglect, 
and false promises. Both national and international authorities had chosen to look away and 
trivialize the cries of the poor who asked for justice.92 
On December 30, 1998, four months and seven days only after the Kasika and 
Kilungutwe massacres, a cry arose again: it was Makobola who was crying for her sons and 
daughters; she did not want to be consoled because they were taken away from her.93 As for the 
Kasika and Kilungutwe massacre, we will describe the facts and introduce the sponsors. The 
account that we are going to report here comes essentially from Father Jacques Bulambo.94 It will 
                                                          
91 These words were reported in an article by Ian Fisher, published in the New York Times on January 6, 1999.  Voir 
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/06/world/500-are-massacred-in-congo-missionaries-report.html?auth=login-
google1tap&login=google1tap  
92 Charles Onana, Ces Tueurs Tutsi: Au Coeur de La Tragédie Congolaise (Paris: Duboiris, 2009), 19-31. In these 
pages, the author questions the silence and inaction of the international community despite all the reports and files 
that have been issued by organizations such as Amnesty International, which we have cited in this work. The UN 
Special Rapporteur, Robert Gareton, following an investigation in the Congo, revealed the discovery of mass graves 
hiding the bodies of Hutu refugees and Congolese civilians killed by the RPA troops. His report was never acted 
upon. On 29 June 1998, the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in a report to the Security Council, 
affirmed the responsibility of RPA troops in the massacres of civilians in the Congo and qualified these massacres as 
crimes against humanity. He also underlined the denial of adequate humanitarian assistance to these populations 
Elisabeth Umutesi also describes in her book, Flee or Die in Zaire, the silence of the international community in the 
face of the human catastrophe that was taking place in the forests of Congo. In the United States, letters from 
Cynthia McKinney, former candidate of the Green Party in the 2008 US presidential elections and special envoy of 
President Clinton to the Great Lakes of Africa in 1997, reproached Bill Clinton for the guilty silence and even 
complicity of the US government and the international community in the face of the massacres of the Congolese 
population by the RPA troops Let's also mention the Mapping report which details the various human rights 
violations and which has never been exploited and which the Congolese Nobel Prize winner Denis Mukwege asked 
to be implemented.   
93 I am paraphrasing here the passage from Mt 2:18-20. 
94 “Livre blanc sur les violations massives des droits de l’homme et des règles de base du droit international 
humanitaire.,” n.d., 13–14. Father Jacques Bulambo Wilondja is a member of the National Observatory of Natural 
Resources in Congo and works on behalf of the National Episcopal Conference of Congo (CENCO). He was present 
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be completed and enriched by the testimonies of other survivors and by local and international 
human rights organizations.  
The new "liberator", the RCD, who wants to regain the power in Kinshasa, mostly 
supported and framed by Rwanda and Uganda, had control over almost the entire Eastern part of 
Congo, especially the North and South Kivu. As the population of the city of Makobola I (the 
city is divided by river in Makobola I and II) posed no danger to the APR and the RCD military, 
the latter decided to withdraw their base from Makobola I toward Makobola II, shortly before the 
1998’s Christmas and 1999’s New Year celebrations. The population felt satisfied and relieved 
not to always have these weapons pointed at every corner of the city. The population had 
therefore celebrated Christmas, in the joy of a rebirth, a new beginning. Yet as in the Bible and 
the Catholic liturgy, the joy of Christmas is immediately followed by the bitterness and sadness 
of the murder of the innocent, the holy martyrs. Makobola will also experience the drama of the 
killing of the innocent less than a week after celebrating Christmas.  
The Mai-Mai, once again ambushed RCD and RPA soldiers. They were camped in Makobola 
II’s forests. By moving their headquarters from Makobola I to Makobola II, a few days before 
Christmas, the RCD soldiers entered the territory of the Mai Mai militia who interpreted this 
action as a provocation and an affront and as was to be expected, the Mai-Mai reacted.  
We are in Makobola II. In the evening of December 29, 1998 (around 5.00 pm), the Mai-
Mai sent a message summoning their opponents (the RCD soldiers) to empty the place under the 
pain of an attack. But without waiting for the answer, the Mai Mai had carried out their threat 
                                                          




and attacked the RCD positions, killing some soldiers. On Makobola I, calm reigned,95 
interrupted by the feverish preparations for the New Year's Day celebrations. The population did 
not imagine that they were just hours away from the apocalypse and that many would not see the 
last year of the second millennium. Around 10 am, on the 30th, a rumor circulated in the city 
announcing the arrival of Rwandan army troops from Uvira, 9.3 miles away from Makobola.  
 As in Kasika, the soldiers arrived at Makobola I, left their vehicles at about 3 miles from 
the city and entered the city on foot. They then devoted themselves to an inhuman carnage. The 
first victim was a woman, Nabyocucwa, who was shot at the entrance of the city without any 
other form of trial. The soldiers went door-to-door, killing, raping, mutilating, burning people in 
their homes, cutting women open after inserting pieces of wood or logs into their genitals and 
burying people alive. The Council of the Catholic Apostolate of Congo gave the number of more 
than 600 people killed (mainly women and children). The final report of the participatory 
consultations for the development of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Document (DSRP) 
produced in December 2004, gives the number of 630 people killed, while the Mapping report 
counts more than 800 people killed in Makobola and in the neighboring villages of Bangwe, 
Katuta, Mikunga and Kashakezi.   
 There was general surprise and total panic. The inhabitants barely realized the nightmare 
that was happening to them, they could not even flee, tetanized by the cruelty and violence of 
these killings. The shock was so violent that some even after so many years still cannot recover 
(we can call here the case of the case of Bwashali, the vice director of Makobola primary school, 
who witnessed the murder of his friend and catechist of the village, Ndama Rusangiza and his 
                                                          
95 The attack was only reported to the RCD headquarters in Uvira late in the day by RCD soldiers who had escaped 
from the attack and managed to get away.  
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family. He is still traumatized by the violence of those killings).96 On the other side of the bank, 
was Makobola II where the Mai Mai attack took place. The Mai Mai heard the few shots and 
withdrew in the mountains abandoning the populations to these "monsters with the human faces" 
as would say, Martin Gray. The "cleaning" which started on Makobola I, continued as the 
soldiers crossed into Makobola II. With the same fury and the same murderous rage, they will 
shave Makobola II, leaving behind them a desolate and empty city. A real hecatomb. In two 
days, more than 818 people (essentially from the Babembe, Bayira and Bafulero congolese 
tribes) were torn from life with unheard-of fury and violence.97 The rest of the people who had 
found refuge in the surrounding forests and that the number is not well known were found and 
murdered in the days that followed, thanks to a strategy of deception and sequestration. It 
consisted of sending one person at gunpoint to call the others out of the woods under the pretext 
that calm had returned. As soon as a group went out, they were immediately captured and beaten 
to death. This would be repeated several times.98  
 Like Kasika, the instigators of these massacres are identified and known as soldiers of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army (APR), with elements of the Congolese National Army (ANC) in 
rebellion against the central government in Kinshasa. Moreover, these reprisals go beyond the 
                                                          
96 “Rapport Final des Consultations Participatives de la Base Pour l'Élaboration du Document de Stratégies de 
Réduction de la Pauvreté (DSRP)  Territoire de UVIRA - Province du Sud - Kivu,” n.d., 173. In 2004, the 
population of Makobola was estimated at 4,333 inhabitants, distributed as follows: 975 men, 1,205 women, and 
2,147 children including 642 boys and 1,505 girls. It was difficult for us to have data on the population of Makobola 
in 1998. This lack of datas also reinforces our conviction of an unacknowledged but palpable desire of national and 
international political actors to ignore this human tragedy. 
97 “Livre blanc sur les violations massives des droits de l’homme et des règles de base du droit international 
humanitaire.,” 16. 
98 “Livre blanc sur les violations massives des droits de l’homme et des règles de base du droit international 
humanitaire.,” 15–16. A young boy named Nyakungu will be captured and those who were in the bush are 
summoned to tell them that calm has returned. Those who went out were killed. He himself was beaten and left for 
dead. He was saved by the other villagers hours later after having dragged himself into the bush. another young man, 
Bulenge, reports how he was the only one to come out of his burning family home. all other members of his family 
perished in the fire. 
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positions attacked and the damage caused. They target the civilian populations that they 
exterminate them just like they use to do in Rwanda.  
 Otherwise, how can we account for such fury, such relentlessness on innocent and 
unprotected civilian populations? Many theories can be developed to find not a meaning but at 
least an explanation for this sabotage of humanity. Some of the statements made in 1998 in 
Butembo, in the North- Kivu, by senior military officers alluded to a deliberate desire to 
exterminate99 indigenous peoples to install Rwandan (Tutsi in particular), Ugandan and 
Burundian colonies.100  These remarks open the way to a key question that may be the main key 
to this eternal conflict in Eastern Congo: what promises did Laurent Désiré Kabila make to his 
Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan peers in exchange for their military support? We know that 
the second Congo war, which began on August 2nd, 1998, was triggered when President Kabila 
asked his allies to withdraw their troops from Congolese territory and to return to their homes. 
We are going to analyze an element that could shed light on this violation of the fifth 
commandment of the Decalogue, thou shalt not kill:  the lack of distinction between war and 
                                                          
99 In the collection of testimonies on the massacres committed in Eastern Congo by the armies of Rwanda, Uganda 
and Burundi, we read the following statement made in Butembo by the commander Aboubakar on the motives for 
these mass killings: "There is therefore no more pity. It is therefore a question of killing, of massacring, from the 
baby to the snake. (...) We will sweep everything away, we will even call on our army in Goma. Afterwards we 
could then build our own city. (...) We are ready to chase every person wherever they are, outside, inside, in their 
house or in the bush, we will do everything to exterminate the enemy. " (My translation).These words tend to 
resurrect another theory, that of the creation of the Republic of the Great Lakes, which would include the three 
countries and the eastern region of the DRC under Tutsi hegemony. Moreover, in late April 1994, while the east of 
the country was breaking up, the Sovereign National Conference denounced what the Congolese historian Isidore 
Ndaywel called the pseudo Tutsi project of detachment from Kivu in Congo, with a view to the creation of a 
"Republic of Virunga". A report about refugees and displaced populations in the regions of North and South Kivu 
had even spoken explicitly of a certain Kabila who would organize incursions by attacking localities in the Beni. 
(See Isidore Ndaywel e Nziem, L’histoire du Congo, des origines à nos jours, Bruxelles, LeCri, 2009, 233-34.) 
100 In its letter of January 22, 1999, the Council of the Apostolate of Lay Catholics in the Congo, a powerful 
organization in the promotion of human rights, denounced the silence and denial of the international community 
regarding the DRC. The CALCC questioned in these terms: "Rwanda and Burundi are overpopulated. Is it necessary 
to massacre Congolese people to turn the Congolese territory into a drain on the demographic surplus of these 
countries? see, Cour internationale de Justice, Livre Blanc, Affaire relative aux activités armées sur le territoire du 
Congo, Tome I et II, 23 juin 1999, 34.  
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retaliation101   This results in the establishment of a reign of terror and the violation of the basic 
principles of a just war, namely the just cause.  
5. From “Liberation” to Retaliation: evidence of an Unjust war 
After the declaration of liberation of 17 May 1997 by Laurent Désiré Kabila's movement 
AFDL, the Congolese people aspired to a new beginning, a new era, far from the nightmares of 
the last decade of President Mobutu. But this dream was quickly swept away by divisions within 
the AFDL and its former allies. The outbreak of the second Congo war on August 2, 1998, led by 
Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, was pointed out as a war of occupation and strongly criticized by 
the population. Thus, President Kabila called on the people to take charge of themselves, to resist 
the oppressor, and to drive the enemy out.102  This slogan will have the merit of triggering a 
"hunt for Tutsis" in several cities of the country and above all a mistrust of the populations of 
Kivu conquered by these new masters of the place. Small groups of pro-government defenses 
will be created throughout the region to face the invader. Practices such as the sabotage of 
equipment, ambushes, and kidnappings will multiply on the military forces of the RCD 
(essentially Tutsi), which will result in reprisals. Unfortunately, these reprisals are carried out not 
on the armed adversary, but the civilian population. This will completely discredit the entire 
struggle of the RCD, transforming it into an ugly, repressive and violent machine. Those who 
claimed to want to overthrow the dictatorial power in place, found themselves no longer at war 
                                                          
101 Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, eds., The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary 
Readings (Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 2006), 333. We will see that RCD soldiers attacked civilian targets 
under the pretext of complicity with their enemies, thus violating all the principles of a just war. 
102 Yeba Tv, Discours de Laurent-Désiré Kabila Sur Les Agressions Au Congo (Bruxelles, 1998), 2012, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MLUnDMUSxUs&t=1s. In his remarks, Laurent Desire Kabila takes the 
Congolese people to witness and castigate Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda which according to him are enemies who 
kill and massacre the Congolese. Their armies, mono-ethnic by the way (Tutsi ethnic group) do not want to leave the 
Congo after having tasted the wealth of this country. For Kabila, an appeal is launched to the Congolese people to 
defend themselves against the Tutsi aggressor. He clarifies the difference between the Tutsi aggressor and those who 
live peacefully. Therefore, the Congolese people's view of the Tutsi will be marked by mistrust, even hostility. 
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with the government, but in a human butchery that did not respect any morality. They could no 
longer distinguish war from punishment.  
Also, the rise of "anti-Tutsi" sentiment placed these soldiers in a defensive posture. They 
knew that they were not loved by the population. They had therefore decided to reign by terror. 
The massacres had the objective of petrifying the population and forcing its cooperation. If the 
cause of the beginning of the rebellion, the failure to respect the agreements, seemed just, the 
cause of the massacres of the civilian population, on the other hand, lacked a basis. The harm 
caused to the civilian population was in no way the result of an evil caused by the population. So, 
we were not in the perspective of an offensive war, but rather amid a kind of vindictive justice, a 
logic of gratuitous violence.103  It is by pointing out the possible modes of offensive war that 
Molina allows us to clarify the mobilization of the actions of these rogue soldiers. Let us see 
what Molina says about the different types of offensive warfare and how to punish when they are 
at fault. In this way, we could better grasp the absurdity of this license to inflict harm on non-
combatants that these soldiers have granted themselves. Under no circumstances can war be 
waged as a form of punishment, Molina reminds us.104 
First, we recognize with Saint Augustine and Francisco de Vittoria that the first motive of 
war is harm. One wage war to repair a prejudice105 or to correct evil, to punish a nation or a 
government that refuses to repent of an evil inflicted on its people, or to return a good taken 
                                                          
103 Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, The Ethics of War, 333. Unlike Cajetan, who supports a firm connection between 
offensive warfare and vindictive justice, Molina reminds us that one can go without the other. An offensive war can 
be waged without a punitive intention, as when it is a question of recovering arbitrarily occupied territory. Likewise, 
we add that an army can carry out vindictive justice disguised as an offensive war. Indeed, in the cases of our work, 
there is no war but a massacre, that the target is not the armed adversary but an unarmed population. One cannot 
even grant the benefit of collateral damage to this RCD army. 
104 Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 334 
105 Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 334. 
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unjustly.106 This definition undermines the actions of RCD soldiers. What harm were they 
repairing by massacring civilian populations? This is absurd. If Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda 
wanted to punish the Congolese government, they would not have obtained reparations by 
attacking civilians. On the other hand, in the vein of St. Augustine, it seems to us that the 
Congolese government had neither wronged its population nor unjustly taken what was rightfully 
theirs and that the rebels, supported by the three countries mentioned above, wanted to return to 
the people.107  Moreover, let us remember with Saint Thomas that for the cause of an offensive 
war to be just, those who are attacked must deserve the attack for a fault committed.108  Now, we 
see that the men, women, and children who are attacked are attacked arbitrarily because no-fault 
weighs on them. This element reinforces the denial of an offensive war, much less a just war, by 
the soldiers of the RCD and their Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan allies.   
On the other hand, these military expeditions were aimed at punishing and creating fear 
that would lead to servitude for those who did not choose the path of exile. This manifest 
intention to terrorize a population that had become distrustful deprived these soldiers of the 
support of invincible ignorance that would have mitigated their actions. In fact, as in the case of 
Makobola, the soldiers arrive and, without asking questions, kill, burn, and rape. If they wanted 
                                                          
106 Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 334. Luis de Molina takes up the Augustinian definition of a just war. See Decretum 
Gratiani, II, 23, question 2, 
107 We will not enter this work in the debate around the so-called Banyamulenge population whose Congolese 
nationality has been and still is a subject that unleashes so many passions. Their case was used as a cover for the 
Rwandan invasion of Congolese soil. Indeed, it was about the protection of a martyred and mistreated civilian 
population. But can the protection of one population be justified by the massacre of another? Is this not the pattern 
of the Rwandan genocide that was being repeated on Congolese soil? For more information on the thorny issue of 
Banyamulenge, we can read David Van Reybrouck, Congo, une Histoire, Actes Sud, 2012 ; Leonard Kambere 
Muhindo, Apres les Banyamulenge, voici les Banyabwisha aux Kivu, la carte ethnique du Congo Belge en 1959, 
Kinshasa, YIRA ;  Leon de Saint Moulin, « Conscience Nationale et Identités Ethniques », in Congo-Afrique, n.330, 
Kinshasa, Décembre 1998 ; Van Bulck, Commission Centrale de l’Atlas, General du Congo, Institut Royal Colonial 
Belge, Bruxelles, 195422 Willame Jean Claude, les Banyarwanda et les Banyamulenge, CEDAF, Bruxelles, 1997 ; 
Mahano Ge Mahano, Existe-il des Rwandais Congolais ?, Kinshasa, Sophia, 1998 ; Charles ONANA, Ces tueurs 
tutsis au cœur de la Tragédie Congolaise, Duboiris, 
108 Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, The Ethics of War, 334. 
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to carry out an offensive, to correct an injustice committed against their people, they could have 
investigated, questioned, spied on, and finally acted. Their ignorance of the facts was therefore 
vincible. Yet they deliberately chose to terrorize the population knowing that the enemy they 
were looking for was not among the population.  
It is for all these reasons, and especially for the fact that this approach was neither to 
avenge an inflicted injury109 (the guilt of the population having never been proven) nor to recover 
property when it is held because of unavoidable ignorance110 (these populations were owners of 
their land and the military knew this very well. There was no reason to drive them off their land 
through violence). It was mobilized by the installation of power through terror. As a result, this 
war was unjust and condemnable.  
Conclusion 
In this first chapter, we wanted to set the precise framework for our work. This 
framework is that of the history of wars and of a political, economic, and cultural conflict that 
has been ravaging the eastern region of the DRC for nearly three decades and that has wiped out 
nearly 12 million people from the face of the earth. To understand this conflict, which is both 
complex and diverse, we have proposed to dissect it. It would have been pretentious for us to 
present all the arcana in a work such as this. The anatomy of this conflict consisted first of all in 
choosing the space in which to work: for this work, we chose the cases of the Kasika and 
Makobola massacres. Then we chose our endpoints: between 1996 and 2002. With these 
prerequisites being established, the work could begin. We began by offering a panoramic view of 
the conflict in Eastern Congo, the background of which was the Rwandan crisis that reached its 
                                                          
109 Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 336. The Rwandan military has never at any time gone to war against Mai Mai 
militias or other self-defense forces. 
110 Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 336. 
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climax in 1994 with the genocide and the civil war. We wanted to present the political, military, 
and the diplomatic role played by the Congo, Zaire at the time, of President Mobutu, which later 
(from 1996) cost the Congo the wrath of the Rwandan government led by President Paul 
Kagame. But whoever speaks of war or conflict also speaks of the protagonists.  We have 
presented the main ones, describing their impact on the general situation in Eastern Congo. 
Having set the scene and introduced the actors, we told the story of the Kasika and Makobola 
massacres as clearly as possible, using documentation from the United Nations (the Mapping 
Project), the Congolese government, and the writings of some authors who have worked on the 
issue and human rights NGOs. The outcome of this narrative led us to an obvious conclusion: the 
war in the Congo is an unjust war. Why is it unjust?  What are the causes that support our 










CHAPTER II:  THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY FACING THE TEST OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Introduction 
The massacres we described above, and the whole catastrophic socio-political situation in 
the Eastern Congo region is a fact that everyone knows about and whose cause is evident: failure 
at different levels of decision and action to protect civilians. The local authorities and the central 
government point the finger at the neighboring countries (Rwanda, Uganda) as well as at the 
international community.  The international community, in turn, aware of the chaos it may have 
caused, blows hot and cold air, and seems to be passing the buck to the first two. Faced with this 
game which has cost the lives of millions of people, this sarcasm that continues to feed the 
insatiable appetites of predators and this vicious circle that locks thousands of men and women 
in terror, trauma and despair, we decided to uncover the culprits, to designate the causes as well 
as the causal agents of this Congolese drama. 
 We will first describe the failure of the international community's military intervention in 
the Congo, whose ineffectiveness is one of the causes of the proliferation of armed groups and 
the massacres of the civilian population. This international community, through MONUSCO 
(United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Congo)111 spends most of its time observing, 
reporting and condemning with the utmost vigor the atrocities committed in the Congo without 
                                                          
111 On November 30, 1999, the United Nations sent a mission to Congo under the name of United Nations Observer 
Mission in Congo (MONUC). But on July 1, 2010, by resolution 1925, the Security Council changed MONUC to 
MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Mission for Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo). This 
changed MONUC from an observer mission to a stabilization mission with the authority to use all necessary means 
to fulfill its mandate, which includes ensuring the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights 
defenders under threat of physical violence and assisting the DRC government in stabilizing and consolidating the 
peace. However, MONUC has had this mandate since 2004, when Resolution 1565 of the UN Charter authorized it 
to act under Chapter VII.  
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any active intervention, despite its mandate under Chapter 7, which authorizes it to use armed 
force to defend itself and the civilian population.112 
 Then we will tackle the failure of the Congolese government. This failure can be 
understood at two levels: the origin of the form of the Congolese state and the regime of 
governance, and the complicity of the state authorities in the plundering and massacre of their 
own populations. Finally, we will charge the Congolese army which since independence has not 
been trained in the service of the defense of the people. The failures at these three levels 
constitute for us the undeniable cause of the suffering of the people. Knowing these causes will 
enable us to find an effective remedy, a theory able to get us out of this infernal circle. This 
theory is that of social justice that we will develop in the third chapter as well as its concrete 
applications to restore these forgotten memories. Once again, it should be noted that the space 
and time frame in which we will develop our thinking in this chapter is essentially situated, as in 
the previous chapter, between 1996 (the official start of the first Congo war) and 2002 (the 
official end of the second Congo war). This choice is justified by the case studies we have 
chosen for this work: the massacres of Kasika and Makobola, which took place between 1998 
and 1999, and whose immediate causes are situated around 1996 and whose consequences are 
felt until 2002. However, we will not hesitate to go beyond this field of definition in order to 
bring more light and clarity to our work, if necessary. 
                                                          
112   The provisions of this chapter also imply the complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, 
sea, air, and postal communications, ..., If the Security Council considers that the measures provided for in Article 
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as it 
deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, 
blockades and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
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1. The failure of International Community’s military intervention in the Eastern Congo 
Conflict 
The images of the populations of Eastern Congo that we have on the media are those of 
people stripped of everything, uprooted from their living environments, torn from life. In this 
region, women, men, children, the elderly, the rich, the poor, the religious, the notables, etc., in 
short, everyone has been tortured, raped, and killed. Everything was taken away from them, even 
their lives. All these people have been deprived of speech either because they are dead or 
because they are subjected to pressures, traumas and reprisals that plunge them into an almost 
permanent mutism.  
  In view of what has just been described, the ambiguous and hypocritical attitude of the 
international community's military intervention leaves us perplexed. The visible inability of its 
troops to solve the problem of the killings in Eastern Congo is so disturbing, especially when we 
know that UN peacekeepers have been present on Congolese soil since July 16, 1960.113  They  
never leave this country since, until they becomes the most financially and logistically costly 
mission,114 and this for the results we described in the first part. The question that still arises 
today is what the real purpose of the UN military forces in the Congo and how effective is its 
action.115 Chapter I of the United Nations Charter defines the purposes of the creation and the 
principles of action of the United Nations.  the charter emphasizes that its purpose is to 
                                                          
113 Isidore Ndaywel, Histoire Du Congo, Des Origines à Nos Jours (Bruxelles: Le Cri, 2013), 187–88. In fact, the 
week following June 30, 1960, the date of the DRC's independence, unrest broke out throughout the country 
(mutinies, secessions, divisions in the political class, collapse of public enterprises, etc.). This crisis, which led to 
fears of civil war, reinforced the strong tensions between the Congolese and Belgian authorities and forced the 
Congolese government to cut off relations with Belgium, whose military troops were repatriated and replaced by 
those of the United Nations. It is thus officially since July 16, 1960 that the international community to put its bags 
on the Congolese ground.   
114 Marc-André Lagrange, “Réflexions sur 17 ans de présence de l’ONU en République démocratique du Congo,” 
n.d., 4. More than 20,000 men on the ground with an annual budget of 1.4 billion dollars to fight rebellions that are 
barely a thousand strong and that often have knives and a few Kalashnikovs in their arsenal. 
115 By this term we are referring to MONUSCO (United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of the Congo), the 
United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Secretariat with all its branches.  
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To maintain international peace and security and to this end to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring 
about by peaceful means, in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations 
which might lead to a breach of the peace.116    
This beautiful statement seems never to have found an echo in the Congo and yet in its 
statement it carries a lot of hope. The Congolese people have, over time, become disenchanted 
with a passive, naïve and borderline complicit international community military forces. Its 
military presence in the east of the country has not improved the situation of the civilian 
population. On the contrary, the more it increases its numbers, its logistics and the length of its 
mandate, the more things become complicated and bogged down in the country, especially in the 
East.  In the following lines, we will describe this military failure of UN peacekeeping forces, 
which in one way or another has contributed to the chaos in eastern Congo.117 The first military 
mission authorized by the United Nations in the Congo after the fall of Mobutu was signed on 
November 30, 1999. It was resolution 1279 that decided to deploy "up to 500 United Nations 
military observers, with a view to facilitate future rapid deployments of the United Nations, as 
authorized by the Council."118 In a country where  other nine countries  (Rwanda, Burundi, 
Angola, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Tchad, Namibia, Soudan and Libya) were fighting on its soil,119 in 
violation of its sovereignty, human rights, and the very charter of the United Nations, and this for 
                                                          
116 “Chapter I,” June 17, 2015, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html. The Translation is 
mine. 
117 Thierry Vircoulon, “Ambiguïtés de l’intervention internationale en République démocratique du Congo,” 
Politique africaine N° 98, no. 2 (2005): 79–95. We are inspired by much of the data in this article, but also by other 
reports from the UNHCR and the Sub-Saharan Africa Program, which in 2016 published a reflection on 17 years of 
UN presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
118 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20SRES1279.pdf, 3. 
119 David Van Reybrouck and Sam Garrett, Congo: The Epic History of a People (New York: Harper Collins, 2015), 
444–46. Van Reybrouck explains in great detail the political, economic and strategic implications of all these 
countries in this new Congo war. Rwanda (the new protégé of the United States and Great Britain), Burundi, and 
Uganda form a bloc against which all the others are united, headed by President Laurent Desire Kabila. 
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at least a year, it seems incomprehensible to us that the United Nations sent only "observers" and 
a multidisciplinary team composed of experts in the field of human rights, humanitarian affairs, 
public communication and medical support, child protection, and political and administrative 
advisers as “first aid”. In comparison and paradoxically, a few years earlier, when, on August 
2nd, 1990, Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded Kuwait, the UN gave the green light to the United 
States and its allies (France, the United Kingdom, and about twenty other countries) to deploy a 
military force and to carry out offensive actions to repel the Iraqi army. This was Operation 
Desert Storm. This vast operation, which also included a military, commercial and financial 
embargo (Operation Desert Shield), was implemented between August 1990 and January 1991. It 
seems that we are dealing with an international community that uses double standards even when 
we are facing the same situations or worse.120  In his speech, the president of the United States, 
George H.W. Bush, speaking on behalf of all the allied countries, evoked the concern of all the 
nations involved in this offensive to come to the aid of the defenseless civilian populations who 
are exposed to a dangerous and merciless invader seeking to destroy everything.  
We note that an almost similar situation is happening in the Congo, between 1996 and 
2002, the Security Council limits itself to observation missions, negotiations, supply of 
humanitarian aid, and production of resolutions (1999: resolution 1279; 2000: resolutions 1291, 
1304, 1316, 1323, 1332; 2001: resolutions 1341, 1355; 1376 and in 2002: resolutions 1399, 
1417, 1445) whose impact will remain minimal on the ground.  Why does it not subject Rwanda 
and Uganda to economic, military, and financial sanctions as was the case with Iraq? On the 
contrary, in November 1999, the UN deployed a larger observation mission (MONUC) which, 
over the years, the more it increased its manpower, logistics, and the duration of its mandate, the 
                                                          




more the conflict became bogged down and the more victims it caused. What did they have to 
observe? It was established that not only the ceasefire agreement signed in Lusaka in July 
1999121 was violated, but the new actors, well known to the UN agencies, had entered the conflict 
for economic reasons,122 while at the same time using the argument of securing the borders 
against rebels from their countries who had taken refuge on Congolese soil and were organizing 
themselves there. 
 In addition, armed groups that had been created during the conflict, either as self-defense 
groups or terrorist groups, were not invited to the Lusaka peace accords (some Mai-Mai groups 
and the so called FDLR-Interahamwe). Consequently, the withdrawal of the regular armies of 
the countries involved could not by itself solve the problem. On the contrary, this withdrawal 
inaugurated the transposition of the Congolese conflict to a more complex field. The conflict had 
just gone underground, the government had lost all control over the conflict, and this under the 
aegis of the United Nations, the OAU and SADEC. Why did they leave out armed groups that 
were, depending on their tendencies and regions, subcontractors of certain countries?123 These 
groups constituted a much greater and more complex danger, because they escaped all control, 
operated in the shadows, and could therefore serve as cheap labor for all the powers or 
multinationals that wished to exploit the Congolese wealth at lower cost.   
                                                          
121 This agreement was signed by the Congolese, Angolan, Namibian, Rwandan, Ugandan, Zimbabwean and 
Zambian governments, representatives of the OAU (Organization of African Unity), the UN and SADEC (South 
African Development Committee).  
122 Van Reybrouck and Garrett, Congo, 442. 
123 The Lusaka peace agreement cites armed groups that are not signatories to the agreement and yet have been 
sowing death and destruction in Congo. These include the ex-FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces), the ADF (Alliance 
Defending Freedom), the FDA (Forces Démocratiques Allies), the FDD (Forces de la Défense de la Démocratie), 
the FNUA (Ancienne Armee de l'Ouganda), LRA (Lord's Resistance Army), UNFR II (Ugandan National Rescue 
Front), Interahamwe militias, WNBF (West Nile Bank Front), NALU (National Army of Liberation of Uganda), 
UNITA. Alongside these, there were other, smaller and often local groups. 
50 
 
Moreover, the military force, which was deployed with great fanfare in February 2000 
with the signing of resolution 1291 was composed of 5,537 people and this number will continue 
to grow until it reaches 22,016 uniformed personnel in 2016,124 was shining a hope. Here again, it 
was a desolation. Even in the configuration of the "mandate under chapter VII, authorizing the 
use of the force, the UN did not succeed in imposing the peace to the East of the Congo and that 
for a reason that Thierry Vircoulon describes to us: one had to deal with a military force and not 
an army.125 This UN apparatus deployed in the Congo lacked the configuration of an army 
(headquarters, command center, tactical observation and intervention units). Therefore, despite 
the large logistical resources, which also depended on the contributing countries (in the case of 
Gulf war we noticed how country were almost directly involved), there was a dissonance in the 
chain of command. Coordination of forces was hampered by a doctrine of passive deterrence, the 
difficulty of coordinating contingents with long-standing enmities (for instance: the Pakistanis 
and the Indians soldiers were not cooperating on the ground because of the hostilities of the two 
countries, same case between Uruguayans and Argentinians. This situation sometimes made the 
application of Chapter 7 almost impossible. Each contingent demanded, for example, that the 
other go to the front lines for confrontations. None of them wanted to lose their men.  As a result, 
intervention was delayed, and civilians were sometimes killed just a few feet from a peacekeeper 
camp (as in Bunia). When operations were conducted jointly with the Congolese armed forces, 
the latter were always on the front line ), a deliberate lack of information capacity that some 
countries (USA, UK, France, Russia, etc.) refused to provide to the United Nations, and a system 
of dual command (soldiers first obeyed the orders of their respective countries before submitting 
to the orders of the UN authorities, which complicated the coordination and effectiveness of 
                                                          
124 Lagrange, “Réflexions sur 17 ans de présence de l’ONU en République démocratique du Congo,” 5. 
125 Vircoulon, “Ambiguïtés de l’intervention internationale en République démocratique du Congo,” 81. 
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interventions on the ground). Once, some soldiers from the Uruguayan contingent told us clearly 
that their mission was not to die in the Congo. They came to get their money and return to their 
country. They saw no direct interest either for themselves or for their country in dying in the 
Congo. On the contrary, some of them were in clubs, nightclubs or brothels. others had 
developed romantic relationships with some Congolese girls and sometimes went as far as 
physical violence. The secretary-General of the United Nations had condemned these acts and 
had promised to punish undisciplined soldiers. A code of conduct had even been produced for 
peacekeepers. But the difficulty here was that the united nations could not initiate criminal 
proceedings against peacekeepers or condemn them for misconduct. It was up to each 
government to decide whether or not to punish its nationals. this situation undermined the 
authority of those in charge on the ground.126 
This puzzle, full of pieces that hardly or sometimes do not fit together, made this force a 
hoax. The means deployed were disproportionate to the impact on the ground. Passive deterrence 
was more like an illusion of deterrence. The rebel groups eventually understood this and were no 
longer afraid to even attack the civilian population in the presence of UN troops.127 Another 
failure was in the lack of independence of this UN military force. Indeed, it has been observed 
that the countries providing troops and financial means impose conditions on the UN that make it 
almost impossible to act effectively on the ground. In the Sierra Leonean conflict, for example, 
the British Army, whose troops were part of the UN mission, retained autonomy of command. 
                                                          
126 “Tough UN Line on Peacekeeper Abuses,” Africa Renewal, April 15, 2005, 
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2005/tough-un-line-peacekeeper-abuses. 
127 The Lusaka peace agreement cites armed groups that are not signatories to the agreement and yet have been 
sowing death and destruction in Congo. These include the ex-FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces), the ADF (Alliance 
Defending Freedom), the FDA (Forces Démocratiques Allies), the FDD (Forces de la Défense de la Démocratie), 
the FNUA Former Ugandan Army), LRA (Lord's Resistance Army), UNFR II (Ugandan National Rescue Front), 
Interahamwe militias, WNBF (West Nile Bank Front), NALU (National Army of Liberation of Uganda), UNITA. 
Alongside these, there were other, smaller and often local groups. 
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Similarly, the U.S. Army in the Somali conflict had autonomy of command over its troops.  
These include loss aversion, a chronic reluctance to place the best military elements under 
international authority, and financial considerations. Depending on how important economic and 
geostrategic interests are in a region, donor countries adjust their strategies. 
 Thus, for example, we are now witnessing a kind of "division of labor" between rich and 
poor countries. The former provides the funding and the latter provide the troops.128 These 
elements have very often contributed to the corruption of the UN mission in Congo  and stirs up 
the distrust and anger of the civilian population, who see a large arsenal of warfare with the UN 
initials on it every day, and who continue to lose lives every day. In September 2003, as an 
example, a contingent of 5,000 blue helmets was deployed in the Ituri region to impose peace. 
But despite their presence, civilians were massacred in Katchele and Gobu, without the UN 
troops intervening, even though they had a Chapter VII mandate. Attacks of this kind multiplied 
in several regions of the East (Bunia, Kasinzi, Mongwalu,). It was necessary to launch Operation 
Artemis in Bunia to restore security because the Uruguayan contingent that had been in place 
was unable even to ensure the safety of the population. The peacekeepers had even been 
summoned by the UPC (Union of Congolese Patriots) rebels to leave the city. The capture of the 
city of Bukavu from May 16th to June 8th, 2004 by Colonel Jules Mutebusi and General Laurent 
Nkunda nearly put an end to the United Nations mission in Congo. The blue helmets withdrew 
from the city, leaving the rebel troops to take over. When asked about this, the spokesman for the 
Secretary General, Fred Eckhard, gave this answer, which for us confirms the idea of the UN's 
military inefficiency in the Congo and questions the organization of the UN structure itself. He 
replied to BBC News: "The mandate was not to wage war. It was based on a peace agreement. 
                                                          
128 Vircoulon, “Ambiguïtés de l’intervention internationale en République démocratique du Congo,” 83. 
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This agreement has been violently challenged and it is up to the parties to the conflict to resolve 
this problem.”  
All in all, we can see that there has been a military failure of the United Nations in the 
Congo. The peacekeeping mission can only be effective if the peace has been imposed, the rebels 
have been disarmed and the refugees repatriated. The UN came to maintain a peace that it had 
not previously imposed, hence the failure of an action that gave the illusion of a great success. 
Today, the pretext of understaffing and lack of resources can no longer hold water. With an 
allocation of 1.4 billion dollars per year and 20,000 well-trained men, an army can overcome the 
militias that disturb the peace of the people. The problem is therefore to be found elsewhere. 
2. A Predatory National Policy: "bellyaching" against Patriotism 
A popular adage in the Congo states that “the enemy of the Congo is the Congolese 
himself”. The history of the country since its independence tends to give credence to this 
statement. The interminable conflicts that the country has been experiencing for years and that 
have cost the lives of millions of citizens, are attributable to greedy and avaricious leaders whose 
interests have almost never been in favor of the people. The beautiful speeches on nationalism, 
patriotism and solidarity have been lullabies that for years have put the people to sleep, leaving 
the field free for their leaders to plunder the country for the benefit of those who covet the wealth 
of the Congo from within and without. In this part we will highlight three elements that account 
for the failure of the Congolese state, since the origins, that is to say since the very day of 
independence. We will analyze the failed departure of the Congolese political class against a 
background of regional and economic quarrels. Then we will expose the carelessness and the 
complicity in the evil of the leaders who succeeded one another at the head of the country since 
the coup d'état of November 24, 1965, and finally we will fall on an essential element in the 
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defense of a nation and which always made lack in Congo: the army. These three elements are 
sufficient proof that the atrocities in the east of the country are ongoing.  
2.1. A failed start in the form of government and the state regime 
Any new beginning is subject to adjustments, improvisations, adaptations and a search 
for a certain stability. For African countries in general, and for the Congo in particular, the 
attainment of independence was a renaissance. Although General Janssens129 had recalled the 
police force 130 , on July 05, 1960, that "before the independence is equal to after the 
independence",131 Lumumba, in his impromptu speech of June 30, 1960, emphasized that this 
new beginning was possible and should be realized as soon as possible. He saw a new struggle, 
one that would lead to peace, prosperity and greatness. He wanted social justice to be 
established, the promotion of principles such as the universal and equitable distribution of the 
country's wealth, the suppression of the oppression of free thought, of all forms of 
discrimination, of international cooperation that respected the sovereignty of the Congolese. 
etc.132 All this vision of a great and prosperous Congo was without counting on those whom the 
first part of this speech had offended (the Belgian and American authorities as well as Congolese 
                                                          
129 David van Reybrouck, Congo: une histoire, 1. éd, Lettres néerlandaises (Arles: Actes Sud, 2012), 308. He was 
the commander in chief of the Public Force. It was he who on January 04, 1959 ordered a bloody repression of the 
people who had gone out to demand independence. He is described by Van Reybrouck as the most Prussian of 
Belgian officers. For him military discipline was sacred, dissent was a fault, chaos a sign of weak character. He is 
fiercely opposed to Lumumba, prime minister of Congo, whom he describes as a man without moral personality, 
superficial, nervous, more feline than human. 
130 Name of the Congolese Army during the colonial period 
131 Reybrouck, Congo, 309–10. Indeed, following a refusal by some soldiers to be reviewed by Belgian officers in 
one of the barracks of Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), General Janssens came to inquire about the situation and 
decided to punish the recalcitrants. This time, instead of provoking fear and a return to order, his decision provoked 
discontent and revolt. Some 500 soldiers then got together to send a memo to the general, denouncing the racism, 
the bad treatment and the lack of promotion. The general's response was summed up in this famous sentence that he 
wrote in capital letters on a blackboard. As one can imagine, this will contribute to the situation and will taint the 
relationship between the army and the government.  
132 Cf. “SPEECH AT THE CEREMONY OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE CONGO’S INDEPENDENCE by 




leaders opposed to the political vision of Lumumba as Kalondji, Tshombe, Kasavubu) and on the 
communist cliché which made Lumumba from now on an enemy of the whole capitalist block.133  
This was the first source of dissension in the political class. Already between the two 
heads of the executive, Lumumba (elected Prime Minister by universal suffrage) and Kasavubu 
(elected President), an opposition is felt. This opposition was already rooted in the structure 
established by the Brussels Round Table Conference of January and February 1960 and the 
resulting law of May 1960.134 Indeed, the resolution of the Round Table Conference had taken 
sides, to the detriment of the Congolese who did not understand much about it, for the traditional 
European parliamentary regime characterized by a duality of the Executive. This duality 
distributed the roles as follows: 
An irresponsible Head of State whose acts can have effects only if they are countersigned 
by a minister of the Congolese government, who is the only one responsible, and a Prime 
Minister whose task consists, among other things, in conducting the State's policy in 
agreement with the Council of Ministers, in directing the action of the government. to 
submit to the Head of State, the proposals relating to the exercise of regulatory power and 
the execution of laws.135 
This trick of the metropolis, the imposition of executive duality and a unitary structure,136 
will be the first background of dissension between a nationalist Lumumba – elected by direct 
universal suffrage and unitarian, who advocated a presidential regime, had with him the majority 
in the parliament and demanded a re-foundation of the fundamental law on the structure of the 
                                                          
133 Let's remember that the Congo gained independence in the middle of the Cold War and the Westerners did not 
want to lose this territory whose wealth, and in particular uranium, should not in any case end up in the hands of the 
communists of the East who were for the most part friends of Lumumba (China, the USSR, Cuba). 
134 François Perin, “La Crise Congolaise et Les Institutions Politiques Africaines / INSTITUTIONAL CAUSES OF 
THE CONGO CRISIS,” Civilisations 11, no. 3 (1961): 281–95. 
135 Cf. Perin, 281. In his article, the author refers to Resolution 3 of the Brussels Round Table Conference. 
136 At the Brussels roundtable conference, many agreed that one of the biggest mistakes of the Belgian government 
was to impose a unitary structure on a country like the Congo, which is so huge and complex, in the Belgian way. 
On the other hand, some thinkers believe that the country, in the state in which it was at independence, was not 
ready for a federal system that would have faced two major obstacles: tribalism and economic neo-colonialism. 
56 
 
state – and a rather moderate Kasavubu who had been elected by the parliamentarians and not 
directly by the people. Lumumba therefore felt more legitimate than Kasavubu in the eyes of the 
Congolese people. However, Lumumba will have to face a denigration, sometimes voluntary, 
often imprudent on behalf of Kasavubu and of the Belgian mentors, which will cause a real split 
at the head of the country. As examples, let's mention:  
- On June 27, 1960, during the investiture of President Kasavubu in front of the Chambers 
(National Assembly and Senate), Lumumba was robbed of the limelight by Kasavubu, who 
presented a unilateral government program, even though this role fell to the Prime Minister.137 
- Lumumba had requested an amnesty for political detainees on June 30, as a sign of 
political relaxation and a new beginning. This request was rejected.  
- The irreparable was committed when in the celebrations of independence, no role was 
reserved for Lumumba as prime minister, even though the country was under a parliamentary 
regime. He had not officially received a copy of the speeches of President Kasavubu and the 
Belgian king (Baudouin)138, and he had not been given any space for a speech. Faced with this 
affront, probably too much to bear, he will improvise. After Kasavubu's speech, while everyone 
was getting ready to leave the hall of the Nation Palace to start the festivities, Lumumba, went to 
the front and gave the famous speech of June 30.139 His speech had the effect of a wave. He was 
                                                          
137 Ndaywel, Histoire Du Congo, Des Origines à Nos Jours, 183. 
138 Isidore Ndaywel tells that it is Jean Van Lierde, a friend of Lumumba's, who will secretly inform him of these 
two speeches. These speeches were written in a paternalistic tone and bore the seeds of a new form of colonization, 
as the country became independent. Kasavubu's speech was that of a vassal thanking his Lord for all the benefits he 
had achieved and for the independence he had been granted and asking him to always be there to guide and direct 
him. That of the King of the Belgians praised the merits of Leopold II, the builder and civilizer, and presented 
Belgium as a father who had finally decided to give a little freedom to his son while keeping a vigilant eye on him. 
For Lumumba, this sounded like an insult and he had to resolve to speak, to restore the truth at his own risk. 
139 In the evening of that day, Lumumba made another speech at the dinner with Belgian officials to clarify the 
intentions of his speech of the day. His idea was not to minimize the Belgian government, much less their work, he 
justified. But the die had been cast. The trial he had made to colonization, his socialist and unitarian ideas had 
already earned him a communist connotation. In this context of cold war, it was clear that his fate was sealed. 
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applauded for many minutes by thousands of listeners, but at the same time he opened the door 
to a crisis whose consequences are still palpable today.  
The Congo had two leaders, one of whom (Lumumba) was considered a hero, an anti-
colonialist in the world of the communist left, and a devil, an enemy to be destroyed in the 
opposite direction. The other (Kasavubu) was considered by the capitalist bloc and the 
imperialists as a wise and moderate man, but also as a perfect "servant of imperialism" for the 
other camp. These stereotypes will unfortunately spread throughout the political class and divide 
Congolese politicians. The climax of this opposition will be reached on September 5, 1960, when 
on the national channel, President Kasavubu announces in a brief speech, the dismissal of Prime 
Minister Lumumba who "betrayed the task that was entrusted to him and threw the country into 
an atrocious civil war. Thus, I have deemed it necessary to dismiss the government immediately. 
The same day, Lumumba will produce in turn a communiqué revoking the president 
Kasavubu.140 For each of them, the fault was to be found in the other. This bad start will be 
crowned by what history has called the first Congolese crisis.141 This crisis presents the following 
picture: the massive flight of the Belgians who remained in the Congo after independence and 
who now feared for their lives because of the mutinies, the invasion of the Belgian army, the 
military intervention of the United Nations, the political support of the Soviet Union which will 
make the Congo a real ground for the cold war, a serious constitutional and state crisis, two 
major secessions (that of Katanga with its governor Moise Tshombe, on July 11, 1960 and that of 
South Kasai with Albert Kalondji, on August 9, 1960) and above all the imprisonment, the 
escape, the capture, the torture and the assassination of the Prime Minister, on January 16, 
                                                          
140 Van Reybrouck and Garrett, Congo, 303–4. 




1961.142 All these events were experienced by the Congolese people within 6 months of 
independence.  
The country was almost non-existent, decomposed, and fell into a civil war with 
rebellions that it could not control, ethnic conflicts set fire to the administration, creating scenes 
of killings (in Katanga, in Kivu). The first republic was a fiasco. Between 1960 and 1965, the 
president, the prime minister, the army, the rebels, the Belgians, the United Nations, the 
Russians, and even the Cubans and the Chinese, each adopted a logic that was secretly coherent 
and understandable but openly contradictory to those of the others. And as always it was the 
people who paid the price.  
2.2. Carelessness and complicity in evil of Congolese authorities (1965 -2002)143 
Since the slippage and disorder that prevailed in the management of the country between 
1960 and 1965, the Congo has never fully recovered from the chaos. The advent of Joseph 
Desire Mobutu144 at the head of the country by a military coup on November 24, 1965, certainly 
put an end to a period of disorder at the head of the state, restored national unity, and opened the 
country to the era of the second republic. But behind this fanfare, which was a typical African 
pattern of the independence years,145 was a hidden manipulation of the Western powers which 
                                                          
142 Reybrouck, Congo, 306. 
143 This period is so long and complex that we will simply mention the part that concerns the years in which we 
situate the present work, i.e., between 1994-2002, that is, the evening of Mobutu's reign and the reign of Laurent 
Desire Kabila and the dawn of Joseph Kabila's (son of Laurent Désiré Kabila) arrival in power. 
144Before working as a journalist for the liberal daily newspaper of Leopoldville, L'Avenir (now Kinshasa), Mobutu 
pursued military training in the public force. He obtained a certificate as a secretary-accountant before being 
assigned to the General Staff of Leopoldville in 1953. In 1956, he met Patrice Emery Lumumba, thanks to Antoine-
Roger Bolamba, his mentor. He never left him and became increasingly close to him, joining Lumumba's party, the 
MNC (Mouvement National Congolais). He participated in the Round Table in Brussels where his qualities put him 
under the spotlight of Larry Devlin (see Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot 
Zone, (New York, PublicAffairs, 2007), who later played an active role in Mobutu's seizure of power as a CIA 
liaison officer. In July 1960, he was appointed Secretary of State in the government of Patrice Lumumba. As the 
only member of Lumumba's entourage to have experience  
145 Zone International- ICI.Radio-Canada.ca, “En Afrique, 200 coups d’État en 70 ans | Les cartes week-end,” 
Radio-Canada.ca (Radio-Canada.ca), accessed March 23, 2021, https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1147040/coups-
etat-putsch-afrique-amerique-sud. Bernard Barbeau has listed, in this article, 200 coups in 70 years on the African 
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were in the middle of the Cold War. The so-called capitalist bloc (led by the United States) and 
the so-called communist bloc (following the policy of the USSR) were fighting each other for the 
control of the resources of the African continent. The Congo, whose uranium had already 
contributed to the manufacture of the first atomic bomb,146 was now the central issue of the Cold 
War.147 The control of the Shinkolobwe Uranium mines in the Katanga province could determine 
the outcome of the war between the USA and the USSR. Both were aware of the power of this 
bomb as a weapon of deterrence and also of mass destruction. It was therefore necessary to have 
at the head of the Congo, a leader dedicated to safeguarding the interests of one or the other 
camp. Finally, the United States, helped by Belgium, succeeded in ousting Patrice Emery 
Lumumba148 – the hero of the independence and the first prime minister of the independent 
Congo who made the crisis of the secession of the rich province of Katanga by soliciting the 
support of the Russians and as a result making himself enemy of the Americans – and pushed 
aside president Joseph Kasavubu, to the profit of Joseph Desire Mobutu of which they made the 
savior of Congo.149  
                                                          
continent. Between 1960 and 1970, Africa experienced 36 coups of which 23 succeeded and 13 failed. This was the 
darkest decade on the continent in terms of governance. Further details can be found in the article by Patrick J. 
McGowan, "African Military coups, 1956-2001: Frenquency, Trends and Distribution, in, The journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3, Sep. 2003, 339-70. 
146 “The Legacy of the Involvement of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Bombs Dropped on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki,” MIT Faculty Newsletter (blog), February 27, 2021, https://fnl.mit.edu/january-february-2021/the-
legacy-of-the-involvement-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-in-the-bombs-dropped-on-hiroshima-and-
nagasaki/. In this article, Professor Jean Bele, member of the Hadronic Physics Group, MIT Nuclear Weapons 
Education Project, Laboratory for Nuclear Science in the Department of Physics at MIT, revisits the revelations of 
Susan Williams' book, Spies in the Congo: America's Atomic Mission in World War II, and shows how not only 
was the Congo at the heart of the geopolitics of the time, but more importantly, how in the name of control of the 
Congo's uranium mines, Congolese lives have been and continue to be lost. 
147 Susan Williams, “How a Rich Uranium Mine Thrust the Congo into the Centre of the Cold War,” The 
Conversation, accessed March 23, 2021, http://theconversation.com/how-a-rich-uranium-mine-thrust-the-congo-
into-the-centre-of-the-cold-war-64761. 
148 Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo: A Memoir of 1960-67, 1st ed (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 94–99. 
Devlin recounts how President Eisenhower himself authorized the physical elimination of Lumumba.  




All the Western powers encouraged Mobutu to quell rebellions throughout the country, 
reunify the country, revive the economy, improve the social conditions of the people and build a 
strong army (the military was trained in the USA, France, Israel or the instructors came to Zaire).  
At the same time that his "friends" (the powers of the capitalist bloc) glorified him for these 
exploits, they turned a blind eye to all his dictatorial excesses (he spent 32 years at the head of 
the country), his authoritarian governance (only one political party existed in the Congo and 
there was no room for the opposition), the hanging of opponents (on June 2, 1966), the 
squandering of state assets, corruption and human rights violations, cult of personality (he 
proclaimed himself Marechal and president for life). Mobutu could even stand up at the United 
Nations to reproach Western countries for their unhealthy imperialism, vilify colonialism and 
break diplomatic relations with Israel in favor of Egypt, all in a satire lasting more than two 
hours. No power reacts. As long as Mobutu protected their interests, they tolerated and 
sometimes even covered up all his excesses.150 Mobutu was thus at the head of Zaire, not for the 
sake of the people but as a steward of the West. He served as a shield against the communism 
that had taken over neighboring Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Thus, over the years, the 
intoxication of power, the race to have and the taste for appearances, took away the one who was 
called the Eagle of Kawele (from the name of the hill of his native village where he had built a 
sumptuous residence to welcome his distinguished guests) and Zaire sank into an ever-deeper 
abyss. The end of the Cold War sounded the death knell for the Marechal's reign.  
Little by little, the West began to abandon him. The pressure inside the country and the 
protests of a people tired of 32 years of essentially dictatorial power, pushed Mobutu to make a 
speech on April 24, 1990, in which he promised an opening to a multiparty system, a transition 
                                                          
150 Reybrouck, Congo, 361–65. We also have Larry Devlin of the US Secret Service who details in his book "Chief 
of Station Congo. 
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that would lead to elections and the end of the state party, which left him still in charge. The 
country was disintegrating, inflation was rising, rebellions were beginning to surface in the East 
and the Americans had already found a new successor. Thus, on April 29, 1997, Bill Clinton sent 
a letter to Mobutu to signify the end of "the long history of close friendship between the United 
States and Zaire.151  
As Charles Onana noted, between 1994 and 1996, the Americans, against the advice of 
the French, delayed, through the Security Council, the intervention of United Nations agencies in 
the Hutu refugee camps in the East of the country in order to separate the ex-FAR soldiers and 
the Hutu Interahamwe militiamen from the civilian population. The Zairian army, already 
weakened and infiltrated, gangrened by corruption and tribalism, without motivation and 
deprived of ammunition, could not ensure security either at the borders, let alone throughout the 
national territory. Tribal and ethnic struggles took on serious proportions. The RPF rebels took 
advantage of this chaos, brandished the Hutu threat to Rwanda and played the card of allies who 
came to the rescue of a liberation rebellion that they had created by putting a Congolese figure in 
the limelight: Laurent Desire Kabila. Indeed, history will show the true face of the RPF and its 
military wing, the RPA: the massacre of Congolese civilians and Hutu refugees. Mobutu himself, 
threatened with death by the rebels whom he knew would not give him a chance, left Zaire and 
went to Morocco to die of a prostate cancer. His remains are still there today.  
2.2.1. Laurent Désiré Kabila and the trap of liberation 
Like his predecessor Mobutu, Laurent Désiré Kabila came to power through a military 
coup. Kabila was already known by the American secret services as being ideologically close to 
Lumumba and therefore nourished by communist ideas. However, he was not immediately 
                                                          
151 Onana, Ces Tueurs Tutsi, 81–83. 
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perceived as a threat to American interests, especially since the West thought that Kagame could 
control him and bring him to cooperate with the Western powers.  His fight against Mobutu, 
which dated back to the 1960s with the ousting of Lumumba and his assassination, his forced 
exile and guerrilla life, and his hatred of Mobutu made him the ideal recruit to cover up 
Rwanda's invasion of the Congo. The war seemed to be waged by the Congolese, for the 
Congolese and against the Congolese. It is surprising that the international community did not 
condemn the recruitment of young children as soldiers by the AFDL, or the massive human 
rights violations along the march to Kinshasa.  
Another element that made Kabila an easy prey was what Professor Isidore Ndaywel 
describes in his book as the negligence of the Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS). It was 
supposed to put all the political tendencies of the country on the same table. Unfortunately, the 
conference made the mistake of not inviting Laurent Désiré Kabila, whose political party had 
claimed to be part of the conference and who had since been fighting against the government. 
Kabila therefore felt ignored by Mobutu and took this as a sign of rejection. He was therefore 
ready to take revenge on Mobutu. As with Kagame and Habyarimana a few years earlier, Kabila 
and Mobutu were called to a negotiating table mediated by President Nelson Mandela. While a 
ceasefire was being negotiated, AFDL troops were advancing and Kabila gave no hope of an 
amicable agreement, feeling that his victory was already close. From the AFDL spokesman, 
Kabila proclaimed himself president and finally president of Zaire, which would become the 
Democratic Republic of Congo once again. He had just taken his friends from Rwanda, Burundi, 
Uganda and the United States by surprise. He had ousted Mobutu, whom he had been fighting 
since the 1960s, and now he wanted to sit in the presidential chair. He had just accomplished his 
dream, to crown his struggle. His first objective was not the people. However, he will 
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immediately, like Mobutu in his beginnings, proceed to reforms and to the revival of the 
economy.  
Still like Mobutu, he will muzzle opponents, eliminate his comrades-in-arms and reign 
supreme. The most serious mistake will be to chase away his former allies (Rwanda, Burundi, 
Uganda). By touching Rwanda, he alienated the USA, Great Britain and France. Moreover, he 
was quick to show himself intransigent towards the Americans, reminding them whenever he 
could that they could not manipulate him as they had done with Mobutu. He had just alienated 
not only his former allies, but above all the United States under Bill Clinton. Thus, in 1998, only 
one year after his accession to power, his former allies started two wars in the east and north of 
the country: Rwanda took over the Kivus and Uganda took over the Eastern Province and 
Equateur. At the same time, investors boycotted his campaign to raise funds for his three-year 
plan to revive vital sectors of life for the Congolese people. The plan was valued at $3 billion. He 
refused to accept the conditions that accompanied this aid: the repayment of the debt contracted 
by Mobutu, the respect of the mining agreements signed at the time of the conquest of power, 
and the acceptance of an independent investigative mission on the massacres of Rwandan 
refugees in the Congo, the idea being to expose him to the world as a murderer. He understood 
the game and instead began to expose Rwanda and denounced the cruelty of the RPA soldiers. 
He even called on the population to rise up and drive out the Tutsi invader.152 
 The country was once again plunged into war. Kabila spent his last years, between 1998 
and 2001, fighting the RCD and MLC rebels (supported by Uganda). The state's money was 
absorbed into the war effort, and Congo's mines were exploited to support the illegal purchase of 
                                                          




arms and ammunition. In fact, the country had, in the midst of the war against the RCD and 
MLC rebellions, been placed under a military embargo that had begun with Mobutu, but also 
under an economic embargo. On the other hand, Kagame benefited at the same time from a loan 
of 95 million dollars from the IMF. Kabila tried not to lose the confidence of his people by 
bringing about economic reforms. The people were divided between recognizing the courage of 
the man who had chosen to emancipate himself from his former allies, to stand up to the West 
and to show the will to bring about a radical change in the course of the country. But the war was 
costly and the misery that overwhelmed the people, soon got the better of his courage to stay 
behind the leader.  He himself became obsessed with the war and its arm wrestling with the 
Western powers. He will come out a loser of this struggle in which he will lose his life, on 
January 16, 2001, assassinated in his office. More than Mobutu, he left a country torn in four, 
whose army was almost non-existent. He also made the mistake of dismissing almost all the 
soldiers of the old regime, who would have been the nucleus of a new army, and who had been 
trained at a high price in the world's largest military academies. 
3. The Congolese Army: Portrait of a giant with feet of clay 
One of the greatest causes of the perpetuation of conflicts in Eastern Congo is the 
weakness of its army. General Douglas McArthur said, "Training distinguishes an army from an 
armed mob.” Throughout its history, the Congolese Army has always had difficulty in finding its 
own personal mark and in forming a real corps around serious leaders. In this sense, it will be 
what Aristotle calls a routed army, that is, an army whose warriors have been scattered by the 
enemy. But suddenly one of them stops. The others imitate What they see seeing. Then they 
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reform the ranks and return to the attack.153 Since the country's independence on June 30, 1960, 
the army has navigated between flight, desertion and mutilation on the one hand, and courage, 
loyalty and sacrifice for the nation on the other. We are going to spread our analysis over two 
major periods which sufficiently demonstrate this handicap of the Congolese army which, over 
the years, has become a real paralysis, preventing it from overcoming the rebel groups in the East 
of the country. It should be noted at the outset that this inability to build up a strong and 
disciplined army is rooted in tribal recruitment, the lack of competent senior officers and 
managers, the poverty of the budget allocated to defense and armament, and finally the 
infiltration of the Congolese army by foreign forces (in particular, elements of the Rwandan 
army). 
3.1. The Congolese Army at independence: a body deprived of its head (1960-1965) 
Only four days after independence, on July 5, 1960, the first Congolese crisis broke out. 
It came from the army, from the soldiers installed in the camp of Thysville (now Mbanza-
Ngungu in the province of Bas Congo). This great mute, as the Congolese historian Isidore 
Ndaywel calls it, wanted to speak out against what it described as unjust and humiliating. Indeed, 
during the period of colonization, the Congolese troops, supervised by Belgian officers154 in 
general had proven their courage and fighting spirit in the battles of the first and second world 
wars to defend the interests of the Allies against the Axis forces.155 However, all the veterans of 
                                                          
153 This image, Aristotle uses it in his Second Analytics to explain a notion that at first sight does not fit with war or 
the army: it is knowledge. But we will take the analogy at the first degree, i.e. as it is given. 
154 Reybrouck, Congo, 308–9. The Congolese troops were estimated at 25,000 men with a thousand Belgian officers. 
No Congolese were officers or even non-commissioned officers. 
155 The Congolese troops, known at the time as the Force Publique, won important battles against the then German 
Cameroon, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania (including the victory of Tabora, a town in the northwest of the country, 
and Mwanza) under the command of Belgian officers. During the Second World War, the Public Force, commanded 
by General Major Gilliaert, entered into a campaign against Italian troops in the East Horn of Africa. With a strength 
of 150,000 men, they conquered Asosa (a city in Ethiopia), Gambela (still in Ethiopia) and Saio. Proud of these 
victories, the troops advanced northwards and reached Sudan, Egypt and even Burma (in South East Asia).. 
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these wars will never be rewarded to their rightful title (medals, rise in rank, improvement of the 
salary, new houses, transfers, etc.). On the contrary, they wrote a letter to their Belgian hierarchy 
to stigmatize the abuses they were subjected to.  The feeling of equality towards their Belgian 
comrades, which they boasted of after the first two world wars, created a mistrust in the Belgian 
authorities' leaders. The latter then created a superior command of the metropolitan forces of 
Africa (COMETRO) to monitor the military and the Public Force and to ward off any hint of 
insurrection.  
The arrival of independence was therefore an opportunity for them to finally be put 
forward and rewarded by the republic. Faced with the inertia and silence of the new Congolese 
authorities, the military rose up to express their anger.156 This mutiny forced the Belgian army to 
intervene to protect the Belgian nationals still there and to disarm the Congolese military. This 
act sounded like an affront and an attack by a foreign army on a sovereign territory. Mutinies 
multiplied because the army lacked leadership and officers. Some corporals formed themselves 
into gang leaders and wreaked havoc (looting, sequestration of Belgian citizens, seizure of 
foreigners' property). These soldiers in search of the "fruits of independence" did not hesitate to 
sell their services to secession movements such as Tsombe in Katanga or Kalondji in Kasai. The 
political authorities were no longer able to control the army. Mobutu forced the UN to demand 
the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo (from July 28 to August 31, 1960) and the 
dispatch of Blue Helmets from July 16.157 This first breach in the Congolese army was the 
beginning of the crises to come in the Congo. Indeed, this army did not have a soul, a solid core 
of officers around whom it could gravitate and orient itself. We understand better then Nigel 
Hamilton when he says: "An Army is a creation of its commander, not the sum of its units". This 
                                                          
156 Ndaywel, Histoire Du Congo, Des Origines à Nos Jours, 186–87. 
157 Ndaywel, 187. 
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soul Mobutu will try with the help of the Americans and the Belgians to give it to the Congolese 
National Army but once again some flaws will make of this army a weakness rather than a 
strength for the Nation. 
3.2. Privatization and corruption of the Zairean Armed Forces (1965 à 1997) 158 
One of the main reasons for the fall of President Mobutu and the carnage of the Rwandan 
and Ugandan armies on Congolese soil is certainly the disintegration of the Zairean Armed 
Forces. The troops of the AFDL (made up mainly of young teenagers without any serious 
military training) supported by those of the RPA (driven by the desire for revenge and the thirst 
for extermination) and the NRA (eager to demystify the great Mobutu), had succeeded in taking 
control of the 2,345,000 km2 that is the Congo in only 7 months and by moving generally on 
foot with a medium armament. And for good reason, in many places the military had deserted the 
battlefield, or negotiated their surrender, or put up resistance but due to lack of means were 
defeated. How to account for the debacle of one of the most powerful armies in Africa in the 70s 
and 80s? Let us begin by understanding what we mean by armed forces. The U.S. Army website 
offers this definition: "the army is one of the largest and most important government 
organization in a Country. Its function is to defend the people from aggressors with a force of 
qualified, skilled, and dedicated soldiers.”159 Mobutu made this definition his own, obviously 
with the help of Americans. The context of the Cold War during which he took power, the 
rebellions that raged throughout the country, the risk of aggression by states with communist 
allegiances (Angola or Zambia) with the consequence of gaining control of strategic minerals, 
                                                          
158 Kisukula Abeli Meitho, La Désintégration de l’armée Congolaise de Mobutu à Kabila, Mémoires Lieux de 
Savoir (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001). This book constitutes in our opinion a reference document for the understanding 
of the disintegration of the Congolese army, which became Zairean under Mobutu (1971) and became Congolese 
again in 1997 with the seizure of power by President Laurent Desire Kabila. We draw much inspiration from it in 
this part. 
159 “About the Army,” goarmy.com, accessed March 27, 2021, https://www.goarmy.com/about.html. 
68 
 
pushed Western collaborators to help Congo-Zaire build an army according to international 
standards. From the start, it was already clear that the soul of the Zairean army, or rather, the 
intention behind the formation and foundation of the army, was not primarily to defend the 
national territory and its people. These two elements were a corollary of the defense of the 
interests of the Western powers (especially American, Belgian, French, etc.). Thus, many Zairian 
soldiers received quality training in the great military academies of the world (USA, Belgium, 
Israel, Morocco, etc.). Even on the national territory, large military training centers such as 
Kibomango, Kitona, Kamina, were created. Training in the most diverse military fields was 
provided by Israeli (paratrooper training) and American (army and special forces) instructors. To 
avoid any risk of secession, Mobutu resorted to mixing soldiers from different regions of the 
country, to transfers and especially to financial treats160 (loyalty was obtained at a high price). 
The problem with this system is that it contributed to creating a chasm within the army between 
the very rich and opulent officers and the sometimes-miserable subordinates whose discontent 
grew slowly but surely. Thus, he was able, but often with the help of mercenaries (Bob Denard 
and Jean Schramm for example), or Belgian paratroopers, to subdue the various rebellions and 
thus clean up the country and open it up to business. Unfortunately, the military officers who 
were already used to taking bribes to remain loyal became more and more greedy. They were 
unknowingly one of the sources of the country's future misery. All the rebels hid in their dens, 
waiting for the right moment, when there would be more money to ensure their loyalty, to go to 
war against the Marechal. 
                                                          
160 Van Reybrouck and Garrett, Congo, 345–46. With the Vietnam war, the world price of copper had risen and 
Mobutu had enough money to stifle all revolts and to ensure the loyalty of all officers, apart from terror of course 
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If at the beginning of his reign, Mobutu had presented himself as a patriotic military man, 
concerned with restoring order and defending the integrity of the national territory,161 over the 
years, he became an unbearable dictator (he had all those who could become potential 
adversaries killed)162 whose actions contradicted the propaganda words he had fed the people. 
With a political class bogged down in endless power struggles, political and administrative 
authorities that showed their inability to control the country and respond to the expectations of 
the people, rebellions that divided the country (Pierre Mulele in Kwilu and Laurent Desire 
Kabila in the East) and an economic fabric that was disintegrating at a glance, Mobutu, then 
Chief of Staff of the army, appeared to everyone as the savior of the Nation. His military coup of 
November 24, 1965, although it broke a cacophony at the top of the state, had just opened a 
breach that would not be closed again during his entire reign: the politicization of the Army. The 
army, which was supposed to remain apolitical and subject to the civil authority, became 
politicized and took the place of the civil authority.  
These faults of the Zairian army were to emerge with the end of the Cold War and the 
weakening of Mobutu's reign. Abandoned by the Americans, rejected by the Belgians, and 
abandoned by the French, he was cut off from all funding. No longer able to bribe officers, many 
of those who had been loyal to him did not hesitate to betray him and sell the country. Thus, 
                                                          
161 Onana, Ces Tueurs Tutsi, 66–69. The American and Belgian secret services had decided to turn their spotlight on 
Mobutu because they realized that Moise Tsombe (the leader of the Katangese secession with the help of Belgium 
and the USA and prime minister at the time) was no longer meeting their expectations. The rebellion that was born 
in the east of 1961 would grow and gain ground. It was supported by the Chinese and African countries that were 
fighting against imperialism (Ethiopia, Algeria). The USA and Belgium were afraid that this revolution would set 
the country ablaze and that the government would collapse, leaving the Communists in charge of the Congo. The 
panic became complete when some Congolese leaders decided to invite Cuba into the dance. As Tsombe proved no 
longer to be carrying out the orders given to him by the West, he became a danger. A more docile and cooperative 
replacement had to be found. The CIA, through Larry Devlin, chose Mobutu. 
162 Van Reybrouck and Garrett, Congo, 341–42. 
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when AFDL troops invaded the country in 1997, even the formidable DSP was no longer able to 
fight, nor to ensure the security of President Mobutu, who was forced to flee to Morocco.  
3.3. The Disintegration of the Democratic Republic of Congo Armed Forces 1997- 2002) 
On May 17, 1997, when AFDL troops took the Congolese capital, Kinshasa, ending 
Mobutu's reign, the country had almost no armed forces left. The Rwandan and Ugandan armies 
that had helped him take power would eventually have to withdraw. His own troops were mostly 
made up of young teenagers (Kadogo) whose place was on the school bench and not in the 
armed forces. One of the great reforms that Kabila gave himself was to rebuild the army. He 
began by changing the name of the Forces Armées Zaïroises to Forces Armées Congolaises. If 
his intention was good, his implementation will suffer from certain decisions that will prove to 
be suicidal for the Congolese army and will destroy it even more.163 
 Kabila's first mistake was to surround himself with Kadogo, frustrated and embittered 
former Mobutu soldiers, those who did not receive crumbs from the tables of the officers and 
non-commissioned officers, ex-Katangese tigers, Tutsi soldiers from Rwanda and Banyamulenge 
civilians (Tutsis from Congo) who had enlisted to defend their community. We did not have an 
army, but rather small groups, each of which obeyed its own commanders.164  
This appointment was received as a humiliation by many ex-FAZ soldiers, who saw it as 
a hostage-taking of the Congolese Army. Indeed, many of the officers of the Congolese Army 
and the intelligence services were Tutsis from the RPA,165 Angola had denounced this situation 
                                                          
163 Cf. Onana, Ces Tueurs Tutsi, 132–35. The ex-FAZ soldiers refused to obey commanders of Rwandan origin, the 
Banyamulenges were more concerned with their ethnic community than with national unity, and the Tutsis wanted 
to accomplish the mission for which they had agreed to accompany Kabila 
164 The ex-FAZ soldiers refused to obey commanders of Rwandan origin, the Banyamulenges were more concerned 
with their ethnic community than with national unity, and the Tutsis wanted to accomplish the mission for which 
they had agreed to accompany Kabila.  




to Kabila. But Kabila, obsessed with his meteoric rise to the supreme magistracy, did not pay 
attention to these warnings, thus leaving the Congolese army in the hands of Rwanda. The 
killings that these soldiers carried out in peace in the east of the country were covered up by 
Kabila, who blamed them on the Interahamwe in front of the media and human rights NGOs. But 
dissension and tension within the army itself forced Kabila to take leave of his Rwandan allies, a 
decision that was certainly good but unwise in its timing and that would cost the country and its 
people a second, more violent war. But it was too late. They were already very well established 
to agree to leave. He nevertheless dismissed James Kabarebe as head of the Congolese army, 
which triggered a manhunt against the Tutsis in the army. In response, we saw the creation of the 
RCD rebellion in the east of the country. The Rwandan military wanted to take revenge on 
Kabila. By occupying the east of the country, by securing the services of certain Congolese and 
by killing civilians, they humiliated Kabila and proved to him that they were the masters, his 
godfathers, the very ones who had brought him to power. The population was once again paying 
for the mistakes of its leader. 
Let us also emphasize Kabila's refusal to work with the former military officers of the ex-
FAZ, some of whom wanted to help rebuild the national army.166 For the old maquis, Kabila, all 
the officers of the Mobutu regime were corrupt and could not serve in his army. He was 
encouraged in this decision by his Rwandan colleagues in the RPA who knew the strength of 
these men (remember the defeat they inflicted on the RPA in October 1990). Kabila himself 
closed the door to the construction of a Congolese army by Congolese officers who had been 
well trained and who knew the RPA very well. Many officers will flee to Brazzaville (in 
neighboring Congo) and others to Angola and other neighboring countries.) Soon Kabila will 
                                                          
166 Onana, Ces Tueurs Tutsi, 132. 
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realize his mistake, because his allies will, as he himself will say, behave like conquerors, trying 
to impose their way of governing and leading the army. This situation pushed Kabila to the 
decision that will lead to the second Congo war.  
Conclusion: A possible way out of the crisis: social justice 
Our analysis of the root causes of the conflict in Eastern Congo has opened our eyes to a 
dimension of our humanity that we have always taken for granted and which must always be 
questioned and updated: social Justice. When millions of people are killed, not by weather, or 
natural disasters, or in the normal course of life, or accidents of daily life, but by others who 
from far and wide, plan, finance, and encourage murder, rape, and terror, it is important to 
seriously question the social justice of the human race and the rights that are vested in every 
human being.  
Along with Jenna Reinbold, we have the bitter impression that the notion of human 
rights, that lead to social justice, is more myth than reality. The conflict in Eastern Congo and the 
behavior of the actors involved further reinforces our hypothesis. The guilty and palpable 
heaviness of the UN machine through MONUC (now MONUSCO), the impression of 
powerlessness that the UN Security Council transmits to us, which produces documents 
describing the situation and condemning with the utmost energy the gravediggers of the 
Congolese civilian population, the hypocrisy and greed of neighboring states in the cooperation 
between states aimed at eradicating the rebel groups in Eastern Congo,167 the naivety or 
                                                          
167 Onana, 134. The countries bordering the Congo have always shown themselves almost incapable of respecting 
the agreements of non-aggression and interference in the internal politics of the Congo. On several occasions, troops 
from the Rwandan, Ugandan, Angolan, Zambian and Burundian armies have found themselves on Congolese 
territory without prior invitation from the Congolese government and for reasons that the Congolese government 
itself has never clarified. The Lusaka peace agreements have been violated several times by Rwanda and Uganda, 
the Dar es Salaam agreements, the Sun City peace agreements, etc. We finally wonder about the naivety of the 
Congolese government or its complicity. 
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complicity of the Congolese authorities in the lack of media coverage of this conflict, the lack of 
firm interpellation of international partners and the lack of realism on the ground due to a failing 
political and military organization.  
The difficulty of the human community (we insist here on the international and national 
institutions whose mission are to fight for social justice) to consider the Congolese crisis as a 
global emergency, In September 2003, as an example, a contingent of 5,000 blue helmets was 
deployed in the Ituri region to impose peace. But despite their presence, civilians were massacred 
in Katchele and Gobu, without the UN troops intervening, even though they had a Chapter VII 
mandate. Attacks of this kind multiplied in several regions of the East (Bunia, Kasinzi, 
Mongwalu,). It was necessary to launch Operation Artemis in Bunia to restore security because 
the Uruguayan contingent that had been in place was unable even to ensure the safety of the 
population. The peacekeepers had even been summoned by the UPC (Union of Congolese 
Patriots) rebels to leave the city.  
The lack of social justice which is only a slogan whose content has been emptied by the 
race of individualism, capitalism and personal enrichment, and cultural alienation whose result is 
the rejection of one's own identity have made the Congolese conflict a puzzle whose resolution 
rests in the knowledge and the implementation of certain principle and moral values that we are 
going to evoke in the following chapter. But first we will engage the ethical element that will 
serve as a discharge to break the locks of amnesia that has led humans to forget the sacred 





CHAPTER III: SOCIAL JUSTICE TO RESTORE FORGOTTEN MEMORIES 
Introduction 
The problem of the conflicts in Eastern DRC, which we described in the first chapter by 
evoking its Rwandan background, its national and regional protagonists, and by illustrating them 
with two specific cases, raises the necessary question of social justice. Then the description we 
have given of the main causes of this conflict, namely the state crisis, the selfishness and greed 
of politicians, and finally the disintegration of the national army, obliges every soul who is keen 
on peace and social justice, to reflect, discuss, plan and act at all levels (social, economic, 
political, religious and cultural) to promote collective well-being. Today, perhaps more than ever 
before, the urgency of a more just, equitable, and charitable society is expressed in the voices of 
all those who are crying out that they are sick and tired168 of seeing humans compete in 
massacres and gratuitous violence.  
Over the centuries, during the great conflicts that have shaken humanity, various moral 
theories have been formulated and solutions envisaged, to give human beings a framework for 
the development and expression of their rights and freedoms, regardless of their class, racial 
origin, religious denomination, and political convictions. However, it is clear that despite these 
efforts, human beings remain a conflicting subject due to their complexity and singularity. 
Therefore, the question of social justice remains relevant, especially in a modern society 
disrupted by political change, the expansion of a predatory capitalist economic model, and all the 
other ills that Pope Francis describes in the first chapter of his encyclical Laudato Si.169 
                                                          
168 Examples include Nobel Peace Prize winner Denis Mukwege, elected deputies from the Eastern Congo region, 
NGOs such as LUCHA, FILIMBI, writers such as Charles Onana, Judith Rever, David Van Reybrouck, Cinthya 
McKinney, Pope Francis, etc. 
169 “Laudato Si’ (24 May 2015) | Francis,” 17–61, accessed May 9, 2020, 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-
si.html. The pope goes into detail about pollution and climate change, the issue of water, the loss of biodiversity, the 
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The post-World War II era was an important turning point in the evolution of the issue of 
social justice. Humanity realized the horrors it was capable of if it neglected the issue of social 
justice. It, therefore, wanted to lay the foundations of a just society by declaring universal human 
rights (on December 10, 1948). However, this was not enough to prevent the long and costly 
Cold War, the Vietnam War from 1955 to 1975, the nuclear conflict of 1966, apartheid in South 
Africa, post-colonial imperialism in Africa and Asia,170 the great waves of social protests in Latin 
America and the resulting bloody dictatorships and military coups, the genocide in Rwanda in 
1994 and the conflict in the Congo that has lasted since 1996. The intellectual elite is therefore 
once again confronted with its failures and called to think of new forms of living together in 
justice and social harmony. 
About 40 years ago, on September 14, 1981, Pope John Paul II, writing the encyclical 
Laborem exercens,171 was convinced that work was a key, and probably the essential key, to the 
whole question of social justice. In meantime, John Rawls had already 10 years before presented 
the primary object of justice as to how the most important social institutions allocate 
fundamental rights and duties, as well as how the distribution of the benefits derived from work 
and social cooperation is determined. Today, such a discourse is no longer sufficient. The 
profound changes that society is undergoing bring new injustices that go beyond the economic 
and political framework. The development of private property, excessive individualism, and the 
                                                          
deterioration of the quality of human life and social degradation, global inequality, the weakness of reactions and the 
diversity of opinions 
170 We are referring here to concepts such as the Commonwealth, France-Africa, Belgian cooperation and the CFA 
Franc. All these elements allow the former metropolises to keep a grip on the political and economic life of their 
former colonies. 
171 “Laborem Exercens (14 September 1981) | John Paul II,” accessed April 1, 2021, 
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091981_laborem-
exercens.html. This encyclical, published on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the encyclical Rerum Novarum 




dictatorship of economic liberalism have created cracks that undermine social institutions and 
seriously impact the lives of millions of people. Consequently, boosting the economy is no 
longer sufficient for human happiness. It has even become, for many, a place of injustice and 
exploitation. The issue of minerals in the Congo is a perfect example to illustrate the predation 
and sadism of the modern economic model.  
The exploitation of Congo's mineral resources escapes to the Congolese government 
control and is concentrated in the hands of groups of individuals who set market prices, define 
the laws of supply and demand and exploit their employees. In a report dated February 2021, the 
Carter Foundation evaluated the achievements of mining companies operating in Kivu at 4.9/10, 
which means a failure to improve the living conditions of the local population, given the turnover 
generated by their mining activities. Companies mentioned include Lugushwa Mining, The Sino-
Congolaise des Mines, Frontier, Twangiza Mining, Tenke Fungurume Mining, Kamoto Copper 
Company, Kibali Goldmines, Mongbwalu Gold Mines (formerly Ashanti Goldfields Kilo).172  
Most of these companies make huge profits from the chaotic, unsupervised or lax and corrupt 
environment of the Congolese government, but also from the financing of armed groups 
(THAISARCO, Afrimex, Trademet were involved in this financing) as highlighted by Global 
Witness in a report published on July 20, 2009.  
In this situation of insecurity, war, terror, and economic misery, the weakness or absence 
of institutional power reinforces the affirmation and imposition of individual powers, opening 
the door to serious injustices. It is therefore urgent to think of a new theorization of social justice. 
Alongside the call to contain socio-economic inequalities (although some are considered 
                                                          




tolerable according to Rawls173), increasingly strong voices are being raised against all other 
forms of inequality (cultural discrimination, religious oppression, or ecological destruction). In 
both secular and religious circles of reflection, an undeniable concern to find a receptacle for all 
these voices and to bring out a homogeneous synthesis for the good of all is reflected in various 
debates and writings. 
This chapter will then focus on the theorization and application of social justice theory to 
restore forgotten memories in the Congo. We will therefore have two main parts: the first, 
theoretical, will put into dialogue the visions of social justice according to the model given to us 
by two modern thinkers: Nancy Fraser174 and Pope Francis.175  Then, with the help of the insights 
drawn from the dialogue between these two authors, we will make practical proposals to 
enlighten local, national and international decision-makers on how to restore the memories of 
those who have been and continue to be victims of social injustice. 
1. Rethinking Social Justice: Nancy Fraser and Pope Francis in dialogue 
1.1. Why Nancy Fraser and Pope Francis?  
Nancy Fraser's democratic approach to social justice constitutes a major advance in the 
construction of a more balanced and just modern society. Fraser points out that the emergence of 
the paradigm of identity-based recognition overturns the traditional paradigm of redistribution as 
the matrix of social justice.176   Between these two paradigms (redistribution and recognition) 
which seem irreconcilable in their approach to social justice, Nancy Fraser shows on the contrary 
                                                          
173 For John Rawls, inequalities would be tolerated as long as a part of the benefits generated by the activity of the 
most talented went to the least favored, or if they were to the advantage of all. 
174 Nancy Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics. Redistribution, Recognition, Participation.,” n.d., 29. 
175 We will consider the references of Pope Francis in his encyclicals Evangelii Gaudium, Laudato Si and Fratelli 
Tutti made public on October 4, 2020. 
176 Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics. Redistribution, Recognition, Participation.,” 1. 
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that true social justice will come from the combination of these two paradigms and not from their 
opposition. Redistribution and recognition must be two sides of the same coin, that of social 
justice.177  In other words, the cry for social justice must combine both the recognition of identity 
differences and the eradication of socio-economic inequalities through the respect of the 
universal destination of goods. The way to reconcile these two theories, Nancy Fraser finds in a 
new paradigm: that of equal participation, which finds an echo in the worldview of Pope Francis.  
Pope Francis proposes to think of social justice, which he calls integral development in 
his encyclical Laudato Si or the best politics (chap. 5) in Fratelli Tutti, as a symbiosis of all 
aspects of human life. Human development is no longer to be confined to an exclusively 
economic, cultural, or religious sphere. All these dimensions must enter into dialogue to open the 
world to what Pope Francis calls the social pact.178 The Pope goes even further by integrating the 
ecological dimension to the construction of a just society (the notion of integral ecology is very 
much linked to that of social justice and the well-being of humanity in the encyclical Laudato Si.  
Convinced, on our part, that the new approaches to social justice of these two thinkers are 
one of the keys to the restoration of forgotten memories in the Congo, the dialogue between 
Nancy Fraser and Pope Francis will allow us to better orient our proposals and make our actions 
more concrete and effective. Without dwelling on the divergences of these two authors, we will 
rather point out their approaches to the theory of social justice and then the convergences and the 
richness that they bring to our struggle for the restoration of forgotten memories for the 
construction of a new Congolese society that is just and harmonious. 
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1.2. The Urgency of Social Justice Paradigm Change.  
1.2.1. Nancy Fraser and the rise of new paradigm 
The philosophical and political controversy between Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser in 
2003179 sounded the death knell for major developments in social justice theories.  The main 
reason for this debate, which opened up social justice thinkers to the reality of the changing 
social question, allowed them not only to see societal changes more clearly but above all to 
accept to think differently about social justice. Careful observation of the new social 
configuration shows that since the 1970s and 1980s, humanity has taken a new step towards 
social justice. It has indeed moved from the first form of justice built around the theory of 
redistribution180 (which constitutes the traditional paradigm held and defended by thinkers such 
as Charles Taylor or Axel Honneth, who considers it in terms of self-realization181), to a new 
conception of justice built on the recognition of identities. Indeed, the compartmentalization of a 
monetary economy, centered on the market and production, is no longer the absolute 
thermometer of social well-being. Moreover, Fraser understands the notion of the redistribution 
paradigm beyond the simple problem of "relations between social classes" such as can be found 
in the liberalism of the New Deal, social democracy, or socialism; it (the redistribution 
paradigm) also includes all the searches for remedies to certain injustices such as those related to 
gender, race or ethnicity. From now on, the institutions in charge of the management of the Res 
publica must give a place to identity claims, that is to say to the paradigm of recognition. This is 
to be understood not only in terms of movements that seek to re-evaluate unjustly devalued 
                                                          
179 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London ; 
New York: Verso, 2003). In this debate, one of the great theorists of the social question on redistribution or 
recognition was a precursor of Nancy Fraser's reflection on the third way (parity participation). 
180 Nancy Fraser, “Justice sociale, redistribution et reconnaissance,” Revue du MAUSS no 23, no. 1 (2004): 154. 
181 Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics. Redistribution, Recognition, Participation.,” 3. 
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identities and that find expression in cultural feminism, black cultural nationalism, the gay 
identity movement, or, in the context of this work, perennial victimization, but also in terms of 
all the deconstructivism tendencies that run counter to the essentialism of traditional identity 
politics.182   Fraser recognizes the relevance of both paradigms but also recognizes the need to be 
vigilant about the danger of reducing these large, deep, and significant social movements to a 
mere class feud in the great arena of social welfare.183   
She is therefore opposed to any epistemological shortcut in the approach to such a 
complex and dynamic issue.  For her, redistribution and recognition "are dimensions of justice 
that can be found in all social movements.”184 Thus, in her approach, she seeks rather to identify, 
question, and propose a comprehensive solution to cases of social injustice and inequality as well 
as to the evolution of social paradigms. For Nancy Fraser, the solution lies in a new paradigm: 
equal participation of all in the debates of society, be they economic, social, or cultural. But how 
did we get there? More profoundly, how can we analyze the eclipse of a socialist imaginary with 
interest, exploitation, and redistribution as its themes? What can we do with the new political 
imaginary articulated around identity, difference, cultural domination, and recognition? 
According to Fraser, the decline of communism, the triumph of neoliberal ideals, and the 
prevalence of essentialist visions of social justice are the underlying reasons that paved the way 
for the celebration of subjective singularity.185  This singularity quickly developed in parallel 
with the idea of redistribution, and dissociated itself from it, until it became almost its opposite. 
There is thus today a real dualism between the paradigm of redistribution and that of recognition. 
                                                          
182 Fraser, “Justice sociale, redistribution et reconnaissance,” 154. 
183 Fraser, 153. Fraser objects to this dangerous presumption that simplifies the politics of redistribution to the 
politics of class, and the politics of recognition to a debate about sexuality, gender and race. This epistemological 
shortcut is simply wrong from his perspective. 
184 Fraser, 154. 
185 Fraser, 153. 
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The feminist movement, for example, is, for Fraser, an eloquent illustration of this oscillation 
and the debate of primacy between the two paradigms. In the case of the Congolese conflict, the 
question would be raised, for example, about the exploitation of women's bodies as shields, 
commercial funds, and weapons of war, or the mass killings of civilian populations, the tribal 
instrumentalization, and the exploitation of children in mining areas. 
These are cases with both socio-economic and cultural ramifications. However, for 
radicals on both sides, there is a mutually exclusive relationship between the two paradigms, and 
if one tries to bring them together, one side will always be subordinate to the other. For the 
proponents of the redistributive paradigm, the claim to identity is "a false consciousness," a kind 
of social malaise that impedes the achievement of social justice.  To this affront, defenders of the 
recognition paradigm denounce unhealthy materialism of the entire architecture of redistribution 
theory that jeopardizes social justice. While acknowledging that the two paradigms 
(redistribution and recognition) offer very different remedies to the question of social justice186 
and that they also diverge on "representations of victim groups," Fraser persists in believing that 
the two paradigms must be taken from the perspective of a dialectic and not a contradiction. The 
reason is that all these quarrels, far from resolving the question of social justice, crystallize it.  
The polarization of positions, the permanent oppositions, plunges the society into a 
useless dilemma. It is as if one had to choose between redistribution and recognition, which for 
Nancy Fraser is absurd and dichotomous. Social justice cannot be reduced to an entity of social 
life. The human person is a complex and plural whole, their blossoming and happiness are found 
                                                          
186 Fraser, 155. Redistribution seeks to remedy social injustice through economic restructuring by redistributing 
income, reorganizing the division of labor or transforming other fundamental economic structures. As for the 
recognition, it proposes to answer the injustice by the symbolic or cultural change through the revalorization of the 
despised identities, the valorization of the cultural diversity, or the complete transformation of the societal models of 
representation, interpretation and communication  
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in the symphony of all the aspects of their life, in this case, the economic, social, and cultural 
aspects. It is therefore imperative to formulate "a bivalent conception" of social justice,187 Fraser 
emphasizes, that takes into account the claims of both sides. Such a conception would avoid 
reducing the politics of redistribution to class warfare and the politics of recognition to issues of 
sexuality, gender, and race.  At the theoretical level, Fraser believes it is important to formulate a 
"two-dimensional" conception of social justice. She points out that "a bivalent conception treats 
distribution and recognition as distinct perspectives on, and dimensions of, justice. Without 
reducing either one of them to the other, it encompasses both dimensions within a broader, 
overarching framework."188  
This theoretical side should also be coupled with a practical programmatic basis that, 
while valuing political processes based on redistribution, favors mechanisms of identity 
recognition (we will give some examples in the second part). Fraser's concern is both to enrich 
normative philosophical thinking about justice and to provide a useful complement to "grassroots 
structures" in their efforts to build a just society. She wishes to consider Rawls' and Habermas' 
insights on social justice, Charles Taylor's and Axel Honneth's reflections, and then to propose a 
revised, corrected, and expanded approach as we will see later. 
1.2.2. Pope Francis and the Urgency of New Social Justice Thinking 
Nancy Fraser's concern for a new social justice paradigm is widely shared by the Catholic 
Church and especially by Pope Francis. Since Pope Leon XIII's encyclical dealing explicitly with 
social issues (Rerum Novarum 1891), the Catholic Church has been very actively engaged in 
promoting social justice. Responding to her mission to teach humanity to do good and to avoid 
                                                          
187 Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics. Redistribution, Recognition, Participation.,” 5. 
188 Fraser, 5. 
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evil, to work for social justice (cf. Mt 28:19-20), the Church has for years endeavored to walk 
alongside those who struggle for social justice.189  This struggle, until recently (with the rapid 
and relevant emergence of certain social issues, placed the question of social justice on the broad 
political-economic terrain, considering justice more in its distributive190 and commutative191 
assertions. Pope Francis, more than any of his predecessors, has opened the Church to a new 
perspective on the social question. It is first of all that of recognition. To deal with this question 
and to allow for a proper understanding of it, the Pope resorts to the traditional approach of the 
Church's social teaching, the trilogy "See-judge-act". This trilogy resembles Fraser's ethical 
approach in many ways. Indeed, instead of being satisfied with grand declarations, this scheme 
of reflection takes on the mission of analyzing and dissecting the subject to provide serious 
answers to relevant questions (for example, to those who reduce the encyclical Laudato Si to a 
"green" encyclical, we can object by showing that this encyclical is indeed a social encyclical 
which calls humans to ecological awareness starting from the observation of the current state of 
our planet and human behavior concerning this situation. The recognition of the evil that is 
inflicted by man to himself through ecological destruction (the case of hectares of forests cut 
                                                          
189 The decree of the Second Vatican Council on the missionary activity of the Church in the world, Ad Gentes, 
returns not only to the catechumenal mission of the Church, or to the role of the traditional missionary institutes as 
principal agents of evangelization, but it returns especially, and already in No. 2, to the pilgrim aspect of the Church. 
She is missionary by her very nature, since she draws her source from Christ and her breath from the Spirit, and is 
drawn to the Father, in that impulse of love which keeps her constantly on mission. 
190 We find a detailed analysis of distributive justice in Aristotle, notably in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, but 
also in Politics (III, 9, 1208 and III, 12, 1282 b). According to Aristotle, who analyzed the question of justice, 
distributive justice consists in the respect of the law and the pursuit of equality. This equality is not absolute but 
proportional, which implies, for example, that the distribution of burdens in a society will be done according to the 
proportion of the merits and personal relationships of each citizen. The danger that is perceptible in this form of 
justice is the introduction of inequality in the proportional distribution. The respect for the law that dictates 
distributive justice can sometimes upset the moral sense on which justice is based. The crystallization of this form of 
justice can be found in the adage of the Roman jurisconsult Ulpian: Suum cuique tribuere (give to each his due). 
191 Unlike distributive justice, which considers the respective value of persons and their unequal merits, 
commutative justice establishes an equivalence between things and gives the same share to all. Thomas Aquinas 
returns to this question in the Summa Theologica (ST IIa-IIae, 61). 
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down, water pollution, mining in the background of armed conflicts, etc.) reinforces the idea of 
the richness of this encyclical.  
Moreover, in the Catholic Church, the question of the recognition of identities is posed on 
several levels. Social changes such as the rise of secularism and its generalization, demands for 
the possibility of same-sex marriage, denunciations of the treatment of women in Catholic 
institutions, the question of women's ordination, demands for recognition of indigenous peoples, 
migratory movements, debates on abuse, have obliged the Church to decompartmentalize the 
debate, to show itself more open to dialogue and discussion. From the beginning of his 
encyclical Laudato Si, Pope Francis underlines this tension between redistribution and 
recognition, between the diktats of economic models and socio-cultural demands. Today, the 
traditional redistribution paradigm has shown its limits. Forged in a capitalist system that has 
now become predatory, this paradigm leaves aside or worse still destroys identity claims. As an 
illustration, indigenous peoples (in this case those of the Amazon in America) are being driven 
off their land by companies that exploit the forest. In the conflicts in Eastern Congo, civilians are 
killed by militias maintained by multinationals or politicians who want to exploit the Congolese 
soil and subsoil without any control.192 The Pope believes that to take into account the most 
vulnerable and to achieve true social justice, humanity needs to communicate "to discover the 
richness of each person and to value that which unites and to see differences as opportunities for 
growth in respect for all.”193  Therefore, the much-touted economic theory of "favorable 
relapse"194 or trickle-down theory is here beaten down by the Pope, supported by Nobel Prize 
                                                          
192 Cf. “Fratelli Tutti (3 October 2020) | Francis,” 125. The Pope echoes the cries of the people who suffer in the 
mining areas of Eastern Congo. 
193 “Fratelli Tutti (3 October 2020) | Francis,” 134. 
194 The pope explains this theory as one that assumes that every economic growth, fostered by free markets, 
succeeds in itself in producing greater equity and social inclusion in the world. For him, this view has never been 
confirmed in fact and expresses rather a crude and naive trust in the goodness of those who hold economic power 
and in the sacralized mechanisms of the dominant economic system. (Evangelii Gaudium, 54). 
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winner Joseph Stiglitz, with whom he reminds us that the market alone is largely insufficient to 
guarantee true social security.195  Like Nancy Fraser, with the women's movement, Pope Francis 
takes as an example the indigenous peoples who suffer from both a denial of recognition and 
economic injustice. However, from a broad point of view, recognition for pope Francis is 
recognition of each person’s dignity, which is a transcendent value. Also, then recognition of 
identity differences.  Thus, to do justice, implies to combine redistribution and recognition. To 
reject one in favor of the other would be to perpetuate an injustice. In other words, without 
leaning towards oppressive redistribution or fanatical recognition, the Pope invites a frank 
dialogue that leads economy and culture to a social synergy. This dialogue will then lead to an 
ethical course of action that will serve as a light for concrete initiatives in the field of social 
justice. 
1.3. The ideal solution for social justice 
We have just seen that Nancy Fraser and Pope Francis are aware of the mutations of 
modern society, of the rise of identity claims, of the dichotomies and absurd oppositions that 
tend to place the paradigms of redistribution and recognition at the antipodes of each other. They 
then demonstrate, using certain groups as an illustration, how an opposition between these 
theories would contribute to widening the gap of social injustice rather than to building a fair and 
balanced society. They, therefore, agree on the need to find an alternative that brings these two 
paradigms closer together and that guarantees structures and individuals true social justice on 
both a theoretical and practical level. This section will explore the notion of equal participation 
proposed by Nancy Fraser as the conjunction of redistribution and recognition. Pope Francis, on 
                                                          
195 “Fratelli Tutti (3 October 2020) | Francis,” 168. 
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the other hand, will address the sense of integral conversion and universal brotherhood proposed 
to show the main way of economic and cultural integration towards social justice.  
1.3.1. Equal participation: Nancy Fraser’s bi-dimensional conception of social justice 
Nancy Fraser is aware of the efforts of redistributive thinkers to incorporate the issue of 
recognition.   However, for her, their efforts are mitigated by the fact that they are a threat to the 
question of identity as a mere outgrowth of the problem of redistribution. She also points out that 
the disregard for identity is not only the result of deficiencies in the system of economic 
redistribution and legal discrimination.196 By sticking to her general thesis that social justice 
requires both redistribution and recognition, she then takes up the intellectual and practical 
challenge of finding the emancipatory aspects of these two paradigms that will need to be 
integrated into a general framework, or rather, a two-dimensional conception. 
This dimension is underpinned by a basic principle which, for Nancy, is the starting point 
for true social justice: egalitarian participation, that is, equal participation in the life of the 
community.197  It is this form of social justice that could guarantee both easy access to resources 
for all and greater recognition of identity. But to achieve this, two conditions must be met: a first 
"objective" and a second "intersubjective" one.  
These two conditions are essential for parity of participation. 
Neither is sufficient on its own. The objective condition emphasizes the concerns 
associated with the theory of distributive justice, particularly concerning the economy 
to the economic structure of society and class differences. 
The intersubjective condition emphasizes the concerns of recognition, particularly those related 
to the economic structure of society and class differences of recognition, particularly those 
related to the statutory order of society and of society and culturally defined status hierarchies. 
                                                          
196 Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics. Redistribution, Recognition, Participation.,” 4. 
197 Fraser, “Justice sociale, redistribution et reconnaissance,” 161. 
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Thus, a two-dimensional conception of justice that focuses on the norm of parity of participation 
encompasses both redistribution and recognition without reducing one of them to each other.198 
In this way, society will be able to drown out tendencies that unjustly denigrate certain 
cultural expressions, their qualities, and their contributions to the life of society, and to contain 
economic tendencies that through an unbridled search for profit would crush the most vulnerable 
social strata. 
With these conditions in mind, we will try to better understand the substance of Nancy's 
quest for a "two-dimensional" conception of social justice. In her normative thinking on social 
justice, Fraser considers the notion of recognition not as a condition of self-realization or 
singular (individual) identity but as a condition of parity participation.199   
 The originality of Nancy Fraser is to present the question of identity not on an individual 
scale, as Charles Taylor or Axel Honneth would do, but on a vision of social status. Indeed, for 
Charles Taylor, the growth and social development of an individual come from this meeting of 
giving and receiving with others. In other words, the social value of an individual depends on 
those for whom he or she counts and those on whom he or she counts.  As for Axel Honneth, 
basing his reflection on experiences of contempt, he supports the self-determination of everyone 
for his integrity. It is through this posture that the person imposes his recognition in his 
community. This means that it is in the value in which I recognize myself, that society will 
recognize me (Self-esteem, self-confidence, self-respect). Thus, the question of recognition 
presents itself as an opportunity for each person to form his or her identity. 
 Going against the grain, Nancy Fraser insists that recognition should instead be seen as a 
necessary condition for access to a social status that allows for equal participation in social life. 
                                                          
198 Fraser, 162. 
199 Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics. Redistribution, Recognition, Participation.,” 27. 
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In other words, for Fraser, recognition is the enjoyment by all individuals or groups of 
individuals of their social status in equal participation in social life. From this perspective, the 
protection or promotion of cultural identity is only important if it contributes to the well-being of 
society as a whole. If it does not, it would be prudent to proceed with a normative-based 
casuistry. This last point is especially important because in some cases, for equal participation, it 
is useful to deconstruct some cultural differences to ensure equal participation for all. 
Institutionalized cultural patterns "that prevent equal participation in social life"200 constitute a 
lack of recognition and become a social injustice.  
It is clear, then, that a status-based approach to justice would be the best way to bring all 
parties together for equal participation, the normative basis for social justice. In this way, Nancy 
Fraser frees us from this dichotomy, this unnecessary dilemma of choosing between 
redistribution and recognition. 
1.3.2. Pope Francis: integral ecology, Universal communion and Social Friendship 
When the Pope issued the apostolic exhortation Evangelii Gaudium (EG) in 2013, he 
denounced two great evils that plague modern society and constitute a grave social injustice: the 
culture of waste and the globalization of indifference.201  In the first case, which for Nancy Fraser 
would be equivalent to the excesses of redistribution policy, the pope castigated an economy of 
predation, "of exclusion and social disparity."202 This economy, despite spectacular advances, has 
turned into an economy of predation, taking away all hope of well-being from masses of people, 
                                                          
200 Fraser, 29. 
201 “Evangelii Gaudium : Apostolic Exhortation on the Proclamation of the Gospel in Today’s World (24 November 
2013) | Francis,” 53–60, accessed April 8, 2021, 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-
ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html. 
202 “Evangelii Gaudium : Apostolic Exhortation on the Proclamation of the Gospel in Today’s World (24 November 
2013) | Francis.” 
89 
 
in this case, the vulnerable. In the same vein, the Pope recalls the setbacks of the trickle-down 
theory, which naively and crudely throws a blanket over misery and hides all those shattered 
lives. Furthermore, the Pope condemns the idolatry of money,203 the servitude of those who 
engage in economic speculation, and violence in the name of money.204  These few elements 
evoked by the Pope sufficiently show how the paradigm of redistribution remains, despite efforts 
to improve it, insufficient to respond favorably to the demands of true social justice. On the 
cultural level, Pope Francis also notes some progress but many challenges. He would agree with 
Nancy Fraser while disagreeing with Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth when he states that a 
culture in which each person wants to be the bearer of his or her subjective truth makes it 
difficult for citizens to want to participate in a common project that goes beyond personal 
interests and desires."205 
There is inevitably a lack of respect for equal participation in a culture that focuses on the 
short term, the quick, and the superficial. Thus, we see attacks on religious freedom against a 
background of hatred and contempt. The Pope will address this issue of recognition in his 
encyclical Laudato Si. The latter, which many call a green encyclical, is in fact, for the pope 
himself, a social encyclical. It has enriched Evangelii Gaudium. In addition to showing that the 
economic paradigm is not sufficient for social well-being, the Pope also points out cultural 
inadequacies. His goal was to find and propose a new way to make the economy and culture the 
basis for building a just society. In addition to the economic and cultural paradigm, the Pope 
adds the ecological paradigm.  Returning to the recognition paradigm, the Pope uses the case of 
                                                          
203 “Evangelii Gaudium : Apostolic Exhortation on the Proclamation of the Gospel in Today’s World (24 November 
2013) | Francis,” 55. 
204 “Evangelii Gaudium : Apostolic Exhortation on the Proclamation of the Gospel in Today’s World (24 November 
2013) | Francis,” 58. 
205 “Evangelii Gaudium : Apostolic Exhortation on the Proclamation of the Gospel in Today’s World (24 November 
2013) | Francis,” 61. 
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indigenous peoples (Fraser exploits the issue of feminism) to emphasize the link that must exist 
between the paradigm of redistribution and that of recognition. "The indigenous peoples of the 
Amazon have never been so threatened in their territory, by their brothers and sisters as now."206 
This statement by the Pope opens our eyes to the problem of the social status of these people, 
which is being violated. While they are recognized as the first occupants of the Amazon region, 
they are not granted the economic rights that should go with their social status. Indigenous must 
be recognized as dignified, as full persons even if they don’t participate directly in government 
decision making arena. unfortunately, a semblance of theoretical recognition is denied by 
normative actions that grant more rights to logging companies, farmers, and industrial ranchers, 
to the detriment of indigenous peoples who often find themselves expelled from their territories. 
We have seen similar cases in the Eastern Congo region. The social injustice suffered by these 
peoples is thus "bi-dimensional" (we borrow Nancy Fraser's terms in comparison). It seems not 
only from a lack of recognition in the demarcation and titling of territories (respect for social 
status) but also from the invasion of large projects described as promoting development but 
which destroy the territories and their populations (...).  
Social justice for these peoples and by extension for the whole community, especially the 
most vulnerable, will then come from considering the economic and cultural aspects in the 
ecological context of these groups. It is this life that the Pope calls integral ecology207 and which, 
in the case of Fraser, is defined under the theme of parity participation. For Pope Francis, 
recognition comes first through a relational dimension. This implies that any economic or 
cultural development must be inscribed in the register of community participation, which should 
be empower through a “culture of encounter” that also includes, in this context, the environment 
                                                          
206 “Laudato Si’ (24 May 2015) | Francis,” 52. 
207 Cf. “Laudato Si’ (24 May 2015) | Francis,” 137. 
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and God and lead to action for the most vulnerable.208 That is why, the Pope's integral ecology 
approach adds to the paradigm of redistribution and recognition, that of relationship. This is 
rather implicit in Nancy Fraser's parity participation.  The relational paradigm provides the 
fundamental articulation of the connections that make true human development possible. It 
allows us to decompose integral ecology into socio-economic and environmental ecology and 
cultural ecology.209  It is the symbiosis of all these components that, within a relational 
framework, will open the door to true social justice. This notion of integral ecology reminds us 
that humans only live and thrive in a safe environment. There is therefore a relationship between 
man and his sitz im Leben. How he uses the resources around him can either improve his life or 
destroy it. This relation thus comprises an intersubjective dimension. We are not monads but 
social animals. This socialization becomes a source of well-being and prosperity when each 
individual while seeking his well-being, dignity, and respect in his/her difference, recognizes 
these same elements in those who are their fellow human beings. Such an attitude will not only 
open the way to the culture of encounter that revives the feeling of belonging to the same 
humanity, of fighting against the same challenges (the Covid pandemic has proven this to us). 
Thus, we realize the illusion of a power built on the selfishness and the rejection of the 
difference, whether it is at the individual, national or international level. It is through the culture 
of encounter that humanity will come to recognize itself as one in its diversity and think then of 
an encounter of differences for an equal participation. All social structures are called upon here 
                                                          
208 “For a Culture of Encounter (13 September 2016) | Francis,” accessed April 19, 2021, 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/cotidie/2016/documents/papa-francesco-cotidie_20160913_for-a-
culture-of-encounter.html. According to Pope Francis, it is not enough to feel sorry for those who suffer, to make 
statements describing suffering and misery, or as we often hear, to condemn suffering or its causes with the utmost 
energy. We must do as Jesus did. That is, be merciful. Such an attitude consists in seeing misery and suffering, 
sympathizing with those who suffer and then approaching them. This presence should touch the heart of the 
suffering and bring hope. It is therefore an active and effective presence that restores hope and opens to life. 
209 “Laudato Si’ (24 May 2015) | Francis,” 137–42. 
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to play their role as regulators of social relations by promoting and protecting the common good 
and by recognizing the dignity and status of all members of the community in their different 
cultural expressions.210 This also implies the effective participation of all members of the 
community in the decision-making process on all matters that concern the economic, social, 
political and cultural life of the nation. For example, the practice of referendum should be part of 
the modus gouvernandi of a country like Congo to allow the encounter and the exchange 
between the institutions and the citizens. Overall, we can see that the issue of social justice 
concerns all segments of society. It encompasses all aspects of life and requires, as our two 
authors point out, the involvement of all the living forces within the community. A just society is 
one in which the economy and culture are brought into dialogue for the good of all. Better still, a 
third element is added to these two: the environment. It is in a relationship of redistribution, 
recognition, and true dialogue with nature that can be summarized in “a culture of encounter”211 
that equal participation will be built given universal brotherhood and true social justice.  
At the end of this reflection, we are situated on a new vision of social justice. By placing 
Nancy Fraser and Pope Francis in dialogue, we have brought two voices that, through their 
immersion and their passion for justice, put us on the path of seeking a society in which all 
people will be treated fairly in terms of distribution of available resources, recognition of 
identity, political consideration, and participation in the promotion of a more fraternal and 
nature-friendly human community. In the second part, we will propose actions at the 
international, national, and military levels to embody this theory that we have developed above. 
                                                          
210 Cf. “Fratelli Tutti (3 October 2020) | Francis,” 30. 
211 “Fratelli Tutti (3 October 2020) | Francis,” 30. 
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2. Moral Recommendations for Social Justice and Restoration of Forgotten Memories 
The journey we have just undertaken has shown us that one of the main keys to the 
restoration of forgotten memories for peace and development in the Congo is social justice. This 
was presented to us from a new perspective, that is, in terms of equal participation by Nancy 
Fraser, and integral ecology and universal brotherhood (social friendship) by Pope Francis. The 
synthesis of these two authors allows us to draw our definition of social justice in the context of 
our work. For us, social justice is an equitable redistribution of available goods and resources, 
respecting and recognizing the socio-cultural status of all segments of the population to create a 
healthy environment and to promote the communion of all in true social friendship.  
With this new vision, we can give concrete moral recommendations at the international 
and national levels (including the government and the Army). This second part of our third 
chapter will therefore focus on moral recommendations to fight against the social injustices 
suffered by the civilian population in Eastern Congo. We will articulate our recommendations in 
two sections: first, to the international community in its interventions in the Congo, and second, 
to the Congolese government and military authorities to provide them with avenues for restoring 
the memories of those who have been consigned to history. 
2.1. To the International Community 
For years now, the Congolese population has been demonstrating and expressing its 
discontent with the presence of UN soldiers in the east of the country. These populations feel 
they are victims of serious injustice. The elements of the blue helmets do not protect them from 
rebel attacks, and yet this is one of their missions, and therefore the people cannot enjoy their 
most fundamental rights (including the right to life and security), let alone the benefits of their 
land and environment. Moreover, local populations are being driven off their land under the nose 
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of the UN military and deprived of their primary sovereign status. These populations realize that 
the UN soldiers do not consider them as their equals when it comes to rights and dignity, and that 
they are not ready to give up their lives for them. Families are separated, raped women are often 
excluded from their families, children are kidnapped and used as labor in the mines or as cannon 
fodder.  
The passivity of the international community, and MONUSCO on the ground, reinforces 
the feeling of injustice and abandonment. As a result, the social friendship between the 
population and the international community is broken, with the consequence of a loss of 
communion and mistrust that can lead to real hostility. The demonstrations, sometimes violent, 
by the civilian population on the bases and offices of MONUC at the time and of MONUSCO 
today bear witness to this feeling of social injustice. To restore social justice for these lives lost – 
because of the laxity and irresponsibility at the material and formal level of the UN military 
forces – and for peace and universal communion, the international community should: 
- Reflect on the conversion of military forces’ structure, which has proven to be less 
effective in defending the distribution of goods for the well-being of all populations, but also in 
creating a viable environment for these populations whose land is destroyed by the exploitation 
of minerals and deforestation, whose waters are polluted by the presence of decomposing corpses 
and whose memories are destroyed by images of violence and atrocities. With a staff of more 
than 17,000 men and substantial logistics (warplanes, battle tanks, military helicopters, satellite 
assistance, sophisticated weapons, and a decent salary), the blue helmets should be able to 
provide the local population with a minimum of economic well-being, cultural development, 
human dignity, peaceful cohabitation, and social communion.  
95 
 
For that to happen, it would be appropriate for the UN, through the Security Council, to call on 
the great military powers (USA, UK, China, etc.) to intervene directly in the Congo as they did 
in Kuwait. The UN should send an army to the Congo to neutralize the rebellions, not soldiers to 
stabilize a region at war. Such a mission would be a just war from two points of view: that of jus 
ad bellum and that of Jus in bello.  
In the first case, which first raises the question of the morality of the act, the fact of 
sending an army to stop the massacre of innocent people constitutes a morally just act. The 
reason for this justice is found in its circumstances212 which, in the case of the Congo, respond to 
a good, that of the restoration of peace and social justice.213And since other means of recourse 
have failed (negotiations, persuasion, amnesty, United Nations resolutions, verbal 
condemnations), the moral law is universal, it is also the universal responsibility to impose social 
peace, even if this implies the use of military force. Since the armed groups that are created with 
the slogan of the defense of the people have proven the immorality of their actions by destroying 
the population, it is legitimate that others wage war against them to restore harmony and social 
peace. Then, since the morality of the act has been established, the subject is therefore 
considered moral. As an example, the Congolese government has just invited the Kenyan army 
to help it resolve the issue of armed groups in the Eastern part of the country. The Kenyan army 
has the necessary authority and comes to fight for a just cause with the intention of legitimately 
defending civilian populations and restoring peace and social justice. This is a just war.  
From the point of view of jus in bello, the UN troops suffer from a lack of coordination in 
their chain of command. The morality of the object, that is, the actions to be taken, suffer from a 
                                                          
212 Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church. (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 2309 & 2312, 
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cacophony. There are several people in charge, which results in dispersion in the execution and 
the inability to be effective. Accountability also becomes difficult. Hence our preference for the 
invitation of a national and sovereign army whose chain of command is not subject to 
interference and to which one can be held accountable in case of immoral acts by the soldiers in 
the field. However, all these principles have their limits given the political and economic stakes 
that may be involved.    
Also, social justice requires the imposition of economic and military sanctions, by the 
security council on all countries and mining companies and corporations that are rear bases or 
suppliers of arms and ammunition to rebel groups, in this case Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. 
These sanctions will have the effect of cutting off the rebel groups from their sources of supply, 
weakening them and making it easier to eradicate them, of imposing on those countries a 
different way of access to the resources, that considers the dignity and sovereignty of the 
population. Also, these sanctions would force the neighboring countries to come to the dialogue 
table, to move toward a “culture of encounter”, to find lasting consensus on the mode of regional 
cooperation in the management of the wealth of the sub-region for the benefit of all.  
Social justice means to fight for the recognition of the rights and duties of all the peoples 
of this region to the expression of cultural difference, raising awareness of the richness of the 
symbiosis of cultural differences and the value of collaboration in the expression of these 
differences. At the same time, the UN should be proactive in preventing dangerous cultural 
expressions that praise cultural supremacy or cultural superiority complex. Here, MONUSCO 
would benefit from working with civil society (especially traditional chiefs), religious 
denominations and administrative authorities to promote a culture of encounter with a view to 
reconciliation between cultures and true social justice. The goal is to create a universal 
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brotherhood and social friendship for peace. The format of the African palaver tree would be 
beneficial for such an undertaking. Furthermore, the promotion of responsible management of 
nature (soil, subsoil, lakes, and rivers, forests, etc.) would help each group not only to find what 
it needs for its well-being but also to take into account the benefit to the future generations who 
must inherit a healthy earth. Such work would lead to the creation of a true social friendship 
between the international community and the people of Eastern Congo, in which friendship is a 
guarantee of effective collaboration to end this cycle of violence and massacres.   
- Social justice also requires the restoration of the dignity of those innocently massacred. 
The sacredness of life and its promotion, which the UN Charter defends, would oblige the UN to 
create an International Criminal Tribunal for the Congo (ICTC), whose headquarters would be in 
the Congo, and whose mission would be to re-establish justice for the victims of the massacres 
and harmony between the victims and the perpetrators, hence fostering fraternal communion and 
the advent of peace in the Eastern Congo.  Such an initiative would not only allow the victims to 
mourn and honor the cultural value of a dignified burial of the dead, but also allow the dead to 
rest in peace after having obtained justice. The logic behind this approach is that of awakening 
awareness of the permanent communion between the world of the living and that of the dead in 
the cultures of the populations of Eastern Congo. That is why doing justice to the dead by 
building memorial sites would ensure the living of the protection and benevolence of those 
whose world is larger and more complex than that of the living.  
Such a tribunal should therefore not take on the appearance of an inquisitorial court, but 
rather of a court-inspired by the African palaver courts in which dialogue with respect for the 
other and the search for communion are the keywords. Victims and perpetrators should express 
themselves, tell their stories, the former to vent their anger, their pain, and even their hatred, and 
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the latter to express their sadism or their regret or to confess their remorse for the acts 
committed. It is only then that justice can be done. This justice will be rendered first to restore 
the victims (those who died and those who survived them) in their rights through reconciliation 
with themselves, with their environment, and in the long term with their executioners. The latter 
should, in turn, enter a process of reconciliation with their victims by asking for forgiveness from 
the living and the dead (traditional reconciliation ceremonies could be envisaged), by paying for 
the stolen goods in kind or cash, and finally by taking an oath of honor to ensure that such a 
thing never happens again.  
Moreover, it will be useful that after confessing, they participate in the restoration of the 
memories that they have erased at the hands of their brutality. Their atonement should continue 
with a moral restoration of the sense of human dignity, of the universal destination of goods, of 
universal brotherhood, and respect for differences. Thus, they could, for example, be engaged, in 
charitable works in the areas they had destroyed (construction of mausoleums, cultivation of the 
land, burial of the dead who had been thrown into mass graves, request for public forgiveness 
and promise of conversion). This time of probation could be shortened or lengthened depending 
on the moral evolution and the ability of those on probation to give signs of conversion and 
desire to integrate into the human community. For this purpose, these courts should be composed 
of specialists in international law, positive Congolese law, and the habits and customs of the 
regions in which the court sits. Besides, a team of psychologists, pastors, sociologists, and 
moralists on an international scale would be of great help.  
2.2. To the Congolese Government and the Congolese Army 
We saw in the previous chapter how the Congolese government and its military forces 
have almost always favored squabbling for political positions, personal and illicit enrichment 
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(and here we cite the control of mining areas in the eastern regions of the country by maintaining 
militias or deserting combat zones and destroying the environment to prevent access to these 
areas), the misappropriation of national economic resources, corruption, and the promotion of 
tribalism and ethnic divisions. The consequence of this depravity of the Congolese political class 
and the Congolese military is that, over time, it has created, cemented, and institutionalized 
social injustice. Citizens have been left at the mercy of rebel groups who kill, pillage, rape, 
deport, and drive people away from their lands, thus robbing them of their human dignity. The 
irresponsible and morally reprehensible actions of these mafia-like and rogue politicians and 
military personnel undermine the cultural values of the Congolese people, break national 
cohesion, promote the destruction of the ecosystem, arouse indignation, and therefore call for 
restoration.  
The communion that has been broken between the people and their political-military 
authorities has led to enmity and even hostility against the state in the eastern regions and has 
engendered within the people unhealthy complicity with evil. Unhealthy individualism has taken 
the place of community solidarity. It has been fueled by the deprivation of the enjoyment of the 
country's wealth, which has remained in the hands of the rulers and armed groups, the lack of 
recognition and respect for the status of the population, which has opened the way to tribalism, 
religious intolerance, xenophobia and bloody opposition between social classes. The solution to 
this state failure is a restoration of social justice according to the following scheme: 
- A process of reconciliation with those who are in the afterlife. As written by the 
Senegalese writer Birago Diop:  
Those who have died are never gone: They are in the Shadow that lights up and in the shadow that 
thickens. The Dead are not under the Earth: they are in the Tree that shakes, they are in the Wood that 
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groans, they are in the water that flows, they are in the water that sleeps, they are in the Hut, they are 
in the Crowd: The Dead is not dead. 214  
This process of reconciliation between state institutions and the citizens who have died 
through their negligence and sometimes even with their complicity will begin with an accounting 
of the Congolese who have died since 1996. This first part responds to the moral requirement of 
any reconciliation process: the recognition of the undeniable identity of the other. The institution 
must be aware that those killed in Kasika, Kilungutwe, Makobola, and elsewhere were indeed 
complex and singular, unique and special, worthy and capable. Recognizing their identities is a 
an act of justice and a reminder that these are particular lives that were violated and desecrated.  
The purpose of this first step is to bring these people out of anonymity, not to count them 
simply as collateral victims of a senseless conflict, and also to restore their dignity as people with 
an identity, that is, a name, and address, and a history. The State will thus face its material and 
formal responsibilities and become aware of the consequences of its negligence and complicity 
with the evil that has cost millions of human lives and an ecological catastrophe. This collection 
of victims' identities also aims to allow the entire nation to mourn, which is a therapy and a path 
to healing and inner liberation, to reconcile with its dead and to rediscover the cosmic 
communion and social friendship that binds the living and those who are in the afterlife. 
  This step, which is also the recognition of the value and social status of those in the 
afterlife, could serve to seal social peace and rid the country of the curse of shedding innocent 
blood.215  The blood of all these people still demands justice. The State will get credit for 
                                                          
214 Birago Diop, Leurres et Lueurs: Poèmes, 4. éd, Poésie (Paris: Présence africaine, 2002), 1. The translation is 
mine.  
215 We will remember the curse pronounced on Cain after the murder of his brother Abel, or on Ahab after the 
murder of Naboth. 
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regaining trust among the population, strengthen the communion, and lay the foundations of a 
solid social friendship that will guarantee peace and development.  
The stage that follows the recognition of identity is that of the equitable distribution of 
goods to which even those who have died are entitled. This economic restoration involves the 
construction of monuments and commemorative sites for all the victims of massacres. These 
places of remembrance, of mourning, but also meeting and communion with the living in the 
afterlife, must be erected at all the sites of massacres (such as Kasika, Kilungutwe, Makobola, 
etc.). These would be shrines for the country to restore the dignity of the dead Congolese, to 
preserve and update their memories, and to ensure their effective presence among their people. 
Moreover, it would constitute a posthumous compensation for those to whom the State did not 
allow to benefit from an equitable redistribution of the wealth of the country. On the ecological 
side, it would be the restoration of ecological life and natural harmony216 that war and massacres 
had made obsolete.  
Finally, these sites would constitute places of the revelation of the human being to 
himself, to the truth of the complexity of his nature, both peaceful and wild, and the need for 
moral formation so that the principles, values, and truths that favor equal participation, integral 
ecology and social friendship become permanent realities in the human community. These places 
could therefore take on the character of places of fraternal communion, where all humans, of all 
"races, people, languages and nations" would come to recall that nothing human is foreign to 
humanity, in other words, that we are all rings of the same cosmic chain that we must constantly 
restore.  Thus, the Congolese and all humans will remain conscious of the drama that has taken 
                                                          
216 The green spaces, the planted trees, the tended flowers and the atmosphere of contemplation that characterize the 
memorial sites, lead to a communion not only with the deceased but also with Mother Nature. This setting shows 
that the power of life cannot be destroyed by evil. In the ashes of burned land, burned houses and decomposed 
bodies, life can bloom, peace can return, and calm can reign. 
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the lives of millions of human beings but also of the danger of injustices in the distribution of 
goods, the recognition of identities, the race for minerals, and the destruction of the environment 
and divisions based on tribalism, regionalism or religion.  
- The formation of conscience. For what we have described above to be possible, it is 
necessary to train consciences in parity of participation, which means that all members of the 
community must be able to take part to social, economic and cultural interactions as peers,  
integral ecology, and social fraternity. This formation could take the form of a moral awakening 
in the school, family, and church environments. In our opinion, it would be spread over three 
essential levels. 
In the first place: To train the Congolese on the conscience of oneself and his Congolese 
being. This stage consists of bringing the Congolese to personal and intimate knowledge, to the 
discovery of their moral capacities, to a permanent analysis of oneself in the decision making, 
and the commitment to the service of the nation. The goal is to create self-confidence that would 
be an asset to the construction of a strong personality, not easily manipulated and capable of a 
greater vision and balance of oneself and the world.   
A second level would be training  in a special way the Congolese Army and police forces 
in the awareness of others (here we consider the people in and out of the country): at this stage, 
the soldiers becomes aware that their abilities can only reach their excellence when they are in 
synergy with citizens, when they work to protect the countries from its inside and outside 
enemies. Moreover, the awareness of their weaknesses opens the military to humility and 
solidarity by cooperating with the civilians and the political authority without compromising 
their own dignity and their honor. The military training will therefore include the presentation of 
the civilian as equal to them in dignity and rights, as different from them in their mission vis a 
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vis the country and complementary in the week for peace and stability of Eastern Congo. It is by 
looking at its encounter with the civilian population from this threefold perspective that the 
Congolese military will be able to avoid exactions, attacks against civilians, the exploitation of 
civilians as beasts of burden or cannon fodder, and corruption by politicians or greedy 
multinationals in order to do harm to the citizens they have sworn to protect. The correspondence 
between the "I" (military) and the "you" (civilian) will become commutative and enriching. In 
this way, social friendship between the two groups would enter the path of restoration.  
The Congolese military will be formed also to respect the dignity of the deceased and the 
unborn. Becoming aware of the links that unite them to those others will open up respect for 
dignity, the promotion of communion (protection of sites of remembrance for those who have 
left and of those who will come). In this sense, killing for a Congolese soldier will only be a 
matter of self-defense or of protecting the weak who are threatened, because the promotion of the 
sacredness of life and its preservation will be part of the habitus of the Congolese soldier. The 
military court of justice will see to sanctioning any soldier who would harm life outside of the 
above-mentioned cases. 
Finally, the Congolese military will learn to protect and defend the nature that surrounds 
him, supports him, and makes him able to live. Becoming aware of the importance and the role 
of nature would help the military to adopt a dignified and responsible ecological behavior even 
on the battle field. Excessive mining (which already beyond a military duty), deforestation, water 
pollution, regardless a war context, would sound like a self-flagellation based on the principle 
that the harm that is inflicted on nature will almost automatically be reflected on them and the 
civilians because of the relational circularity that links military, to their fellow civilians and to 
their mother earth (here Congo).  
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Politics, military and civilians) will be conscious of being heirs of the same history and 
bearers of the same destiny that is to pass to the next generation a better and healthy country as 
emphasized in our national anthem. They will thus be able to commit themselves to the 
promotion of social justice for the well-being of all and the advent of a peaceful and united 
society. This commitment to the Congo would also translate into concrete actions on the side of 
the Military Forces and the government such as the refoundation and restructuring of the Armed 
Forces of the DRC (FARDC) through recruitment and promotion based on skills and not on tribe 
or political affiliation, the revision of the country's military budget217 for recruitment, the 
rehabilitation and construction of training camps, training at home and abroad, the equipping of 
the army and its deployment throughout the national territory Add to this the training of special 
units (special forces), border police and the purging of infiltrators in the chain of command of the 
national army, etc. 
Conclusion  
The best way to conclude this chapter is by remembering that “the call for us to listen to 
one who is suffering is not an easy one, for it presupposes that the sufferer can or will speak.”218. 
The ability to listen to the sufferer, who sometimes has difficulty expressing his or her pain in 
ways we can understand, reminds us that we have a way to go in restoring forgotten memories 
                                                          
217 “RDC : la loi de finances 2020 accorde 355 millions USD à la défense contre 330 millions USD en 2019, soit une 
légère augmentation de 25 millions USD,” Actualite.cd, November 21, 2019, https://actualite.cd/2019/11/21/rdc-la-
loi-de-finances-2020-accorde-355-millions-usd-la-defense-contre-330-millions-usd. According to this article, the 
budget allocated to defense was $355 million in 2020, or 3.7% of the general budget. Of this budget, 352 million 
were allocated to military operations. As for the research of the army, it received the sum of 291 thousand dollars. 
For a country of this size, with multiple and complex conflicts, and with an estimated 204,898 military personnel, 
this amount is derisory. With only about 17,000 soldiers in the field and all the personnel and logistics, MONUSCO 
spends more than a billion dollars a year with mixed results. Moreover, with an army that needs to be reformed, it 
must be said that this budget is a real injustice not only to the army. As a result, the military are easily corrupted, get 
involved in mining and logging and takes out their frustrations and anger on the civilians. 
218 James F. Keenan, Commandments of Compassion (Franklin, Wis: Sheed & Ward, 1999), 123. 
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and achieving social justice. Developing a sense of listening to and reading suffering by 
"revisiting the terrain of one's own suffering establishes the ground work for becoming a 
compassionate and perceptive listener"219 of the motions of the suffering. This is what we have 
tried to propose through the analysis of the new vision of social justice proposed by Nancy 
Fraser and Pope Francis. This approach is expressed in parity participation, integral ecology and 
social friendship.  
We then opened this new way of social justice to the situation in Eastern Congo by 
proposing moral recommendations that allow the victims, those who suffer, not to justify their 
suffering, but to express their rage, their anguish and their despair through the tribunal, the 
memorial sites and the dialogue with the authorities. On the other hand, we have shown that it is 
only through a willingness to act, or better yet, to act proactively, that the international 
community, the national political and military authorities, will allow the perpetrators to confess 
their wrongs, to ask for forgiveness, and to resolutely commit themselves to the path of 
conversion by working to restore the memories that they have destroyed. This process will also 
benefit the victims, who, in the face of the conversion process and the formation of the 
conscience of their executioners, and that of national and international decision-makers, will be 




                                                          




At the end of this journey, it is clear that we have made enormous discoveries, but that 
this is only the beginning of a theoretical and practical path that must be deepened and constantly 
enriched. By setting the scene of the security situation in the East of the DRC while making a 
detour through the causal link between the Rwandan past and the Congolese conflict, we have 
paved the way for an exploration of a complex and diverse humanitarian disaster. This is why we 
have chosen to limit the scope of our work to find more conciseness and precision. We have 
therefore chosen to work on the cases of Kasika and Makobola as an illustration of the human 
and ecological tragedy that has ravaged the Congo for more than two decades. Here we presented 
the protagonists of this conflict, outlining their origins and their direct or indirect involvement in 
the massacres of civilian populations. With the scenery set and the actors presented, it was easy 
for us to point out the causes of this conflict that seem insoluble. 
Aware that the causes, like the conflict itself, are multiple and complex, we have 
pinpointed three of them in the context of this work which, for us, represent a failure on the part 
of humanity to assume its responsibility. These are the errors and failure of the United Nations' 
military intervention in the Congo through MONUSCO, the failure of a predatory government 
whose foundation has been fragile since the country's independence, and finally, a disintegrated 
army that represents only a giant with feet of clay. These causes have made us realize that we 
can contribute to the issue of restoring forgotten memories, peace, and reconciliation in Congo. 
We discovered this solution in a new way of thinking about social justice. To do so, we turned to 
the innovative thinking of Nancy Fraser and Pope Francis on social justice. These two authors 
propose a new way of thinking about social justice that, while maintaining the traditional 
paradigm of economic redistribution, adds to it the paradigm of the recognition of cultural 
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identities. The synthesis of these two paradigms has led, in Nancy Fraser, to the notion of equal 
participation. For Pope Francis, it has led to an integral ecology, universal communion, and 
social friendship which are only possible in a culture of encounter.  
This theorization found its anchor in the enumeration of certain moral recommendations 
to the international community, the Congolese government, and the Congolese Army so that 
social justice becomes a true reality. It is only at this moment that we could talk about a true 
restoration that would take into account the dignity of the people who were victims of war and 
atrocities, the respect of the dead through the construction of sites of remembrance, and finally 
the opening to peace and development through reconciliation between the living and the dead, 
the victims and the executioners, and finally humans and nature in frank and sincere dialogue.  
All in all, we remain convinced that the work we have started is the starting point of a 
reflection and actions that must be completed and finalized. Social justice is not an entelechy but 
a dynamic that is enriched as the realities of society evolve. In Congo, and particularly in the 
East, we think that our work, associated with those of all the other researchers, will constitute a 
stone of more has the construction of the city of peace which would be a prefiguration of the true 









———. “Refworld | La Crise Rwandaise : Structures et Deroulement.” Refworld. Accessed 
March 15, 2021. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c28.html. 
———. “Rwanda : révélations sur les massacres de Bisesero,” December 21, 2019. 
https://www.marianne.net/monde/rwanda-revelations-sur-les-massacres-de-bisesero. 
———. “What Kabila Is Hiding | Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo.” Human Rights 
Watch, October 1, 1997. https://www.hrw.org/report/1997/10/01/what-kabila-
hiding/civilian-killings-and-impunity-congo. 
———. MOBUTU KING OF ZAÏRE - CONGO - VOST EN - Belgique, 2019. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OpCb_Yg_qJA. 
“2006-7congomortalitysurvey.Pdf.” Accessed February 9, 2021. 
https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/661/2006-
7congomortalitysurvey.pdf. 
“3312.Pdf.” Accessed February 9, 2021. 
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/4201/3312.pdf?sequence=1&isA
llowed=y. 
“5253c1ae4.Pdf.” Accessed January 29, 2021. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5253c1ae4.pdf. 
“5253c2e34.Pdf.” Accessed January 29, 2021. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5253c2e34.pdf. 
“9232AA63AAE71FD4492575FA000EDE6A-Rapport_complet.Pdf.” Accessed April 8, 2021. 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9232AA63AAE71FD4492575FA0
00EDE6A-Rapport_complet.pdf. 
“Accords-de-Lusaka.Pdf.” Accessed February 24, 2021. 
https://www.radiookapi.net/sites/default/files/Accords-de-Lusaka.pdf. 
“Accords-de-Lusaka.Pdf.” Accessed March 8, 2021. 
https://www.radiookapi.net/sites/default/files/Accords-de-Lusaka.pdf. 





“Apostolic Journey to the Republic of Iraq: Interreligious Meeting at the Plain of Ur (6 March 
2021) | Francis.” Accessed March 31, 2021. 
https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2021/march/documents/papa-
francesco_20210306_iraq-incontro-interreligioso.html. 
“CD_990710_Lusaka Agreement (Fr).Pdf.” Accessed February 27, 2021. 
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_990710_LusakaAgreement
%28fr%29.pdf. 
“Chapter I,” June 17, 2015. https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html. 
“Chronologie de la République démocratique du Congo / Zaïre (1960-1997) | Sciences Po 
Violence de masse et Résistance - Réseau de recherche,” December 17, 2015. 
chronologie-de-la-republique-democratique-du-congo-zaire-1960-1997.html. 
“Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Causes, Impact and Implications for the Great 
Lakes Region | United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.” Accessed May 7, 
2020. https://www.uneca.org/publications/conflicts-democratic-republic-congo-causes-
impact-and-implications-great-lakes-region. 
“Congo_2015.Pdf.” Accessed May 2, 2020. 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2015.pdf?lang=en. 
“Déclaration de Dar es Salaam sur la paix, la sécurité, la démocratie et le développement dans la 
Région des Grands Lacs,” n.d., 14. 
“Document.” Accessed March 19, 2021. 
https://www.amnesty.org/fr/documents/document/?indexNumber=AFR62%2f036%2f199
8&language=fr. 
“DRC - Congo Constitution. Pdf.” Accessed May 2, 2020. 
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/DRC%20-%20Congo%20Constitution.pdf. 





“DRC SRES1279.Pdf.” Accessed March 1, 2021. 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20SRES1279.pdf. 
“Drc_mapping_report_final_fr.Pdf.” Accessed May 7, 2020. 
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/countries/cd/drc_mapping_report_final_fr.pdf. 
“Evangelii Gaudium: Apostolic Exhortation on the Proclamation of the Gospel in Today’s World 
(24 November 2013) | Francis.” Accessed April 8, 2021. 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-
francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html. 
“Factsheet_monusco-Feb_2018_3.Pdf.” Accessed February 9, 2021. 
https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/factsheet_monusco-feb_2018_3.pdf. 
“For a Culture of Encounter (13 September 2016) | Francis.” Accessed April 19, 2021. 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/cotidie/2016/documents/papa-francesco-
cotidie_20160913_for-a-culture-of-encounter.html. 
“Fratelli Tutti (3 October 2020) | Francis.” Accessed April 2, 2021. 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html. 
“Gaudium et Spes.” Accessed May 6, 2020. 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_fr.html. 




“Katanga-the-Congo-s-Forgotten-Crisis.Pdf.” Accessed February 9, 2021. 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/katanga-the-congo-s-forgotten-crisis.pdf. 
“L World Communications Day, 2016 - Communication and Mercy: A Fruitful Encounter | 





“La RDC, deuxième front de la déforestation mondiale.” Le Monde.fr, April 27, 2019. 
https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/04/27/la-rdc-deuxieme-front-de-la-
deforestation-mondiale_5455653_3212.html. 
“Livre blanc sur les violations massives des droits de l’homme et des règles de base du droit 
international humanitaire.,” n.d., 65. 
“Loyoko_Nkoy_Desire_MA_2018.Pdf.” Accessed March 2, 2021. 
https://savoirs.usherbrooke.ca/bitstream/handle/11143/14196/Loyoko_Nkoy_Desire_MA
_2018.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y. 
“Papa-Francesco_20150524_enciclica-Laudato-Si_en.Pdf.” Accessed April 2, 2021. 
https://www.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si_en.pdf. 
“Rapport : Mission d’information Sur Le Rwanda.” Accessed March 15, 2021. 
https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/dossiers/rwanda/r1271.asp#P843_41406. 
“RDC : Les Principaux Groupes Armés Encore Actifs Dans l’Est Du Pays.” Accessed March 9, 
2021. https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/rdc-les-principaux-groupes-armés-encore-actifs-
dans-lest-du-pays/952281. 
“S/2001/357: UN Documents : Security Council Report.” Accessed March 11, 2021. 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/drc-s-2001-357.php. 
“SPEECH AT THE CEREMONY OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE CONGO’S 
INDEPENDENCE by Patrice Lumumba June 30, 1960.” Accessed March 4, 2021. 
https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/lumumba/1960/06/independence.htm. 
“The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: The Assassination of the Presidents and the 
Beginning of the ‘Apocalypse.’” Accessed February 15, 2021. 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB119/index.htm. 





“Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” October 6, 2015. https://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights/. 
“Washingtonpost.Com: Congo Report.” Accessed February 22, 2021. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/congo/stories/070997.htm. 
“Wayback Machine,” June 30, 2007. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070630230342/http://www.lexpress.fr/info/monde/dossier/
rwanda/PDF/rwanda.pdf. 
Abingdon Press, ed. The New Interpreter’s Bible: General Articles & Introduction, Commentary, 
& Reflections for Each Book of the Bible, Including the Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical 
Books. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994. 
Actualite.cd. “RDC : la loi de finances 2020 accorde 355 millions USD à la défense contre 330 
millions USD en 2019, soit une légère augmentation de 25 millions USD,” November 21, 
2019. https://actualite.cd/2019/11/21/rdc-la-loi-de-finances-2020-accorde-355-millions-
usd-la-defense-contre-330-millions-usd. 
Adair, Philippe. “La Théorie de La Justice de John Rawls. Contrat Social versus Utilitarisme.” 
Revue Française de Science Politique 41 (January 1, 1991). 
https://doi.org/10.3406/rfsp.1991.394540. 
Africa Renewal. “Tough UN Line on Peacekeeper Abuses,” April 15, 2005. 
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2005/tough-un-line-peacekeeper-
abuses. 
Augustine, and Marcus Dods. The City of God. Modern Library ed. New York: Modern Library, 
1993. 
Avenue, Human Rights Watch | 350 Fifth, 34th Floor | New York, and NY 10118-3299 USA | t 
1.212.290.4700. “Human Rights Watch.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed May 8, 2020. 
https://www.hrw.org/. 




Blood In The Mobile (ENGLISH) - FULL DOCUMENTARY. Accessed May 8, 2020. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tv-hE4Yx0LU. 
Editors, History com. “Persian Gulf War.” HISTORY. Accessed April 7, 2021. 
https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/persian-gulf-war. 
Fofack, Eric Wilson. “L’ONU face aux conflits en Afrique centrale post-guerre froide, 1990-
2004.” Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains n° 248, no. 4 (2012): 83–96. 
Fraser, Nancy, and Axel Honneth. Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical 
Exchange. London ; New York: Verso, 2003. 
goarmy.com. “About the Army.” Accessed March 27, 2021. 
https://www.goarmy.com/about.html. 




Google Docs. “Hilary’s Article[9766].Docx.” Accessed February 1, 2021. 
https://docs.google.com/document/u/1/d/1MzKrItpc7tn47E_4-
peerBpDcdsPe8Au/edit?usp=gmail_attachment_preview&usp=embed_facebook. 
GovTrack.us. “Text of S. 1067 (111th): Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern 
Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (Passed Congress Version).” Accessed March 10, 2021. 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s1067/text. 
HOCHSCHILD, ADAM. KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism 
in Colonial Africa. Place of publication not identified: MARINER Books, 2020. 
Hugo, Jean-François. La République Démocratique Du Congo : Une Guerre Inconnue. 
Collection Ligne d’horizon. Paris : Michalon, 2006. 





IBANDA KABAKA, Paulin. “Histoire Politique Récente Du Congo-Kinshasa (RDC) : De La 
Création de l’AFDL à l’assassinat de LD Kabila (1997-2001),” March 2016. 
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01287435. 
ICI.Radio-Canada.ca, Zone International-. “En Afrique, 200 coups d’État en 70 ans | Les cartes 
week-end.” Radio-Canada.ca. Radio-Canada.ca. Accessed March 23, 2021. 
https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1147040/coups-etat-putsch-afrique-amerique-sud. 
International Monetary Fund. “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Selected Issues.” IMF Staff 
Country Reports 15, no. 281 (2015): 1. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513590189.002. 
JeuneAfrique.com. “Qui sont les FDLR ? – Jeune Afrique,” December 3, 2007. 
https://www.jeuneafrique.com/131136/archives-thematique/qui-sont-les-fdlr/. 
JeuneAfrique.com. “RDC : quel bilan pour la Monusco, près de 18 ans après son déploiement ? – 
Jeune Afrique,” March 30, 2017. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/422664/politique/rdc-
bilan-monusco-pres-de-18-ans-apres-deploiement/. 
JeuneAfrique.com. “Rwanda : le FPR, bien plus qu’un parti – Jeune Afrique,” July 9, 2015. 
https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/243548/politique/rwanda-le-fpr-bien-plus-quun-
parti/. 
Kim, Angela Y. “Cain and Abel in the Light of Envy: A Study in the History of the 
Interpretation of Envy in Genesis 4.1-16.” Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha 
12, no. 1 (April 1, 2001): 65–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/095182070101200103. 
Kisukula Abeli Meitho. La Désintégration de l’armée Congolaise de Mobutu à Kabila. 
Mémoires Lieux de Savoir. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001. 
Kitumaini, Jean-Marie Vianney. “L’agir socio-politique de Mgr Christophe Munzihirwa à 
Bukavu (1994-1996, R.D. Congo).” Nouvelle revue theologique Tome 126, no. 2 (2004): 
204–17. 
Kristeva, Julia, and John Lechte. “Approaching Abjection.” Oxford Literary Review 5, no. 1/2 
(1982): 125–49. 
Kristeva, Julia, and Leon S. Roudiez. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Nachdr. 
European Perspectives. New York, NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 2010. 
115 
 
Lagrange, Marc-André. “Réflexions sur 17 ans de présence de l’ONU en République 
démocratique du Congo,” n.d., 23. 
Lemarchand, René. “Bearing Witness to Mass Murder.” African Studies Review 48, no. 3 
(December 2005): 93–101. https://doi.org/10.1353/arw.2006.0025. 
Lenoir, Frédéric. L’oracle della Luna: le tragique et lumineux destin de Giovanni Tratore : 
roman, 2016. 
McGowan, Patrick J. “African Military Coups d’état, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and 
Distribution.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 3 (2003): 339–70. 
MIT Faculty Newsletter. “The Legacy of the Involvement of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo in the Bombs Dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” February 27, 2021. 
https://fnl.mit.edu/january-february-2021/the-legacy-of-the-involvement-of-the-
democratic-republic-of-the-congo-in-the-bombs-dropped-on-hiroshima-and-nagasaki/. 
NDEKO ELIEZER TOKOKOMA. La Guerre Au Congo Expliqué Par Charles Onana, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IR3e_5bsocw. 
New Internationalist. “The Looting of the Congo,” May 2, 2004. 
https://newint.org/features/2004/05/01/congo. 
Newbury, Catharine. “Suffering and Survival in Central Africa.” African Studies Review 48, no. 
3 (December 2005): 121–32. https://doi.org/10.1353/arw.2006.0032. 
Ngemi, Yaa-Lengi M. Genocide in the Congo (Zaire): In the Name of Bill Clinton, and of the 
Paris Club, and of the Mining Conglomerates, so It Is! San Jose: Writers Club Press, 
2000. 
Nienhuis, Nancy Eileen. “Theological Reflections on Violence and Abuse.” Journal of Pastoral 
Care & Counseling 59, no. 1–2 (March 1, 2005): 109–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/154230500505900111. 





Perin, François. “La Crise Congolaise et Les Institutions Politiques Africaines / 
INSTITUTIONAL CAUSES OF THE CONGO CRISIS.” Civilisations 11, no. 3 (1961): 
281–95. 
Pourtier, Roland. “Le Kivu dans la guerre : acteurs et enjeux.” EchoGéo, January 21, 2009. 
https://doi.org/10.4000/echogeo.10793. 
Press, Steven. Rogue Empires: Contracts and Conmen in Europe’s Scramble for Africa. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017. 
Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | Concluding Observations on the 
Fourth Periodic Report of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Refworld. Accessed 
May 2, 2020. https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b4dec787.html. 
Reichberg, Gregory M., Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, eds. The Ethics of War: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings. Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 2006. 
Rever, Judi. In Praise of Blood the Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, 2020. 
Rubango, Nyunda. “Maux et mots de la guerre dans la littérature congolaise contemporaine 
(1999-2010).” Revue de l’Université de Moncton 42, no. 1–2 (2011): 195–219. 
https://doi.org/10.7202/1021304ar. 
Rusamira, Étienne. “La dynamique des conflits ethniques au Nord-Kivu : une réflexion 
prospective.” Afrique contemporaine n° 207, no. 3 (2003): 147–63. 
Rutabana, Ben. De l’enfer à l’enfer: Du Hutu Power à La Dictature de Kagame. Les Moutons 
Noirs. Paris: Books éditions, 2014. 
Schatzberg, Michael G. “The State and the Economy: The ‘Radicalization of the Revolution’ in 
Mobutu’s Zaire.” Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études 
Africaines 14, no. 2 (1980): 239–57. https://doi.org/10.2307/484801. 
Secretary-General, Un. “Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” June 13, 2006. 
http://digitallibrary.un.org/record/577394. 




The Mail & Guardian. “Kivu: The Forgotten War,” September 26, 2018. 
https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-26-kivu-the-forgotten-war/. 
The New Humanitarian. “Les groupes armés dans l’est de la RDC,” October 31, 2013. 
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/actualites/2013/10/31/les-groupes-armes-dans-l-
est-de-la-rdc. 
The Paulist Biblical Commentary. New York, Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2018. 
Trefon, Theodore, ed. Reinventing Order in Congo: How People Respond to State Failure in 
Kinshasa. London ; New York : Kampala, Uganda: Zed Books, ; Fountain Publishers, 
2004. 
Tshibinda, Baudouin WIKHA. “LES FORCES ARMEES DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO ORGANISATION, STRUCTURE ET BASE 
JURIDIQUE,” n.d., 32. 
Umutesi, Marie Béatrice. Fuir Ou Mourir Au Zaïre: Le Vécu d’une Réfugiée Rwandaise. 
Mémoires Lieux de Savoir. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000. 
Vazquez, Michael, and E Wamba-dia-Wamba. “The Guerrilla Professor: A Conversation with 
Ernest Wamba Dia Wamba.” Transition 10 (January 1, 2000): 140–59. 
Vinck, Patrick, Phuong Pham, and Suliman Baldo. “UNE etude realisee au sein de la population 
sur la paix, la justice et la recon- struction sociale dans l’Est de la République 
démocratique du Congo,” 2008, 78. 
Vircoulon, Thierry. “Ambiguïtés de l’intervention internationale en République démocratique du 
Congo.” Politique africaine N° 98, no. 2 (2005): 79–95. 
Von Clausewitz, Carl, Michael Eliot Howard, and Peter Paret. On War. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&A
N=390520. 
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Fifth 
118 
 
edition. New York: Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Books Group, 2015. 
webmaster. “Historique de la Guerre du RCD au Nord-Kivu (par Kakule Vyasongya) – Beni 
Lubero Online.” Accessed March 11, 2021. https://benilubero.com/historique-de-la-
guerre-du-rcd-au-nord-kivu-par-kakule-vyasongya/. 
Williams, Susan. “How a Rich Uranium Mine Thrust the Congo into the Centre of the Cold 
War.” The Conversation. Accessed March 23, 2021. http://theconversation.com/how-a-
rich-uranium-mine-thrust-the-congo-into-the-centre-of-the-cold-war-64761. 
Yeba Tv. Discours de Laurent-Désiré Kabila Sur Les Agressions Au Congo (Bruxelles, 1998), 
2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MLUnDMUSxUs&t=1s. 












   
120 
 

































4. Kasika and Makobola Region 
 
Kasika 
Makobola 
123 
 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&url=https%3A%2F%2Freliefweb.int%2Fmap%2Fdemocratic-
republic-congo%2Fdr-congo-carte-des-territoires-du-sud-
kivu&psig=AOvVaw2MN1dCkiscpzkQRtrrNYsr&ust=1619545006512000&source=images&cd
=vfe&ved=0CAIQjRxqFwoTCLD4pbq5nPACFQAAAAAdAAAAABAJ  
